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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
CHINA’S INTEREST IN AFRICA: CONFLICT OR STABILITY? 
by 
Tristan di Montenegro 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor 
 China’s increase in economic and military force projection capability has 
grown substantially since the beginning of the twenty-first century. This rapid 
evolution, has in turn, triggered a rush for resources in Least Developed 
Countries, opened up new markets for Chinese-manufactured products, and has 
frequently been accompanied by an increased Chinese military presence in 
those nations in which it maintains an economic or industrial presence. 
 China’s activites in Least Developed Countries, such as those in Africa, 
have had a direct impact on cultures, regional politics, economies, infrastructure 
creation, and the environment, yet the complexity of these dynamics has to date 
precluded an in-depth analysis of their effect on conflict and stability. In order to 
effectively guage China’s influence on the continent, localized studies of Chinese 
operations and activities in different locales were scrutinized.  
 China’s Interest in Africa: Conflict or Stability? examines Chinese 
infrastructure and financing packages, Chinese-owned extractive and non-
extractive industries, Chinese military and defense industrial enterprises, and 
finally, Chinese miltary activities on the continent. In order to provide for a 
vii 
balanced analysis, this work utilizes case studies from diverse locales, which 
include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola. 
While some argue that Chinese loans, infrastructure creation, and 
resource extraction operations contribute to development in Africa, there are 
ramifications, which have eluded the most erudite of academics. This analysis  
demonstrates that China’s primary concern in Africa is based on securing the 
food, fuel and resources necessary to sustain its economic growth, often, subtly 
to the detriment of the African host-countries, which it claims to assist through 
financing and development. 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 PAGE 
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1 - Chinese Infrastructure Financing and Development ........................ 18 
The “Angola-mode” ............................................................................................. 19 
Infrastructure Financing and Development in Angola  ........................................ 25 
Negative Aspects of Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Angola .......................... 31 
Summary of Infrastructure Financing and Development in Angola ..................... 36 
Infrastructure Financing and Development in Ethiopia ....................................... 39 
Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Ethiopia ............................................... 42 
Negative Aspects of Chinese Transportation Infrastructure Projects .................. 45 
Hydroelectric Projects ......................................................................................... 49 
Negative Aspects of Hydroelectric Projects in Ethiopia ...................................... 51 
Telecommunications Projects ............................................................................. 56 
Summary of Infrastructure Financing and Development in Ethiopia ................... 62 
Infrastructure Financing and Development: Sudan and South Sudan ................ 67 
Infrastructure Financing and Development in Sudan .......................................... 68 
Infrastructure Financing and Development in South Sudan ............................... 70 
Summary of Infrastructure Financing and Development in Sudan 
and South Sudan ................................................................................................ 73 
Chapter 1 Summary ........................................................................................... 75 
Negative Aspects of Infrastructure Development ............................................... 76 
Negative Aspects of “Angola-mode” Financing................................................... 81 
Chapter 2 - Extractive and Non-Extractive Industries: National Oil 
Companies and State-owned Enterprises .......................................................... 90 
Extractive and Non-Extractive Industries: Petroleum, Mining and Timber .......... 90 
National Oil Companies ...................................................................................... 95 
Chinese NOC Activity in Sudan and South Sudan ............................................. 97 
Ramifications of Chinese NOC Activity in Sudan and South Sudan ................. 102 
Targeting of Chinese-owned NOCs by Indigenous Groups .............................. 107 
National Oil Companies Summary .................................................................... 112 
Mining Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo ................................. 117 
Health and Safety Issues .................................................................................. 120 
Employee Abuse and Human Rights ................................................................ 123 
Child Labor ....................................................................................................... 124 
Environmental Issues ....................................................................................... 126 
CHAPTER
ix 
Conflict Minerals ............................................................................................... 128 
Mining Summary ............................................................................................... 131 
Logging Operations .......................................................................................... 136 
Logging Operations in Mozambique ................................................................. 139 
Deforestation and Environmental Impacts ........................................................ 141 
Corruption ......................................................................................................... 143 
Logging Summary ............................................................................................ 145 
Chapter 2 - Summary ....................................................................................... 149 
Chapter 3 - Chinese Military and Defense Industrial Enterprises ..................... 157 
Norinco ............................................................................................................. 160 
Poly Technologies ............................................................................................ 162 
The Zimbabwe Mode: The PLA, Arms and Blood Diamonds ........................... 163 
Arms and Blood Diamonds: The PLA in Zimbabwe - Summary ....................... 175 
Resources, Power Projection and Conventional Weapons Transfers .............. 178 
Great Lakes Region .......................................................................................... 181 
Great Lakes Region - Summary ....................................................................... 189 
Sudan and South Sudan .................................................................................. 192 
Domestic Arms Production ............................................................................... 194 
PRC-manufactured SALWs and Munitions ....................................................... 196 
Heavy Weapons ............................................................................................... 198 
Tanks and Vehicles .......................................................................................... 202 
Aircraft .............................................................................................................. 204 
Sudan and South Sudan - Summary ................................................................ 206 
Zimbabwe: Arms and Military Equipment ......................................................... 211 
‘Stabilizing’ Aspects of Chinese Transfers to Africa .......................................... 213 
Chapter 3 - Summary ....................................................................................... 216 
China’s Real Agenda and Plausible Deniability ................................................ 219 
Chapter 4 - Chinese Military Activities .............................................................. 227 
People’s Liberation Army .................................................................................. 228 
United Nations Peace Keeping Operations ...................................................... 229 
Demining Operations ........................................................................................ 234 
People’s Liberation Army Navy ......................................................................... 236 
Chapter 4 - Summary ....................................................................................... 243 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 248 
Appendix .......................................................................................................... 270 
References ....................................................................................................... 289 
VITA...................................................................................................................319
x 
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - Decision-making Chain of China Exim Bank-funded Projects.............23 
Figure 2 - Chinese contracting and procurement process in Angola...................27 
Figure 3 - Project Entities Structure in the Ring Road.........................................44 
Figure 4 - HDI Selected Indicators and Economies.............................................84 
Figure 5 - Administrative Control of NOCs...........................................................96 
Figure 6 - Defense Industrial and Military Industrial Export Controls.................276 
FIGURE PAGE
xi 
LIST OF MAPS
Map 1 - Chinese Projects completed and planned in Africa as of June 2015.......8 
Map 2 - The Grand Renaissance and Gibe III Dams...........................................52 
Map 3 - CNPC and SINOPEC Operations in Sudan and South Sudan ............100 
Map 4 - Conflicts and Ethnic Clashes in Sudan and South Sudan....................103 
Map 5 - Mineral Resource Distribution in the DRC............................................271 
MAP PAGE
xii 
AERC 
AFECC   
AICD 
AfDB 
APL 
ASM 
AVIC 
BBC 
CACDA 
CASC 
CCCC  
CCCM 
CDB 
CDIE  
CH-3 
CHEC 
CIF 
CMF 
CMIE 
CNGC 
CNOC 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
    African Economic Research Consortium 
  Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company  
    Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 
  African Development Bank 
    Anti-Personnel Landmines 
    Artisanal or Small-scale Mining Operations 
    Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
    British Broadcasting Corporation 
    China Arms Control and Disarmament Association 
    China Aerospace and Technology Corporation’s 
    China Communications and Construction Company 
    Chinese Collum Coal Mine 
  China Development Bank 
 Chinese Defense Industrial Enterprise 
 Caihong-3 unmanned aerial vehicle  
    China Harbor and Engineering Company 
    China International Fund Limited 
    Combined Maritime Forces 
    Chinese Military Industrial Enterprise 
    China North Industries Group Corporation 
    China National Oil Corporation 
xiii 
CNODC     China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development 
    Corporation 
CNOOC     China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNPC     China National Petroleum Corporation 
COIC      China Ordnance Industries Corporation 
COSCO   China Ocean Shipping Company 
COSTIND   Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National 
 Defense 
COVEC      Chinese Overseas Engineering Company 
CPECC      China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Group 
CREC      China Railway Engineering Corporation  
CSG      China South Industries Group Corporation 
DFID      Chinese Department for International Development 
DGI      Dangerous Goods International 
DRC      Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECOS       European Coalition on Oil in Sudan 
EEPCo      Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 
EEZ      Exclusive Economic Zone 
EIA      Environmental Investigation Agency 
ELINT      Electronic Intelligence 
FAR     Forces Armées Rwandaises 
GAC       General Administration of Customs 
GAD    General Armaments Department 
GCL      Golden Concord Group 
xiv 
GLR      Great Lakes region 
GoS      Government of Sudan (North) 
GoSS      Government of South Sudan 
GNOC      Greater Nile Operating Company 
HDI      Human Development Index 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
IADC      International Aero Development Corp. 
IIED      International Institute for Environment and Development 
ICC      International Criminal Court 
IDMC      Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre  
IDP      Internally Displaced Persons 
IEA      International Energy Agency  
IFV      Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
INSS      Congolese Social Security Institute 
IRIN      Integrated Regional Information Networks 
LSN      Landmine Survivors Network 
LDC      Least Developed Country 
MBT      Main Battle Tanks 
MDGs      Millennium Development Goals 
MIC      Sudan Military Industrial Corporation - Arms Manufacturer  
MIIT   Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
MINURSO      United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
MINUSMA      UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
xv 
 
MNC       Multi-national Corporation 
 
MOFA       Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
MOFCOM      Ministry of Commerce 
 
MOFTEC      Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
 
MONUSCO       United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the   
       Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
NOC                   National Oil Company 
NORINCO          China North Industries Corporation 
OCHA        UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OECD        Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ONLF        Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia) 
OPV                    Offshore Patrol Vessel 
OSISA       Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa  
PGEs        Platinum-group Elements 
PLA                     People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN                  People’s Liberation Army Navy 
POLY                  POLY Technologies  
 
PRC                    People’s Republic of China 
 
REE        Rare Earth Element 
 
REM         Rare Earth Mineral 
 
REPO                 Resource Extraction Protection Operation 
 
SALW                 Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SASAC       State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission  
xvi 
SASTIND  State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for  
      National Defense 
SHADE       Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Maritime Operation 
SIGINT       Signals Intelligence 
SINOPEC       China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation  
SIPRI   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SLOC     Sea Line of Communication 
SME       Small and Medium Enterprises 
SNNPR       Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (Ethiopia) 
SOE   State-owned Enterprise 
SPLA       Southern People’s Liberation Army 
SPLF       Sudan People’s Liberation Front 
SLPM       Southern People’s Liberation Movement 
SPLM-IO       Southern People’s Liberation Movement in Exile 
TEU       Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit 
TLOC   Terrestrial Line of Communication 
TLVS       Timber Legality Verification System  
UAV       Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN       United Nations 
UNAMID        United Nations Mission in Darfur 
UNMIL       United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNMISS       United Nations Mission in South Sudan 
UNEP       United Nations Environment Program 
xvii 
 
UNICEF       United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund 
UNOCI        United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire 
UNPKO               United Nations Peace Keeping Operation 
UNRA        United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
UNSC        United Nations Security Council 
WMEAT       World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers  
WS-1              Weishi-01 PRC-manufacturerd Multiple Rocket Launching  
        System 
 
ZELA        Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association 
ZMDC        Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation  
ZNA        Zimbabwe National Army 
ZTE        Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation 
3TG Minerals      Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold  
 1 
 
Introduction 
 A compelling case can be made that one of the most dramatic, if not the 
most dramatic changes in global geopolitics in the early twenty-first century has 
been China’s rapid ascension to become one of the largest economic and 
military actors on the international stage. China’s massive increase in military 
power projection and expanding economic presence now and for the foreseeable 
future make it one of the most important players in the global arena, which in turn 
accentuates the need for scholars and policy-makers to gain an understanding of 
the complex dynamics generated by its rapid growth. In order to facilitate its 
economic growth, China has of necessity looked outward - often to Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) - for the raw materials and food supplies to bolster 
its expansion, and new markets for the export of Chinese goods. The advent of 
China’s global reach has taken several forms and has in turn generated 
consequences - not all of them salutary - for the supplier countries involved.  
 In the belief that the People’s Republic of China will attempt to become a 
hegemonic force, John J. Mearsheimer, notes “if those who are bullish on China 
are correct [China’s rise to power] … will almost certainly be the most important 
geopolitical development of the twenty-first century, for China will be transformed 
into an enormously powerful country. The attendant question that will concern 
every maker of foreign policy and student of international politics is a simple but 
profound one: can China rise peacefully?”1 Mearsheimer’s question in turn 
                                            
1. John J. Mearsheimer, Can China Rise Peacefully? The National Interest, October 25, 
2014. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204. Accessed on 
January 8, 2016. Mearsheimer founded and developed offensive realism, a school of thought 
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demonstrates the need for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of China’s 
global activities on regional conflict and stability in the LDCs in which it is 
present. It is this crucial question that this dissertation attempts to answer. 
 In addition to asserting itself in virtually every world region, in an 
increasingly complicated global environment China must provide security for its 
resource founts and for the transportation lines for homeward-bound natural 
resources. This has spurred the Chinese government to re-assess its military 
capabilities, as the world begins to shift away from a principally unipolar system 
dominated by the United States.  
 As a result of these dynamics, the government of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) realizes that China’s economic stability, inherently intertwined with 
an abundant and constant supply of natural resources, is a matter of national 
security. Accordingly, it has made corresponding economic and military policy 
adjustments in order to enhance the force projection capabilities of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).2 As far back 
as 2000, Richard J. Stoll noted, “while China's economy may slow its growth, 
there is every reason to believe that China will continue to enhance its position … 
                                            
which attempts to explain the dynamics and interactions of nation-states, which he believes are 
rationally inclined to attempt to become hegemonic powers, in order to counter-balance the 
uncertainty regarding the intentions of other state-actors. 
 
2. People’s Liberation Army forces include both the Army and Navy. Subsequently within 
this work, the People’s Liberation Army will be designated as “PLA” and the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy will be designated as “PLAN.” To date the PRC Air Force (PLAAF) has such limited 
activity in Africa that information regarding its presence on the continent would not facilitate this 
analysis and thus will not be included. 
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throughout the world.”3 Subsequently in 2003, the United States Secretary of 
Defense, in his report to Congress, stated that 
 “Beijing is pursuing its long-term political goals of developing its 
 comprehensive national power and ensuring a favorable ‘strategic 
 configuration of power.’ China’s efforts to accomplish its security goals 
 involve an integrated strategy that seeks to apply diplomatic … military, 
 and economic instruments of national power. China’s leaders believe 
 that national unity and stability are critical if China is to survive and 
 develop as a nation.”4  
  
 Since the PRC’s scramble for resources has resulted in increased security 
and resource competition in regions such as Latin America and South Asia, the 
need for understanding its impact on conflict and stability has become much 
more pivotal to geopolitics. China’s positioning reflects national security interests 
and an internal reassessment of its power distribution at resource founts and 
along transportation lines. As will be argued here, Africa provides the ideal 
template for comparison by which these dynamics can best be understood, since 
China’s quest to secure and maintain its growth trajectory has extended through 
the activities of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), national oil companies (NOCs), 
defense and military-industrial enterprises, and an increased presence of the 
PLA/PLAN in African LDCs.  
 Chinese companies are mining oil in Angola and Sudan, building roads in 
 Ethiopia, working with the electricity sector in Kenya, building 
 infrastructure and developing the tourism industry in Sierra Leone, and 
 servicing mobile phone networks in Kenya and Nigeria. Throughout  
                                            
3. Richard J. Stoll, In Harm’s Way? Chinese Power Projection in Historical Perspective, May 
2000. p. 2. http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/in-harms-way-chinese-power-projection-in-
historical-perspective. Accessed on October 17, 2015. 
 
4. United States Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China. Report to Congress, July 28, 2003. Executive Summary. http://bit.ly/2aAzX1q. 
Accessed on October 9, 2015. 
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 Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese companies are building vital infrastructure, 
 including dams, ports, and roads, and helping to renovate government 
 offices and other buildings.5 
  
 For more than a decade, China experts such as J. Peter Pham and R. 
Evan Ellis have noted that the PRC was leveraging its influence in Africa and 
Latin America, in order to guarantee access to natural resources needed to 
bolster its rapid growth. In his 2007 testimony before Congress, Pham noted that 
Africa had become more important to China than any other region.6  
 While the PRC has made major forays into other regions, Africa’s lack of 
infrastructure, unexploited resources, and relative proximity to China have made 
that continent the primary focus of the PRC’s quest for raw materials. China’s 
growth has been coupled with investment in Africa and an increasing demand for 
African oil, since the PRC presently ranks second after the United States as the 
world’s largest oil consumer. China’s demand for resources and oil has resulted 
in partnerships with petroleum-rich countries such as Angola, Sudan and South 
Sudan, Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan states. 
 According to Barry van Wyk, Coordinator of the China-Africa Reporting 
Project in South Africa, by 2011 “China … [was] comprehensively engaged with 
almost all of Africa's 54 countries - lending money, providing aid, trading, 
                                            
5. Ali Zafar, The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links, The World Bank Research Observer, 22 (1), 
2007, p. 105. http://wbro.oxfordjournals.org/. Accessed on October 14, 2015.  
 
6. Pham (2007). F. William Engdahl, China and the Congo Wars: AFRICOM. America’s 
New Military Command, Global Research, November 26, 2008.  http://www.globalresearch.ca 
/china-and-the-congo-wars-africom-america-s-new-military-command/11173. Accessed on 
February 4, 2015.   
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investing, and more than all else: building infrastructure and extracting 
resources.”7 The PRC’s presence in Sudanese and South Sudanese oil fields are 
the biggest cases in point. 
 While China’s expanding presence in Africa can be linked to its rapid 
growth, Sino-African partnerships have also been facilitated by the absence of 
Western companies and financing institutions. African states have opted to do 
business with China due in part to its permissive financing stipulations and less 
than stringent human rights and environmental considerations. Thus, the PRC’s 
policy of non-interference, often criticized by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and Western powers, has opened the door for Chinese national oil 
companies and state-owned enterprises in countries with abusive human rights 
regimes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.  
 Countries like Sudan and South Sudan, which are targets of Chinese 
investment, seem to welcome the chance to develop their infrastructure while 
accepting what outwardly appear to be generous financing offerings. There is no 
argument that China has assisted in infrastructure development, and in some 
cases, the countries in which they do business experience an influx of funds. 
However, the effects on these LDCs have not been weighed in totality, especially 
those concerning impacts on local populations, regional conflicts, and the 
environment. 
                                            
7. Barry van Wyk, Resources for Infrastructure: China's Role in Africa’s New Business 
Landscape, The China Analyst, September 2011. http://www.thebeijingaxis.com/tca/editions/the-
china-analyst-sep-2011/88-resources-for-infrastructure-chinas-role-in-africas-new-business-
landscape. Accessed on November 30, 2015.  
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 Chinese financing packages, infrastructure creation, and resource 
extraction operations may outwardly appear to benefit the African host countries, 
but there are additional effects, which have escaped the scrutiny of both 
Sinologists and Africanists. This analysis addresses shortfalls in assessing the 
impact of China’s activities in Africa, many of which have yet to be fully 
documented. 
 Even though the leadership in Beijing might propagate the concept of a 
beneficent China interested in supporting under-developed countries, the prime 
motivations for its activities in Africa are based in the first instance on its need to 
secure resources necessary to maintain its domestic development. Thus, 
according to China in Africa: A Strategic Overview, published by the Japan 
External Trade organization in 2009: 
 China’s … scramble into Africa has little to do with benevolent idealism but 
 rather  a hard-nosed preoccupation with accessing desperately needed 
 raw materials, especially oil and iron ore, to drive its burgeoning economy 
 and new consumer  markets for its exports …. China’s global economic 
 and political reach in places like Africa, strongly … [reflects] the 
 imperatives of domestic economic development, which is driving China’s 
 search for natural resources in Africa today.8 
 
 China’s recent ventures in Africa to procure raw materials needed to 
support its economy, manufacturing sector, military expansion and growing 
population have created complex dynamics. African leaders are quick to point out 
the relative ease of doing business with the PRC compared to Western countries. 
Despite the issues created by China’s presence, often felt more by the general 
                                            
8. Executive Research Associates Party Limited, China in Africa: A Strategic Overview. 
Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization, 2009, p. 4.  
http://bit.ly/2bdHAWh. Accessed on October 12, 2015. 
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populace than by the elite, the governments of many of the African host countries 
have proven to be ready partners. The following map details the extent of China’s 
presence on the African Continent as of June 2015, with investment amounts, “oil 
pipelines, railway connections, and ports with Chinese engagement” visually 
designated.9    
 
                                            
9. South China Morning Post (2015). Jeff Desjardins, Visualizing Chinese Investment in 
Africa, Visual Capitalist, December 9, 2015. http://www.mining.com/web/infographic-visualizing-
chinese-investment-in-africa. Accessed on June 6, 2016. 
8 
Map 1 - Chinese Projects completed and planned as of June 201510  
10. Ibid.
9 
While Chinese banks have extended credit options to African countries, 
which afford them opportunities not available via traditional, Western financing 
mechanisms, there are also hidden drawbacks. In most cases, the Chinese 
banks, which provide the financing, also decide which Chinese SOEs will be 
awarded the project, thus depriving the host governments of some of their 
autonomy. The bidding processes usually occur behind closed doors among the 
heads of the Chinese SOEs, and in many instances, African-owned companies 
are not invited to submit bidding tenders for the projects in their own country. 
According to Cindy Hurst, an analyst with the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies 
Office, “on the one hand, China has been contributing much needed 
infrastructure to many of the underdeveloped African nations. On the other hand, 
China’s practices are believed to be exacerbating some of the political problems 
in certain countries, maybe even increasing instability in some cases.”11  
Even though China’s political elites have attempted to create the image of 
a ‘peaceful rise,’ China’s ‘Going Out’ policy has created friction among its SOEs, 
which in turn has ramifications for the countries in which they operate. In reality, 
the policy pits Chinese state-owned enterprises against each other in a race to 
generate revenue. This in turn facilitates backroom negotiations among Chinese 
financing institutions, Chinese SOEs, and the decision-making apparatus of the 
African governments in places where Chinese companies have mounted 
operations. 
11. Cindy Hurst, The Politics of Oil: China and Sudan - A Well-Oiled Relationship, Foreign
Military Studies Office, July 28, 2008, p. 1. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/China-
and-Sudan.pdf. Accessed on April 10, 2015.
 10 
 
 The understudied contrast in outcomes that Hurst references forms the 
basis for this dissertation: Is China contributing to the stabilization of African 
countries through financing, infrastructure projects, an increase in resource 
exports, and revenue streams or do the activities of PRC corporate, industrial 
and military entities serve to facilitate regional conflicts?  
 Host countries are affected economically, socio-politically, and 
environmentally by the activities and operations of foreign state-owned 
enterprises, yet the total impact of China’s financial, industrial and military 
presence is complex enough that it is difficult to determine the extent of these 
effects, especially considering the opacity of the financing and bidding methods 
which are discussed in detail in Chapter 1. China’s on-the-fly negotiations and 
infrastructure-for-resources-based-credit extensions to African states are beset 
with a lack of transparency, which is not as prevalent in negotiations and 
contracts with Western-based companies and financing institutions. “African 
leadership has typically welcomed China’s fresh approach to development 
assistance, which eschews any interference in domestic affairs, emphasizes 
partnership and solidarity among developing nations, and offers an alternative 
development model based on a more central role for the state.”12  
 Yet, since decisions to use local labor and indigenously sourced materials 
are deferred to Chinese SOEs, the potential for beneficial trickle-down effects to 
                                            
12.  Vivien Foster, William Butterfield, Chuan Chen, and Nataliya Pushak, Building Bridges: 
China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Executive  
Summary. 2009. p. 3. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2614. Accessed on 
October 10, 2015. 
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local or state-owned African companies in underdeveloped regions with poor 
economic conditions is diminished. This serves to inflame local and regional 
tensions towards Chinese SOEs and their employees, which in turn has 
generated civil unrest and several incidents of violence involving Chinese 
nationals.  
 Additionally, despite China’s official ‘non-interference’ policy, political 
pressure is often quietly wielded by Chinese SOEs against the governments of 
the host countries and in some cases is complemented by remuneration or 
corruption. One of the most frequent complaints of African governments is that 
Western-financed infrastructure projects and resource-extraction contracts 
contain too many caveats and stipulations, in addition to a protraction of the 
processes through which credit is provided to the host countries. China has 
readily stepped into this void and has taken advantage of this investment 
vacuum, and many of the contractual conditions and financing arrangements are 
obfuscated from the public eye and not subject to any regulatory mechanisms.  
 In order to determine the sum effect of Chinese activities in Africa, a 
framework or template has to be deployed in order to categorically analyze the 
Chinese actors. Chinese companies are often hybridized, making it difficult to 
determine who controls the chains of command in Beijing. State-owned 
enterprises may operate independently or may have to answer to parent 
corporations that are linked to either the military or the defense sectors, while 
other companies may be provincially-owned and not answer directly to the 
Beijing elite. Historically, while there was integration between military and 
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defense sectors, over the past decade and a half, these two sectors evolved into 
more distinct and separate operational entities, especially so since the Chinese 
government has strongly encouraged the streamlining of the People’s Liberation 
Army and People’s Liberation Army Navy. China’s activities in Africa are spread 
across a rather vague spectrum that consists of banks, financing mechanisms, 
state-owned enterprises, industrial, defense and military operations.  
 Because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintains a multifaceted 
presence through “…. diplomatic … military, and economic instruments of 
national power”13 in less developed regions like those found on the African 
continent, this dissertation will utilize regional case studies to analyze and 
summarize the ramifications which result from Chinese entities operating across 
the aforementioned spectrum. 
 The author will categorically analyze China’s investment and finance 
mechanisms, state-owned enterprises, Chinese military-industrial and defense-
related enterprises, as well as the effects of the activities of the People’s 
Liberation Army on regional stability in four chapters: Infrastructure Financing & 
Development, Extractive and Non-extractive Industries (National Oil Companies 
and State-owned Enterprises), Defense and Military Industry Activities and 
People’s Liberation Army and Navy Activities in Africa.14 
                                            
13. United States Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s  
Republic of China, Report to Congress, Executive Summary. July 28, 2003.  
 
14. Appendix 3 details the difference between defense-industrial (essentially defense 
contractors) and military-industrial entities. While these two categorizations are often used 
synonymously in the West, they comprise two distinct industrial entity types in the PRC.   
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 The first chapter will examine Chinese banks, financing mechanisms, 
infrastructure projects, credit lines and re-payment options offered to African 
host-countries for infrastructure projects through China’s state-subsidized banks. 
This aspect of the PRC’s activity in Africa is noteworthy since China’s entries into 
least-developed regions frequently commence with offers of aid and 
infrastructure development bundles. These agreements, which superficially 
appear to benefit both the Chinese and their African partners, are subsidized 
through a mechanism referred to as the Angola-mode, which allows the host 
countries to repay China for infrastructure with raw materials. Subsequent to the 
cessation of Angola’s civil war in 2002 “…. State-owned Chinese companies ... 
[entered] Angola, as [their] infrastructure contracts were guaranteed by oil 
repayments. These oil repayments provide[d] China with a long-term secure 
supply of oil …. This oil-for-infrastructure deal … [was] dubbed [the] ‘Angola-
mode’ by the World Bank, but actually it is an adaptation of what Japan practised 
in the past.”15 
 The second chapter of the dissertation scrutinizes the activities of 
extractive industries, which include national oil companies and other state-owned 
enterprises that involve petroleum, mining and logging operations that are 
typically not connected to either the military or defense establishments.16 The 
                                            
15. Alex Vines, Premier Li Keqiang in Africa: The Importance of Angola for China, May 6, 
2014. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/ 14134#. Accessed on November 30, 
2015.  
 
16. “Although the stake the Chinese government holds in SOEs has been reduced … [many] 
SOEs are still hybrids [emphasis added] - publicly traded on the stock exchange, but still majority-
owned by the government.” Lucy Corkin, Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Local 
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evaluation of national oil companies will focus on China’s petroleum exploration 
and extraction operations, while discussion and analyses of other state-owned 
enterprises will center on industrial activities unrelated to petroleum exploration, 
extraction and transit, since China has also invested in the removal and export of 
precious metals and rare earth elements, as well as logging. While the PRC’s 
petroleum exploration and extraction operations often monopolize the headlines, 
China's other SOE-run projects also have an impact on conflict and stability. 
 The third chapter of the dissertation commences the transition into an 
overview of Chinese defense and military enterprises, which are responsible for 
the production and supply of conventional weapons, military vessels, aircraft and 
military equipment.17 While China’s military activities play a large role in its 
African presence, enterprises run by companies within its defense sector also 
figure prominently in its continental operations and therefore require some 
scrutiny. This chapter will address the use and impact of Chinese-manufactured 
military equipment and weapons on regional stabilization in African States over 
the past four decades, in addition to providing an overview and analysis of the 
construction of indigenous African weapons manufacturing plants, which 
frequently facilitates regional weapons proliferation in regions which have 
historically been susceptible to civil war and inter-tribal tensions. 
                                            
Linkages Perspective, MMCP Discussion Paper No. 2, March 2011, p. 9. 
http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za /sites/ cssr.uct.ac.za/ files/pubs/MMCP paper 2_0.pdf. Accessed on 
October 6, 2015 
 
17. Conventional weapons include small arms, light weapons (SALWs), as well as heavy 
weapons (and missiles) which necessitate some type of mechanical means for movement and 
deployment. Case studies throughout the dissertation will be selected based on data availability. 
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The fourth chapter of the dissertation will examine the activities of the 
Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
presence and missions in Africa and adjacent waters. At the present time, 
China’s military is increasing its footprint in Africa through participation in United 
Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKOs) and Anti-piracy Operations 
(APOs). At this juncture, it is difficult to determine whether China’s peacekeeping 
contributions in conflict zones are humanitarian contributions or opportunities to 
put boots on the ground with the goal of protecting Chinese assets. These 
operations may also provide the PLA with opportunities to conduct ‘live-fire 
styled’ exercises for its relatively inexperienced military. To answer this question 
this section of the dissertation will scrutinize PRC participation in UNPKOs. 
Since the People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels have participated in anti-
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, its naval 
activities will be examined and analyzed in this section of the dissertation. 
China’s naval and military force projection is ramping up in the region, as is 
demonstrated by the PRC’s November 2015 announcement that it intends to 
construct a logistics facility in Djibouti, on the east side of the Red Sea-Gulf of 
Aden chokepoint, where both American and French militaries are already 
situated. This chapter of the work will provide a comprehensive assay of the 
potential impact of PLA and PLAN activities in Africa on both conflict and stability. 
As Chinese workers travel to Africa to provide labor for PRC-financed 
infrastructure projects in places such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Sudan, 
the operational areas of China’s state-owned enterprises involved in petroleum 
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extraction, mining and logging are expanding, at the same time that China 
infuses conflict-prone regions with inexpensive small arms, light weapons and 
military equipment. 
 In Ethiopia, for example, Chinese SOEs are responsible for the recently 
built roads and the light-rail network that encircle the capital city of Addis Ababa 
and serve to highlight China’s work to visiting African Union dignitaries. 
Meanwhile, China also signed deals in Kenya in late 2013 for railway lines and 
energy projects, which totaled in excess of $5 billion dollars. As Zimbabwe’s 
President Mugabe has opened the door for Chinese mining companies - some of 
which are purported to be affiliated with the PLA - Zimbabwe has taken steps to 
adopt the Chinese Yuan as an official trade currency. In tumultuous South 
Sudan, as Chinese national oil companies expand their base of operations, 
Chinese soldiers comprising UNPKO units provide security to Chinese personnel 
staffing the Chinese-owned facilities. 
 Simultaneously, the PRC is increasing its littoral presence in Africa’s most 
important ports and along strategic choke points such as the Mandeb Strait in the 
Horn of Africa. The construction of China’s new military base in Djibouti signals 
that the PRC has adopted a multi-tiered approach towards the continent, which 
appears to be geared towards protracted rather than short-term economic, 
industrial and military activities.  
 Yet this creates a dilemma for Beijing; for while its leaders would like to 
maintain a uniformity of interest in Africa among the commercial, industrial and 
military entities operating on the continent, these entities often have conflicting 
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goals, which will serve either to stabilize the regions in which they operate, or 
facilitate conflict there. This dissertation examines China’s activities on regional 
levels while attempting to determine the overall impact of its operations.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to PRC Financing of Infrastructure and
Development 
Compared to the activities of national oil companies, China’s infrastructure 
projects receive a relatively small share of the limelight in the international media, 
despite the widespread socio-economic and political effects on its African 
partners. Therefore, it is necessary to examine China’s financing mechanisms, 
the Chinese SOEs involved in infrastructure projects, and the ramifications for 
the African host states.18 
This analysis of China’s infrastructure projects will commence with an 
examination of the banks that facilitate the financing between African states and 
the Chinese SOEs involved in infrastructure projects. The PRC’s credit 
extensions and loan packages to Africa’s LDCs are made possible by state-
backed financial institutions, through which government subsidies are extended 
to Chinese SOEs, in addition to the African countries with an abundance of 
desirable raw materials that include but are not limited to petroleum, timber, 
minerals, precious metals and rare earths.  
According to the Japan External Trade Organization, the ability of 
Chinese SOEs to aggressively enter African energy sectors and commence 
18. “China’s economic expansion in Africa is carried forward by thousands of individual
entrepreneurs; a small number of large, state-owned enterprises; and a host of companies
owned by provincial and municipal authorities. While small private enterprises dominate
investment in commerce and manufacturing, state-owned enterprises typically invest in
extractive and infrastructure projects. In integrated investment packages, government
institutions and state-owned companies work closely together. The Chinese government’s
active involvement in resource extraction is not fundamentally different from the financial,
political and military support granted to oil and mining operations by the US, French or
South African governments.” Peter Bosshard, China in Africa Policy Briefing, China’s
Environmental Footprint in Africa, SA Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Number 3, April
2008, p. 2. http://bit.ly/2bJoRUj. Accessed on June 5, 2016.
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infrastructure projects on the continent has hinged on their close cooperation with 
state-backed banking institutions, which are able to tap into national reserves, 
which exceed more than two trillion dollars (U.S.).19 Chinese state-owned 
enterprises have an edge over other business ventures since they are not held to 
the same level of accountability as their Western counterparts. Furthermore, the 
loans granted to the SOEs are bundled with generously subsidized interest rates. 
In many cases, the executives of Chinese banking institutions have close 
working relationships with the administrators of the SOEs, which allow them to 
work in tandem, often on a country-by-country basis.20 
The Angola-mode 
 China employs several different financing mechanisms, which provides 
resource-rich African countries (at least in the short term) with an attractive 
alternative to traditional Western financing options: 
 1) Export credits to support national exporters.  
 2) Natural resources-backed lines of credit (i.e., “Angola-mode”).  
 3) Mixed credits, where financing packages combine concessional and 
     market-rate loans, such as a mixture of FDI and export credit.21  
                                            
19. Executive Research Associates Party Limited, China in Africa, 77.  
 
20. “These entities include the China Development Bank (CDB), Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC), China International Trade and Investment Corporation (CITIC), China 
Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (CECIC), Sinosure and the China Export-Import Bank.” 
Ibid.   
 
21. Adopted from van Wyk, Resources for Infrastructure. 
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 These different credit extension mechanisms give Chinese SOEs and 
NOCs leverage in resource ventures in Africa not typically utilized by Western 
corporations that are vying for the same exploration, extraction, and export rights.  
China Exim Bank is the largest state-controlled, infrastructure financier of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa.22 “According to Fitch Ratings, in the 
decade to 2010, loans to African countries by China’s main state bank for 
overseas finance reached $67bn, outstripping African lending by the World 
Bank.”23 
 African countries, which do not have the financial means to back the loans 
they receive from China, utilize their resources as a guarantee through the 
Angola-mode. In turn, the China Exim Bank underwrites and services loans to 
both Chinese SOEs and African countries, which enter into infrastructure-for-
resource contracts. This allows financially limited African states to “…. package 
natural resource exploitation and infrastructure development.”24 
 The Chinese SOEs discussed in the first part of the dissertation are what 
the I refer to as ‘Front End’ SOEs, which are primarily involved in infrastructure 
creation projects. While oil refinery construction, refurbishment, and other 
petroleum-related projects may also be classified as infrastructure projects, 
                                            
22. “China Exim Bank … is devoted primarily to providing export seller’s and buyer’s credits 
to support the trade of Chinese goods …. In addition, the China Exim Bank is the only Chinese 
institution that is empowered to provide concessional loans to overseas projects.” Executive 
Research Associates Party Limited, China in Africa, 78. 
 
23. Tom Burgis, Demetri Sevastopulo and Cynthia O’Murchu, China in Africa: How Sam Pa 
became the Middleman, The Financial Times, August 8, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/308a 
133a-1db8-11e4-b927-00144feabdc0.html#axzz39uFFUYxu. Accessed on November 1, 2015.  
 
24. Executive Research Associates Party Limited, China in Africa, 81. 
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Section 2 of the dissertation, Non-Military-Industrial and Non-Defense-Industrial 
Activities, will examine the operations of national oil companies and other state-
owned enterprises involved with resource extraction. The SOEs discussed in 
Section 2, which include NOCs, mining, and logging companies are what I refer 
to as ‘Back End’ SOEs (versus “Front End’), since their primary function is 
extracting and exporting resources as payment by the host country, per the 
Angola-mode financing mechanism. 
 While the Angola-mode concept originated as a post-2002 moniker for 
China’s loans-for-resources subsidization model employed in post-war Angola, 
the term is now utilized in a blanket fashion for all the countries that enter into 
similar credit-for-resources programs with the Chinese government. Since many 
African states such as Angola, have experienced issues with graft and 
corruption, the impact on the host countries is vigorously debated, especially 
because China maintains a non-interference policy with foreign governments.  
 With the ending of the civil war in April 2002, Angola needed rapid socio-
 economic development to fast-track the development of an emaciated 
 populace .... Angolan officials … turned to China because Beijing was 
 willing to offer assistance without political strings attached, especially on 
 the issue of transparency, as well as opening up important sectors of the 
 Angolan economy. The Chinese were prepared to negotiate low interest 
 rates and reasonable repayment schedules, but with the understanding 
 that there would be economic and political prizes to be won, especially in 
 the oil  industry.25  
 
 The Angola production-sharing model acts as one of the support systems 
for the Chinese government’s Go Global strategy. The China Exim Bank creates 
                                            
25. Executive Research Associates Party Limited, China in Africa, 81. 
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credit lines for both Chinese SEOs and the governments of African host countries 
in which they are operating. The credit lines serve to pay for project overhead for 
the SOEs and provide a mechanism by which the African governments can 
purchase Chinese goods. In turn, the SOEs and NOCs simultaneously secure 
access to exploration and extraction rights to valuable natural resources, which 
include but are not limited to oil, timber, precious and non-precious metals.26 
 A more detailed explanation of the Angola-mode is as follows: Subsequent 
to the host country’s determination of which infrastructure projects it feels are the 
most pivotal, its ministry of finance or a similar state apparatus will work in 
conjunction with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to establish a 
“framework agreement” in which the terms of project development, loans (credit 
lines), and repayment terms can be established through the China Exim Bank in 
a fashion, which, at the outset, appears to be equitable to both states.27  
 Figure 1 shows the “Decision-making chain of China Exim Bank-funded 
projects” as outlined by Lucy Corkin.28 While the flow chart was created for the 
purposes of delineating the steps of Sino-Angolan loan-for-resources deals 
(Angola-mode), the basic outline is applicable to similar resource deals with other 
African governments when the host countries choose to utilize a Chinese 
financial institution. The chart also demonstrates the Byzantine complexity of 
                                            
26. Executive Research Associates Party Limited, China in Africa, 78. 
 
27. Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership, December 
5, 2007, p. 6. http://csis.org/files/media/csis /pubs/080306_angolachina.pdf. Accessed on March 
24, 2015. 
 
28. Corkin, Chinese Construction Companies, 16. 
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China’s financing protocol in least-developed countries, while underscoring how 
difficult it is to accurately identify all of the Beijing-based ministries, command 
chains, intermediaries, state-owned enterprises and subsidiaries involved in 
financing and development schemes in Africa.    
Figure 1 - Decision-making chain of China Exim Bank-funded projects29 
Loan disbursement is frequently divided into phases and is utilized by the 
recipient African states for infrastructure project development.30 In most cases, 
“project proposals identified as priorities by the respective [host state] ministries 
29. Lucy Corkin, Chinese Construction Companies, 16.
30. These projects often involve the development of “…. energy, water, health, education, 
communication, and public works” in addition to the construction of roads, bridges and 
establishment of hydro-electric power installations.” Other subsidized projects may include, but 
are not limited to “…. the rehabilitation and enlargement of … provincial and municipal hospitals 
and various district health centers ….  the … rehabilitation of secondary schools and polytechnics 
[and] …. the acquisition of new agricultural machinery as well as the rehabilitation of irrigation 
systems. Campos and Vines, Angola and China, 6. 
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are put forward to … a joint committee [comprised] of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Chinese Ministry for Foreign and Commercial Affairs …. MOFCOM has in the 
past suggested [to the host country] further areas of development where it feels 
China can provide important know-how.”31 So despite China’s policy of “non-
interference,” the African states that opt for PRC-backed infrastructure 
development lose a lot of their autonomy once the credit has been extended by 
the financial institution.  
 The subsequent phase includes the selection of a Chinese SOE to 
complete the development project. While African host countries “oversee” the 
project implementation in a limited fashion, the Chinese government “suggests” 
which Chinese SOEs are best suited for the proposed projects subsidized by the 
credit extension.32 
 “The loan operates like a current account. When ordered by the Ministry of 
Finance, disbursements are made by Exim Bank [for example] directly into the 
accounts of the [Chinese] contractors. Repayment starts as soon as a project is 
completed. If a project is not undertaken, no repayment is made. Revenue from 
oil sold under this arrangement is deposited into an escrow account from which 
the exact amount toward servicing the debt is then deducted. The government of 
… [the host country] is free to use the difference at its own discretion.”33 
                                            
31. Ibid, 9. 
 
32. Ibid. 
 
33. Ibid. 
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 Creating a cost breakdown of specific infrastructure project types is 
difficult, since neither China nor the African countries they have collaborated with 
provide comprehensive data, which in turn paves the way for speculative 
deductions, versus allowing for the establishment of solid conclusions deriving 
from financial analyses. Bräutigam notes studies that examine Chinese aid 
packages to African states lack details and value-per-sector breakdowns.34 
 In summary, this overview reveals that China actually has more control 
over infrastructure projects than the African host countries themselves. It is also 
apparent that China profits in several different ways from the Angola-mode: The 
credit lines they extend to African countries are utilized by those countries to 
purchase Chinese-manufactured goods, the repayment schedules often include 
interest structuring which is favorable to the Chinese lender, and, thirdly, 
repayment is made to China through exploration rights and natural resource 
concessions. The next three sections of Chapter 1 will examine Infrastructure 
Financing and Development through the Angola-mode in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Sudan and South Sudan. 
Case Study One - Infrastructure Financing and Development in Angola  
 In 2002, after the cessation of Angola’s civil war and proclamation of 
independence, its government approached various financial institutions in search 
of credit by which the country could be rebuilt. Deterred by the prerequisites for 
                                            
34. “Chinese reports on their aid [only] make it clear that the primary sector financed through 
aid is infrastructure, ranging from bridges, roads, and water systems to the so-called ‘prestige’ 
projects: stadiums, conference halls, [and] Ministry of Foreign Affairs buildings.” Deborah 
Bräutigam, China, Africa and the International Aid Architecture, African Development Bank, 
March 2010, p. 22, http://bit.ly/1dQu6gK. Accessed on November 8, 2015. 
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credit required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Angolan 
government turned to China to fund its post-war reconstruction process. 
Subsequent to 2002, until today, the People’s Republic of China has been one of 
Angola’s biggest sources for external finance.35 
 Between 2004 and 2011, three banks financed Angolan infrastructure 
projects, the majority of which were undertaken by Chinese SOEs: The China 
Export Import Bank (Exim), the China Development Bank (CDB), and the China 
International Fund Ltd.36 The subsequent flow-chart, created by Corkin, diagrams 
Chinese contracting and procurement processes in Angola, and is also 
representative of those processes in other African states that utilize Chinese 
banks as infrastructure funding sources. 
                                            
35.  Nataliya Pushak and Vivien Foster, Angola’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, March 2011, p. 2.  
http://bit.ly/2a8FMgQ. Accessed on December 2, 2015. “In 2013 … Angola was … for China the 
second largest source of imported oil after Saudi Arabia.” Vines, Premier Keqiang in Africa, 2014. 
 
36. Zachary Hylton, China in Angola: The Pros and Cons of China’s Aid Structure, The 
Humphrey Review, May 7, 2014. http://humphreyreview.com/article/china-in-angola-the-pros-and-
cons-of-chinas-aid-structure. Accessed on October 25, 2015. 
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Figure 2 - Chinese contracting and procurement process in Angola37 
While there is some debate as to whether or not China’s loans and 
infrastructure have benefitted Angola, according to Campos and Vines the PRC’s 
investment has facilitated poverty reduction in the country.38 
37. Corkin, Chinese Construction Companies, 27.
38. Campos and Vines, Angola and China, 19-20.
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The construction and rehabilitation of electrical and hydroelectrical  
infrastructure by the Chinese … expanded electricity access to over 
 60,000 new clients in Luanda. The rehabilitation of water supply systems 
 across the country … granted thousands of people access to clean  
 water. 
 
 The rehabilitation of roads, bridges, and rail networks provides access to 
 parts of the country that had been disconnected by the war and facilitates 
 commercial activities .... [and could benefit] people commuting into towns 
 and the transport of goods across the whole southern African region.  
 
 Lastly, the rehabilitation of hospitals, health centers, schools, and 
 polytechnic institutes will provide access to education and health to many 
 communities that had for years had been deprived of it.39  
 
 China’s policy of non-involvement and no-strings-attached, credit-for-
resources subsidization packages have allowed the Angolan government to 
make headway in strengthening its internal infrastructure, however, some 
sources suggest that the lack of regulations and transparency, which is atypical 
of Western financing mechanisms, has led to graft, misappropriation of funds, 
and lack of development proportionate to the amount of credit extended to the 
Angolan government through Chinese banks.  
 One of the biggest issues pointed out by both NGOs and international 
donors is the lack of transparency, which characterizes Sino-Angolan funding 
mechanisms. The opaque nature of the credit extensions and actual finance 
transfers helps to obfuscate how the funds are actually spent.40 Furthermore, in 
some cases, the PRC paid its SOEs directly, rather than allowing the Angolan 
                                            
39. Ibid. 
 
40. Ibid, 11. 
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government to administer the payments to the Chinese companies involved in 
reconstruction projects. 
 “The China Construction Bank (CCB) and China’s EximBank provided the 
first funding for infrastructure development in 2002. [Yet] the Angolan Ministry of 
Finance had little input in these arrangements since CCB and EximBank funding 
was provided directly to Chinese firms.”41 Corkin posits “….the larger state-
owned Chinese companies … entered Angola largely on the back of Chinese 
government loans, as … state financing structures mitigated the risk that would 
otherwise have prevented these Chinese firms from entering the … Angolan 
market.”42  
 In January 2007, a Centre for Chinese Studies analysis entitled China’s 
Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction and Infrastructure Sectors noted that 
the People’s Republic of China was involved with several infrastructure projects 
within Angola. They included the development of a new oil refinery (Lobito); 
reconstruction of more than 540km of war-damaged roads between mining and 
agricultural areas; repairs to the Benguela Railway line (1300 km);43 construction 
of a new international airport (Bom Jesus Airport); fabrication of the Luanda 
                                            
41. Ibid, 5. 
 
42. Corkin, Chinese Construction Companies, 7. 
 
43. This project was funded and undertaken by the China International Fund Ltd, a Hong-
Kong based construction firm at a cost of US$300 million. Centre for Chinese Studies. 
Stellenbosch University, China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction and Infrastructure 
Sectors, (PRC) Department for International Development, January 1, 2007, pp. 22-23. 
http://bit.ly/2afrps9. Accessed on November 25, 2015. 
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General Hospital by the Chinese Overseas Engineering Company (COVEC);44  
construction of more than 5000 housing units;45 and renovation of the existing 
water distribution network.46 
 The Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University analysis 
published in January 2007, should have provided a baseline by which quality and 
project completion rate could be evaluated nine years later - in 2016. Yet it is 
difficult to determine the success of these projects for several reasons: lack of 
transparency on the part of both the Angolan and Chinese governments, the 
frequent passing off of projects to secondary and tertiary Chinese firms, and the 
lack of comprehensive analyses and news articles which reference 
reconstruction progress in any detail.  
 In an April 2015 Xinhua article, “one of CRBC's senior managers for 
Angolan projects, maintained that … CRBC … built or rehabilitated over 1,500 
kilometers of highways in Angola since 2006 when it first joined the rebuilding 
process ... including the recently-finished rehabilitation of a 200-kilometer 
highway …. [which] links the capital city of Luanda and the northern part of the 
country which is rich in oil and natural gas resources.”47 Whether the 1,500 
kilometers of ‘highways’ includes the roads referenced in the Stellenbosch 
                                            
44. Ibid, 23. 
 
45. In March 2006, China International Fund Ltd was contracted to build forty-four 15-storey 
buildings, with 5,000 apartments in total (Cabinda City Housing Project). Ibid. 
 
46. Ibid, 22-24.  
 
47. Xinhua, We are Building the Best Highway in Angola: CRBC Manager, April 14, 2015. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/14/c_134147777.htm. Accessed on November 6, 
2015. 
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analysis is difficult to determine at this time. In 2008, Campos and Vines 
attributed a 371-kilometer road reconstruction project to CRBC, valued at $211 
million.48 However, to date, the Benguela Railway reconstruction project is most 
likely one of China’s most successful endeavors in Angola.49  
Negative Aspects of Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Angola 
 Despite some evidence of transportation infrastructure development in 
Angola, Corkin has leveled criticism at Chinese SOE practices in Africa. Corkin 
references lax safety standards observed by Chinese companies, China’s 
insistence that its SEOs source reconstruction materials from the PRC (versus 
utilizing local procurement), and its preference for hiring Chinese workers over 
indigenous Africans. “Officially more than 30,000 Chinese nationals are working 
in Angola, mostly as low-skilled contract labourers for Chinese companies ….”50  
 While Corkin stated in 2011 that 30,000 Chinese nationals were working in 
Angola, in 2014 Campos and Vines indicated a much higher number of Chinese 
workers in the country: “In 2010 at least 50 Chinese contractors were in Angola 
and in 2011 the Angolan government admitted that more than 258,000 work 
                                            
48. Campos and Vines, Angola and China, 6. 
 
49. “The Benguela Railway was first completed by Portuguese colonists in 1912 to link the 
Lobito and Benguela with Huambo, Angola's second-largest city. The line was deserted in 1975 
… the beginning of a 27-year civil war …. The new line, under construction since 2004, will be 
linked with the Angola-Zambia railway and the Tanzania-Zambia railway in the future … [as part 
of a network which is intended to connect] ... the Atlantic and Indian oceans.” Zhao Lei, Angola 
Rail Line, Built by China, Gets Rolling, The China Daily, February 16, 2015. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-02/16/content_19600829.htm. Accessed on November 
6, 2015.   
 
50. Lucy Corkin, China and Angola: Strategic Partnership or Marriage of Convenience? 
Angola Brief. Chr. Michelson Institute (CMI) and Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica 
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visas had been issued to people from China.”51 The Angolan government’s 
statement that more than 258,000 work visas had been issued to Chinese 
citizens calls into question the results of both Corkin’s research, and that of  
Stellenbosch University, which cited that 90% of the workforce contributing to 
Chinese projects In Angola consisted of indigenous Angolan laborers. This point 
further emphasizes the lack of transparency of such projects. 
 According to Shinn, the number of Chinese in Africa ranges from 1 million 
to 2 million. “While there is no precise number for Chinese nationals living in and 
visiting Africa at any given time, senior Chinese officials usually put the figure at 
more than one million and some analysts say there may be as many as two 
million. At the end of 2014, there were about 200,000 Chinese working in Africa 
on contracts and another 62,000 providing services under aid programs.”52 
 Vines also noted that the sourcing of cement from China, in addition to the 
large number of work visas issued to low-skilled Chinese laborers also called into 
question the modus operandi of Chinese SOEs. “Taking into account that Angola 
has a population of around 19 million and a significant unemployment problem 
such large numbers of Chinese workers in Angola are not sustainable long term. 
That the main import by Angola from China in 2010 was cement is [also] … 
troubling.”53 
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 The Benguela rail line is a case in point for questionable Chinese policies 
implemented during Angola’s infrastructure upgrades. In addition to sourcing 
nearly all of the equipment, labor and resources from the PRC, a higher-than-
normal number of worker fatalities were reported. During construction of the rail 
system, there were more than 20 reported fatalities of Chinese workers.54 
 Problems are evident in other infrastructure projects as well. More than 
eight years after the assertion that construction of The Bom Jesus Airport outside 
of Luanda would soon commence with the assistance of Chinese funds, it was 
still not completed in 2015. In cases where Chinese building construction projects 
have been completed, there are often quality issues: The Luanda General 
Hospital made international headlines when its patients had to be evacuated due 
to structural problems that threatened the safety of its occupants. 
According to Deborah Bräutigam, “Luanda General Hospital, built by 
Chinese company COVEC under China's aid program (not under China's multi-
billion dollar line of oil-backed credit) had developed severe cracks and was 
closed, with patients living in tents on the grounds.” Local reporters and human 
rights activists noted that the problems, which the hospital experienced due to 
poor construction quality, were representative of issues experienced at many of 
the projects undertaken by Chinese SOEs.55 
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 However, Bräutigam stated that the Chinese take pride in their aid work 
since it is an important aspect of their diplomacy, and maintains that the hospital 
was built with a majority-Angolan labor pool (90%).56 Bräutigam also posited that 
the widely publicized evacuation of the hospital unfairly made China’s other aid 
and infrastructure projects suspect. “What is clear is that one … [problematic] 
hospital project has cast a particularly large shadow over hundreds of other less 
visible Chinese construction projects in Angola that do not seem … to have had 
such dramatic flaws.”57 
 However, Angolan human rights activist Rafael Marques de Morais 
expresses views that strongly counter Bräutigam’s perspective while 
simultaneously providing analysts with local perceptions of China’s infrastructure 
project work in Angola: 
[When], the General Hospital in Angola’s capital of Luanda had to 
evacuate all medical personnel and patients … [as] severe cracks 
appeared everywhere in the two-story building and bricks began to 
disintegrate …. The moral … [which Angolans] drew from the story 
…[focused] on the short life span of public works undertaken by Chinese 
companies in Angola as part of the low-key economic and cultural 
offensive China is waging on the African continent.58 
  
 While the Luanda General Hospital received a lot of negative publicity due 
to its rapid structural degradation, the housing unit construction touted in the 
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Centre for Chinese Studies analysis also gained a lot of attention since the 
construction contracts and financing agreements were negotiated behind closed 
doors. Secondly, “only about 20% of Luanda’s population … [could] afford to live 
in [this area].”59 While the Angolan government was responsible for the majority 
of the issues, the fact that sprawling, Chinese-constructed cities in Angola 
resembled the recently built ghost towns in mainland China, negatively portrayed 
the Chinese SOEs involved in their construction. 
 There were also other issues regarding the opacity of some of the 
financing by Chinese institutions, as well as the inter-relationship with secondary 
Chinese SOEs involved in petroleum projects. This was exemplified by rather 
murky negotiations between the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) and the China International Fund (CIF) over the construction 
of tens of thousands of housing units across Angola.60 
 The renovation and broadening of Angola’s water treatment and sewage 
facilities by Chinese SOEs have not been widely covered by the media, making it 
difficult to gauge the progress of these projects. Secondly, given the extent of the 
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credit extensions for water, sewage, and hydroelectric projects - and the media 
publicity dedicated to this type of infrastructure improvement in Angola 
subsequent to 2002, there should be a more extensive list of completed projects 
of this nature. 
 While China has contributed to Angola’s post-war infrastructure 
development, the overall opinion among Angolans is far from positive, as may be 
reflected from journalist Rafael Marques de Morais’ experiences. He stated that 
more than 500 km of recently tarred, Chinese-built roadway, which he traversed, 
had totally decomposed in less than a year, and that this was typical of China’s 
projects in Angola. 
 [Over a seven month period] the tar had … [decomposed in] different  
 sections of [Chinese-built roadways] as a result of poor workmanship by 
 Chinese engineers. This was not an isolated occurrence …. Tales of … 
 Chinese roads being washed away by rain or filling up with potholes within 
 months of being opened to traffic are now the stuff of legend [in Angola]. 
 …. I saw a new Chinese-built school whose roof had blown off in a recent 
 rainstorm, [while] … older neighboring houses kept their roofs even 
 though some of them were thatched.61 
 
 Summary of Infrastructure Financing and Development in Angola 
  
 In summary, despite “the growing magnitude of China’s projects in Angola 
very little is known about them. As a result there have been many myths about 
the terms of co-operation”62 The opaque nature of Sino-Angolan negotiations, the 
involvement of covert Chinese state actors, and the history of graft and 
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corruption has led to the cultivation of a negative perspective of Chinese SOEs 
involved in infrastructure projects in Angola. The poor quality of work, whether it 
be the rapid degradation of roads or crumbling buildings which are less than half 
a decade old has also served to contribute to the overall negative impression of 
the presence of China’s state-owned enterprises in the country. 
 “Assessing the impact of China’s ‘foreign assistance’ projects in Angola is 
further complicated by the ‘bundling’ of … ‘assistance’ with direct foreign 
investments from the approved Chinese companies …. [This is exemplified by]  
oil‐backed loans and credits … intertwined with massive investments by state‐led 
enterprises such as the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
(CITIC), the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and … privately‐owned 
CIF.”63 Furthermore, some of the infrastructure projects, such as the Benguela 
Railway, have been created in order to facilitate the transport of raw materials, 
and will not benefit the population. 
 In post-war Angola, the majority of the population lives below the poverty 
line and from its perspective, both China and the Angolan elite are enriching 
themselves at the expense of the country, which still has a relatively low level of 
infrastructure development, especially considering its vast resource wealth. While 
China has spent billions of dollars with the Angolan government, the general 
population has yet to see many benefits from the influx of oil-backed credits and 
currency.  
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 With respect to China’s credit extensions to Angola, it is apparent that the 
benefits reaped by China far outweigh any socio-political or economic gains 
made by the East African state and the general population. “This [credit 
extension] is not ‘aid’ in any conventional sense therefore. In many cases, it is 
unclear how money has been spent … [on] the projects that have resulted from  
bilateral co-operation as the funds are often tracked so far off the books that they 
do not appear in any budgets whilst the bidding process for the lucrative 
contracts themselves … [is] opaque.”64 
 Thus in the case of China’s resources-for-infrastructure development 
projects in Angola, they serve to increase tension among the local population, 
and these dynamics have become more prevalent across the continent over the 
past decade as Chinese presence increases. It should be noted that this rise in 
tension is not limited to labor-intensive infrastructure projects, but is also an 
effect of local market displacement created by inexpensive Chinese goods, and 
of an increase of Chinese-owned business establishments.  
 Chinese managers and employers have been reported in the African 
media for being abusive, under-paying their employees, and forcing them to work 
in hazardous conditions. In some cases, this has triggered violence and resulted 
in the death of Chinese nationals. The antagonism toward Chinese managers 
and workers has risen “in countries with struggling economies [which include the 
majority of African states and] the arrival of large numbers of … Chinese … [that] 
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combined with a lack of enforcement of laws and regulations, have fuelled tense 
relations with locals [across the continent].”65 This has been demonstrated by 
attacks on Chinese-owned facilities, and violence against Chinese SOE 
managers and laborers in Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan 
and South Sudan, South Africa, and Zambia.66 
 While the Angola-mode does allow for superficial infrastructure creation, 
the collateral aspects of Chinese operations in LDCs such as Angola are 
questionable at best, and seem to indicate a one-step-forward, two-steps back 
devolution of Sino-African SOE operations, which are tightly bundled with 
resource-for-infrastructure financing packages. The negative aspects of Chinese 
infrastructure creation are further compounded by the poor quality of the 
buildings, roads, and bridges, in addition to the lower-than-market wages and 
poor working conditions local employees are subject to, if they are able to secure 
employment with a Chinese company.  
Case Study Two - Infrastructure Financing and Development in Ethiopia 
 “China has had a long history of involvement with Ethiopia, especially 
since the rise of the … Zenawi government”67 Observing China’s infrastructure 
financing and development activities in Ethiopia provides for a different 
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perspective than the examination of the PRC’s involvement in petroleum-rich 
Angola. The two countries are diverse in location, culture, and indigenous 
resource-wealth. While post-war Angola has earned a name for itself due to its 
vast oil reserves, Ethiopia is the official seat of the African Union headquarters 
and has struggled to overcome a history of famine, illiteracy, and internecine 
power struggles among its eighty-plus ethno-linguistic groups. 
 According to Ethiopian scholar Seifudein Adem, “Ethiopia does not 
produce industrially critical raw materials such as oil and strategic minerals, 
which have presumably provided the basis for China’s relations with many 
countries in Africa …. If China’s relations with many African countries could be 
described as one of ‘infrastructure for natural resources,’ the Sino-Ethiopian 
relationship can be described ‘infrastructure for diplomatic support.’”68 Knowing 
that Ethiopia serves as a transit point and base for diplomats of all of the African 
states, China has used the country to ‘showcase’ its credit extensions and 
infrastructure development. 
 Dr. Monika Thakur notes, “[the] majority of the growing literature on Sino-
African relations focuses on China’s relations with resource-rich/economically 
robust countries or unsavoury regimes. Limited attention has been paid to the 
rest of Africa’s states, but it is in these ‘less significant’ countries, such as 
Ethiopia, that China has the potential to have the most impact. [In Ethiopia] 
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China’s economic engagement … focuses mainly on infrastructure 
development.”69 According to the World Bank’s 2015 Country Overview,  
Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa …. 
[and is] one of the world’s oldest civilizations …. The country’s per capita 
income of $550 is substantially lower than the regional average …. The 
main challenge for Ethiopia is to continue and accelerate the progress 
made in recent years … [and] to address the causes of poverty among its 
population …. Large-scale [foreign] donor support will … [thus] provide a 
vital contribution in the near-term to finance the levels of spending needed 
to meet these challenges.70 
  
While the rate of Ethiopia’s economic growth has been difficult to gauge 
due to a general opacity and lack of consistent annual expenditure reporting, the 
country has shown progress which can be attributed in some part to an influx of 
foreign funds and infrastructure development. The PRC has been Ethiopia’s 
primary contributor since 2004. The analysis entitled Chinese FDI in Ethiopia: A 
World Bank Survey states “China’s economic cooperation with Ethiopia has 
expanded rapidly over the past decade. In 2011, China was both the largest 
import and largest export-trading partner of Ethiopia. Similarly, China’s 
investment in Ethiopia has increased steadily.”71 
 Thakur notes that China’s primary focus in Ethiopia has been 
infrastructure (road, bridge and railway), hydroelectric power, water supply 
projects, and telecommunications.72 According to a 2010 World Bank report, in 
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Ethiopia, of all “the non-OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] financiers, China is an increasingly important source of external  
finance and currently contributes 20 percent of [Ethiopia’s] total capital 
expenditure.”73 
 One of the principal differences between Angola’s and Ethiopia’s 
infrastructure development is that the majority of infrastructure projects initiated 
by Chinese state-owned enterprises in Ethiopia, were not originally financed 
through Chinese lending institutions. Initially, “the major sources of finance for 
the projects were … the World Bank, European Commission, African 
Development Bank, OPEC Fund, and Arab Bank for Economic Development.”74  
Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Ethiopia 
 Over the past decade, China has been responsible for a large portion of 
Ethiopia’s transit creation and rehabilitation projects. “[By] 2009 all new 
construction and 66.6 percent of rehabilitation, upgrading, and maintenance of 
roads in Ethiopia were being done by Chinese companies.”75 One of the biggest 
road and bridge construction projects engaged by Chinese SOEs in Ethiopia to 
date has been the Ring Road project, which entailed the building and reworking 
of the major arteries surrounding Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa.  
 In 1998 [the state-owned] China Road and Bridge Corporation …signed a 
 contract agreement with Addis Ababa City Roads Authority (AACRA) for 
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 the project. The contract price to complete the Ring Road project was US$ 
 86.02 million, US$ 67.25 million in the main contract for the road 
 construction and US$ 18.77 million in a supplemental contract. The 
 contract with the AACRA included the construction and upgrading of 33.4 
 km of highway, which included the upgrading of 14.2km of bituminous 
 asphalt concrete surfacing and the construction of 19.2km of new road, 41 
 new structures, 6 flyover bridges, 23 pedestrian bridges, and 12 
 culverts.76  
  
 As previously mentioned, the primary difference between Angolan and 
Ethiopian projects is that Ethiopia utilized non-Chinese financing mechanisms for 
the majority of its projects. In the case of Ring Road, China financed less than 
twenty percent of the US$ 86 million venture. 77  However, over the past decade, 
Ethiopia has increasingly opted to utilize Chinese financing mechanisms for its 
projects instead of the aforementioned entities.   
 The Addis Ababa Ring Road Case Study by Mo et al. outlines the 
structuring of the Sino-Ethiopian “project entities” involved in the metropolitan 
road and bridge venture, which can be compared to Corkin’s flow chart (Figure 2)  
Chinese contracting and procurement process in Angola in Case Study One. 
Both illustrations reflect similar project entity structuring, with the Chinese 
Government jointly entering financing agreements with the host countries, and 
then allowing for local (African) government ‘oversight’ of the Chinese state-
owned enterprises involved in the infrastructure development, which in the case 
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of the Ring Road Project is China Road and Bridge Construction.  
Figure 3 - Project Entities Structure in the Ring Road Project78 
 
 Given Ethiopia’s limited pre-project road network prior to the completion of 
the venture, Addis Ababa’s population and its commercial enterprises appear to 
have benefited from the upgraded transportation system. 
“Ring Road was completed in 2004, six years after commencement. Local 
residents were content .... [Since the new roadways] allowed heavy 
vehicles … to bypass portions of the city .... reduced traffic congestion 
…and linked neighborhoods with market places, schools, churches and 
clinics. [In turn] the diminishing traffic congestion ... reduced the risk of 
traffic accidents.”79 
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Negative Aspects of Chinese Transportation Infrastructure Projects 
Despite the improvements in traffic flow, congestion and accident reduction, 
there were negative ramifications to the project. In Scoping Study on the Chinese 
Relation with Sub Saharan Africa: The Case of Ethiopia, Ethiopian academic 
Alemayehu Geda reveals serious drawbacks, like the ones experienced in 
Angola.  
 1) Sub-standard (work) quality of the construction undertaking itself 
 
 2) Failure of Chinese labor and products (materials) to meet international  
     standards, especially in terms of sanitation, and water supply facilities. 
 
 3) Sub-standard remuneration for local Ethiopian laborers. 
 
 4) Failure of CRBC to hire a number of local unskilled laborers,  
     commensurate with the scope of the project. 
 
 5) The duty- and tariff-free importation of technically outdated construction  
       equipment through a Sino-Ethiopian incentive plan which subsequent  
      to the project[s] completion does not have a significant service life. 
 
 6) Chinese usage of governmental connection to crowd out domestic     
       firms.80   
          
 Point 4 of the foregoing list references that Chinese companies prefer to 
use Chinese laborers, rather than Ethiopian workers. As mentioned in the 
previous sub-section, similar complaints were voiced by the Angolan populace. 
However, in a January 2013 interview with the China Daily, the operational 
director of First Highway Engineering Company, a subsidiary of CCCC (China 
Communications and Construction Company), maintained that he had hired 
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8,400 laborers for the project, at a 20 to 1 ratio, which equated to 8000 Ethiopian 
workers and 400 Chinese.81 
 Chinese SOEs were also responsible for other roadway installation 
projects in different parts of the country. In early 2013, Ethiopia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs announced the opening of an important Ethio-Sudanese 
transportation link between Asosa (Ethiopia) and Kumruk, Sudan. The Ethiopian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “The 100km-long road … will enhance trade 
relations as well as social ties between the two countries …. The construction of 
the project was carried out by … [the Chinese SOE Sinohydro] at a cost of over 
US$ 27 million. This Ethiopia-Sudan highway is the second highway connecting 
Ethiopia with Sudan …. and opens up another route … [which allows] interior 
Ethiopia to trade within the region.”82  
 Once again, issues of transactional opacity, similar to the phenomena 
evidenced in Angola, were present in Ethiopia. The Sinohydro website outlined 
that the project, initiated in 2007, was slated to be completed in 2010. Another 
questionable discrepancy is that the Sinohydro website states that the overall 
project cost was more than double what the Ethiopian government claimed to 
have paid out US$ 62 million, versus the Ethiopian government’s cost quote of 
US$ 27 million. The estimated project completion time nearly doubled, and this 
                                            
81. Andrew Moody and Zhong Nan, 60 Percent of the New Roads in Addis Ababa have been 
Built by First Highway Engineering Company of China, MelesZenawi.com. January 25, 2013. 
http://bit.ly/2am1HC1. Accessed on December 3, 2015.    
 
82. Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). MelesZenawi.com, Ethiopia-Sudan Highway 
Link Completed, January 17, 2013. http://www.meleszenawi.com/ethiopia-sudan-highway-link-
completed. Accessed on November 25, 2015. 
 47 
 
may have been one of the reasons for the 130% increase in the project price. 
Additional reasons for the delayed project completion and the large cost 
discrepancy have never been published. 
 While this dissertation does not allow for a full-scope and detailed 
examination of Sino-sponsored road and bridge construction in Ethiopia, the 
foregoing example indicates that other infrastructure projects of the same nature 
may have been susceptible to similar pitfalls and detriments: substandard work 
quality, questionable bidding processes, and overall project costs, which 
exceeded original agreements. Before delving into hydroelectric and 
telecommunication projects, the author will briefly examine one portion of China’s 
recently completed railway refurbishment in Ethiopia.   
 In September of 2015, the “Chinese-built and funded Light Rail .... 
[opened] the first phase of the state-owned urban railway, which comprises 34 
kilometers (21.1 miles) of lines across the city …. The Light Rail is the first in a 
raft of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects that Ethiopia’s government says will 
… help maintain annual economic growth …. Another railway along the main 
trade route to neighboring Djibouti may begin early in 2016.”83 
 According to a May 2015 article in Xinhua, a secondary project referred to 
as the Sebeta/Addis Ababa-Mieso line, will comprise a total length of 329 km, 
and serve to facilitate imports and exports throughout East Africa. “The … railway 
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[project was] … contracted by [China Railway Engineering Corporation] CREC 
with a total cost of US$ 2 billion …. [Moreover] Prime Minister … [referred to the] 
project … [as] a blood-line of the country's economy.”84 Xinhua noted that the 
CREC’s work facilitated technology transfer between China and Ethiopia, in 
addition to “supporting the locals, especially those who ... [live in close proximity 
to] the projects sites, where the Chinese company has undertaken development 
programs in water supply and road development.”85 
 The construction of Ethiopia’s rail system appears to reflect dynamics 
described by Geda, and those, which Adem referenced in China in Ethiopia: 
Diplomacy and Economics of Sino-optimism. 
 The Sino-Ethiopian relationship … [could] be described [as] ‘infrastructure 
 for diplomatic support’”86 and “…. [since] the African Union and the 
 Economic Commission for Africa [is] located in Addis … African leaders … 
 visit Addis frequently. [Therefore] symbolic [projects  undertaken] … by 
 Chinese SOEs in Ethiopia thus could serve to advertise their work … [to] 
 the rest of Africa:”87 The track of the Light Rail “…. [which] skirts the 
 African Union’s headquarters …. [was described by the Ethiopian] 
 Transport Minister … [as] one of the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa, 
 [and] as a milestone in the nation’s journey out of poverty.88 
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 However, in a departure from the previously discussed Sino-Ethiopian 
road construction-financing models, the Ethiopian government opted to go 
through the Export-Import Bank of China rather than the alternative non-Chinese 
financing mechanisms it had previously opted to utilize, as with the Ring Road 
project undertaken by CRBC.89 
 Due to its staged-phase completion schedule, it is too early to make a 
determination of the impact of the implementation of a Chinese built and funded 
light rail system in Ethiopia. However, at the present time, while aspects of the 
Sino-Ethiopian financing agreements may be questionable, it appears as though 
the general population will benefit from the establishment of a modernized 
transportation system, which represents improvements to the general 
architecture of Ethiopia’s infrastructure. “The Light Rail is the first in a raft of 
Chinese-funded infrastructure projects that Ethiopia’s government says will 
[soon] come online … and help maintain annual economic growth.”90  
Hydroelectric Projects 
China has also been the primary contributor to Ethiopia’s blossoming 
hydroelectric project aspirations, which if successful, may make it one of Africa’s 
largest suppliers of electricity. A September 2015 Bloomberg article noted, “the 
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Gibe III hydropower dam’s reservoir has started filling, with its 1,870 megawatts 
capable of almost doubling Ethiopia’s generating capacity.”91 However, these 
projects have the potential to adversely impact local populations, limit agricultural 
operations of small villages, which survive through subsistence farming, and 
damage the environment (and some may rightfully point out that this 
phenomenon is not particular to Chinese activity alone - other countries have 
acted in similar fashion).  
 As with the rail projects undertaken by CREC, Ethiopia - like Angola - has 
turned to Chinese financial institutions for credit extensions rather than applying 
to more transparent and traditional institutions to subsidize its ambitious 
hydroelectric projects. This is due in part to the comparatively strict prerequisites 
created by non-Chinese financing mechanisms that are bundled with credit 
extensions when projects have the capacity to negatively impact the environment 
and regional stability. 
 No international development banks funded the dam projects, yet some 
 have funded international transmission lines that will carry power from the 
 dams, a decision criticized as backdoor support for the dam projects. 
 Instead, Ethiopia is relying on the sale of government bonds and funding 
 from Chinese state banks. These findings indicate a departure from 
 international standards found in the funding criteria of development banks. 
 Ethiopian officials view complying with these standards as a burden and 
 dams as a development imperative requisite at all costs.92 
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92. “A number of Chinese state banks are involved in Ethiopian hydro projects, including The 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the world’s largest bank with assets exceeding 
U.S. $2 trillion.” Pat Adams, Progress at Any Cost? International Development Banks, Large 
Hydropower, and the Environment in Ethiopia, Environmental Policy Update, 2012, pp. 2-6. 
http://bit.ly/2agtPvj. Accessed on November 18, 2015. 
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 Ethiopia plans to become East Africa’s largest power exporter by the end 
of this decade, which it believes will in turn help to support its economic growth. 
The government of Ethiopia believes that with Kenya, Djibouti, and Sudan, as 
possible electricity consumers, by 2018 electricity will supplant coffee as the 
nation’s primary export.93 
Negative Aspects of Hydroelectric Projects in Ethiopia 
 It appears that one of the reasons Ethiopia bypassed traditional financial 
institutions and opted for Chinese subsidies, is that the potential for socio-
economic crises generated by the project would not have satisfied the 
prerequisites of Western institutions such as the World Bank. In cases such as 
this China’s policy of ‘non-interference’ may be called into question. 
 “Findings suggest that in its zeal to develop with massive hydro, the 
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo), the state-owned power utility, 
understates critical social and environmental impacts of the dams …. Large 
dams like those under construction in Ethiopia come with a host of social and 
environmental costs including displacement of communities upstream, disruption 
of watersheds downstream and the communities that depend on them, and the 
risk of conflict over trans-boundary water resources.”94 
 Map 2 details the location of the Gibe III and the Grand Renaissance 
Dams, and their proximity to Ethiopia’s national borders. Of special concern is 
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the Gibe III Dam which transverses part of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, 
and People’s Regions of Ethiopia (S.N.N.P.R.).  
 The S.N.N.P.R. contains more than 45 different indigenous tribes, which 
make it one of the most ethno-linguistically diverse areas in the world, per square 
kilometer. Additionally, many of these primitive groups which will be affected by 
the Gibe III in Ethiopia; Kenya, and South Sudan risk having their limited 
resources disrupted, in a region which is already rife with tribal tensions 
stemming from cattle raids (often to subsidize bride price payments), and  
 
Map 2 - The Grand Renaissance and Gibe III Dams95 
grazing-, fishing-, hunting-, and agrarian-rights disputes in an arid environment 
which is dependent on an adequate water supply.   
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 The construction of the Gibe III Dam, which was inaugurated on 
December 17, 2016, has drawn the ire of activists, NGOs, and water-dependent 
tribes of northwestern Kenya.  
 The World Bank and the European Investment Bank … dropped 
 consideration of the Gibe III Dam after viewing the environmental impact 
 report commissioned by the Ethiopian government. Activists say the World 
 Bank and the African Development Bank lost interest in the project after 
 considering its social and ecological implications on the region's fragile 
 ecosystem stretching across Ethiopia and northern Kenya. The European 
 Investment Bank also dropped consideration of the … [Gibe III].96 
  
 In a move that creates issues which parallel those resulting from massive 
hydroelectric projects in China, some communities will lose their farming and 
grazing lands due to an increase in drought-like conditions, while other 
communities will have to relocate because their centuries-old tribal lands will 
become submerged as the dam fills. China, in conjunction with Ethiopia, is 
helping to create inroads towards a multi-national crisis, which has the potential 
to affect hundreds of thousands of people. 
 The project has been mired in controversy since it was just a blueprint …. 
 A November 2010 hydrology report by the African Development Bank 
 (AfDB) noted that the Omo River is responsible for 90 percent of the water 
 leading into Lake Turkana. A major dam blocking the river would drain 
 most of the lake, depriving 300,000 Kenyans of the water needed for 
 agriculture, cattle herding and fishing …. [In Ethiopia] The area that will be  
flooded by the dam is home to low-level farmlands used by 300,000  
Ethiopians. Food resources are already so scarce in the drought-hit border 
 region between Kenya and Ethiopia that two of the main ethnic groups 
 living there have resorted to violence in their bid for more land and 
 water.97  
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While tribal contentions have existed between many of these ethnic 
groups for centuries, regional stability will become much more tenuous since 
neither the Ethiopian government nor the state-backed Chinese financial 
institution subsidizing the dam construction took the socio-economic, political or 
trans-national impacts of such a project into consideration. Although, until this 
juncture, Sino-Ethiopian dam projects have not yet contributed to either conflict 
or destabilization, these projects are creating conditions that will greatly escalate 
regional tensions between tribal groups that already have a history of conflict.  
China has also provided financing to the Ethiopian government for the Grand 
Renaissance Dam, the operation of which will also foment regional tensions and 
create downstream issues for North Sudan and Egypt.98 
 It is important not to confound Ethiopia’s decision-making processes 
concerning hydroelectric projects with the role played by the Chinese SOEs and 
Chinese-owned financial institutions. The Ethiopian government is responsible 
for its own decisions. However, China’s funding of infrastructure projects through 
its own state-owned financial institutions in African countries is markedly different 
from those, which are provided by traditional, impact-cognizant, financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and African Development Bank.  
In cases such as the Gibe III and Grand Renaissance Dam projects, it 
becomes apparent that the Ethiopian government has opted to ignore the longer-
term, negative socio-economic and environmental impacts. Statements from the 
                                            
98. Chinese financing for the Grand Renaissance Damn, which is slated to be finished in 
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Ethiopian government indicate that China’s policy of non-interference and its 
aversion to considering the socio-economic and ecological implications of foreign 
peoples within its infrastructure project zones make PRC-based financial 
institutions and SOEs preferential partners for such endeavors. It also needs to 
be noted that even in developed countries, analyses of hydroelectric projects 
reveal that in most cases, “large hydropower dams ... [are] too costly in absolute 
terms and take too long to build to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return .... 
[especially since] large dams have strikingly poor performance records in terms 
of economy, social and environmental impact.”99 
 “In a 2012 interview with The Reporter, a prominent English language 
newspaper in Ethiopia, EEPCo’s board chairman Debretsion G. Michael said the 
World Bank has ‘very stringent regulations over environmental issues’ and can 
ask ‘exaggerated questions,’” thus indicating it was preferable to attain credit 
through Chinese state-owned financial institutions that ignore typical 
prerequisites for credit extensions.100  
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100. “[The] phenomenon of viewing hydropower as a development imperative, regardless of 
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Michael characterized the nature of infrastructure funding from China in 
contrast to the World Bank: “The Chinese only focus on the viability of the project 
…. If they can recover the loan, they will provide funds … [for] the projects. They 
pay due attention to the feasibility study. If they are convinced on the commercial 
viability of the project, they … grant the loan. They do not attach other issues to 
the loan request. The Chinese give deaf ears to the cries of NGOs.”101  
It is important at this juncture to make a final point in regard to financing 
for the two Ethiopian hydroelectric projects. While Chinese financial institutions 
played a role in subsidizing the two dam projects, they do not qualify as Angola-
mode financing strategies since Ethiopia has arranged to remunerate the PRC-
based financier(s) with money versus raw materials or resources. 
Telecommunications Projects 
 The final section of Case Study 2 will examine the ramifications of Sino-
Ethiopian telecommunications deals.102 In Ethiopia, there has been a flurry of 
issues associated with less-than-transparent transactions in respect to Sino-
Ethiopian telecommunications projects undertaken by two Chinese SOEs: 
Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation (ZTE), and more recently 
by Huawei. While the directorship of Huawei has consistently engaged in tactics 
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102. “Telecommunications [generally] refers to the industry that provides mobile and fixed-line 
telephony, television, and Internet access and includes network operators and equipment 
providers.” Alfred Wong, China’s Telecommunications Boom in Africa: Causes and 
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in an attempt to keep its ties to the Chinese government and PLA layered in 
secrecy, for the purpose of this analysis, I will examine Huawei with the 
perspective that the company acts as an agent of the state, and in cooperation 
with the Beijing elite.  
 The Huawei Corporation, founded by PLA Engineer (retired) Ren 
Zhengfei, has not publicly divulged its ownership. A 2012 Investigative Report 
authored by the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence maintained Huawei Technologies Company Ltd. refused to elucidate 
its potential ties to the Chinese government, and concluded the company posed 
a potential security threat.103  
 As will be demonstrated below, ZTE and Huawei have been accused of 
bypassing generally accepted bidding practices, utilization of governmental 
connections to secure contracts, and installation of sub-standard networks. 
Additionally, there is concern these two companies may be contributing to 
Ethiopia’s human rights issues through the implementation of surveillance 
technology on behalf of the Ethiopian government. This also raises questions 
about the security of communications for the Ethiopian-based and Chinese-
constructed African Union facility and the Economic Commission for Africa. 
 Both “’Huawei and ZTE have ... been … [criticized] over the quality of … 
[their] products and services.”104 Despite having a more positive track record for 
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network installations and customer service than ZTE, allegations of unfair 
practices have also been leveled against Huawei, especially regarding the 
advantage it derives from being backed by Chinese state-owned financial 
institutions. In June 2011, “Huawei Technologies … rejected a charge by the … 
[chairman] of the U.S. Export-Import Bank that it has an unfair advantage over 
rivals because of help from the Chinese government.”105  
 The US Exim chairman maintained that opaque credit extensions from 
state-backed, Chinese financial institutions allowed Chinese companies to 
monopolize developing foreign markets and specific sectors, which included 
countries in need of telecommunications infrastructure. Furthermore, in a 
surprising turn of events, African countries, which have a less-than-stellar 
reputation themselves, also raised the alarm over ZTE’s opaque dealings with 
developing nations.  
 According to a November 2014 article in the Wall Street Journal by 
Matthew Dalton,   
 “ZTE and Ethio Telecom have been locked in a standoff over prices that 
 Ethiopia would pay for ZTE's equipment and other issues …. The 
 Ethiopian government … warned ZTE … that it may cancel a huge 
 contract it awarded to the Chinese telecommunications firm last year, 
 amid concern about the prices ZTE is proposing to charge for its 
 equipment …. Cancellation of the contract would also be another blow to   
                                            
105. “In a [2011] speech … Export-Import Bank Chairman and President Fred Hochberg said 
Huawei had a US$30 billion credit line from the Chinese Development Bank … [which] reduced 
the Chinese networking vendor's cost of capital and provided financing to its customers at rates 
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Government Help “Hogwash,” IDG News Service, PC World, June 18, 2011. http://bit.ly/2bJvkgu. 
Accessed on November 23, 2015. 
 59 
 
 ZTE's business in Africa, where several countries have annulled contracts 
 awarded to the firm because of concerns that it violated government 
 purchasing rules, acted improperly or wasn't up to the job.”106 
  
 As a result of these tensions, Ethio Telecom, “Ethiopia's government-
controlled, monopoly telecommunications operator,”107 opted to edge ZTE out of 
some of the network installation work, which it had already been awarded, albeit 
through dubious contractual processes. “[A subsequent] investigation by the 
World Bank … found fault with the deal, criticizing Ethiopia for sidestepping 
government procurement rules to give the project to ZTE and for awarding such 
a big contract to one company. ZTE … said it … [did not] violate the [Ethiopian] 
government's rules.108 [However the deal was] …. conditional on ZTE doing the 
job without bidding.”109 
 Ethiopia also lodged complaints with ZTE, which stated that the 
telecommunications network was plagued with sporadic network coverage, slow 
data transfer speeds, and poor call quality. Furthermore, the Ethiopian 
government contested the financing terms. While Chinese financial institutions 
subsidized the project cost, ZTE structured what the Ethiopian government 
interpreted as unfavorable terms. In response to the complaints regarding the 
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financing cost(s), ZTE maintained that it was simply attempting to recoup fees 
charged to them by the Chinese financial institutions.110 
 In 2013, possibly anticipating additional issues, the Ethiopian government 
decided to renegotiate the agreement and awarded Huawei work that was 
originally slated to be completed by ZTE. “Like many of the contracts that ZTE 
and Huawei have won in Africa, the two firms offered Ethiopia large amounts of 
financing backed by Chinese state-run development banks, brushing aside 
Western competitors for the contract,” yet based on Dalton’s observations, it 
appears that in some cases the original financing terms are subject to change.111 
 Another serious issue is that ZTE- and Huawei-telecommunications 
projects may provide the means for foreign governments to illegally monitor 
opposition groups, which in turn has the potential to create human rights issues 
in countries, which have already faced international criticism for failing to adopt 
democratic norms. Media and information exchange in Ethiopia, like China, are 
closely monitored by the central government in an attempt to stifle dissent from 
those with political views which run counter to those of the ruling political party. 
 Political opposition groups in Ethiopia today are weak and fragmented … 
 but they … are sometimes critical of China’s support for the … 
 [Ethiopian] government. China’s significant involvement in the country’s 
 telecommunications industry has recently been singled out as alarming, 
 since the Ethiopian government is suspected of using Chinese technology 
 for jamming radios and television broadcasts critical of the government 
 and for blocking opposition-controlled or opposition-affiliated Web sites.112  
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The scope of Huawei and ZTE’s undertakings and their potential 
connections to the Chinese government, military and intelligence branches has 
also raised the ire of U.S. politicians. In October of 2012, the U.S. House 
Intelligence Committee released a report, which expressed concern with the 
activities of both ZTE and Huawei.113 
 While the report focused on the activities of ZTE and Huawei within the 
United States, the security issues created by the utilization of their equipment 
and software in least-developed countries, such as Ethiopia for example, may 
pose even greater concerns, because LDCs lack the technological capabilities to 
detect and deter cyber-intrusions and potential cyber-kinetic attacks. 
Furthermore, many developing states struggle with human rights issues and the 
installation of potentially intrusive technologies runs counter to democratic 
development. 
 [ZTE and Huawei] sell telecommunications equipment needed to create 
 and operate wireless networks …. [These] concerns are most acute about 
 Huawei and ZTE because of their close ties to the Chinese government, 
 which the committee said has heavily subsidized the companies.  
 
 Allowing the Chinese companies to do business in the United States … 
 would give the Chinese government the ability to easily intercept 
 communications and could allow it to start online attacks on critical   
 infrastructure, like dams and power grids.  
  
                                            
sector for instance, will potentially enhance interconnectivity among Ethiopians and with the 
outside world, which could in turn encourage the emergence and consolidation of grassroots 
movements and pave the way for a greater challenge to the ruling regime in Ethiopia.” Adem, 
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 The report [also stated] … the committee had obtained internal documents 
 from former employees of Huawei that showed it supplied services to a 
 “cyberwarfare” unit in the People’s Liberation Army.114 
 
  Summary of Infrastructure Financing and Development in Ethiopia 
 Given Ethiopia’s general lack of transparency, limited freedom of the 
press, and record of human rights violations, China’s non-interventionist policy 
may contribute to the Ethiopian government’s firm grip on an already oppressed 
population. Although at least in the short-term it appears as though China’s 
infrastructure projects will benefit the country economically, it is, however, too 
soon to determine the long-term impacts of the infrastructure development, which 
is often subsidized through Chinese-backed concessionary loans. 
 “It is still premature to conclude whether Chinese engagement has 
 definitively contributed to overall economic progress in Ethiopia …. 
 China’s contribution to Ethiopia’s economic development (vis-à-vis 
 infrastructure growth, information and communication technology (ICT) 
 development and hydroelectricity projects) is undeniable, despite certain 
 issues related to the quality of the infrastructure, technology transfer and 
 employment.115  
 
 African critics have pointed out that China’s ‘help,’ often in the form of 
loans are not without negative implications for the future. According to a former 
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executive working for the African Development Bank, “the heavy volume of 
concessionary loans from China is a cause of concern … [since it contributes to 
a] growing debt burden. The former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki … 
warned … [that this is] a “new form of neo-colonialist adventure.’” 116 
 There are additional worries since Chinese projects in the Ethiopia have 
created disparities similar to the ones experienced in Angola, Zambia, and other 
African states. Local companies are not utilized in accordance with the initial 
agreements, potential local labor pools are not incorporated, and if they are, the 
employees are under-paid - even by local, Ethiopian standards.117 
 In Ethiopia - like Angola “China is accused of failing to create local jobs, 
flooding markets with poor quality goods, devastating local industries, securing 
contracts through outright bribery and turning a blind eye to human rights abuses 
…. George Ayittey, a Ghanaian economist says China’s increased engagement 
in Africa “has impeded the continent’s halting steps towards democratic 
accountability and better governance.”118 
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 Chinese financing and construction contracts pose several problems for 
African host countries. In many cases, indigenous African companies and 
international firms are not included in the bidding processes. Agreeing to that 
condition is usually one of the prerequisites for financing. This in turn allows 
Chinese construction companies, which have been awarded contracts to set their 
own terms, including provisions for the utilization of Chinese laborers, instead of 
local workers. Furthermore, the contracts offered by Chinese financial institutions 
often have light “front-end” burdens, which are subsequently eroded by future 
terms that gradually encumber the host country with higher costs, through subtle 
‘bait-and-switch’ styled mechanisms.  
While it is true that Chinese financial institutions offer project-subsidization 
packages to African governments that are unable to secure credit from Western 
banking institutions, the negative aspects of such deals are not always 
immediately evident, and the host-countries may pay more over the long-term 
than they had originally intended. 
 In the construction and the energy sector, Chinese involvement in 
 telecommunication, road and power plant construction projects through 
 very low initial bid-prices (as well as offering credit to finance such 
 projects) has ... [displaced] both local and other foreign construction 
 firms. Notwithstanding, for example in the case of power plants, the fact 
 that the very low initial entry bid-prices are … [off-set] by high operational 
 costs when the projects start operation; and the fact that Chinese big 
 credits are almost at commercial terms.119 
  
 In a rare move, considering the stance of the Ethiopian government 
towards those who openly voice dissent, some of the employees of Ethio-
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Telecom complained about the opacity of the bidding processes, and political 
cronyism between the Chinese and Ethiopian government which paved the way 
for additional discrepancies which are not typical of the more transparent 
Western-based companies and governments.  
 “The success of Chinese firms in …. [infrastructure projects can] explained 
by the political ties their government created with the government of Ethiopia, low 
initial bidding price offered by Chinese firms in bidding for such projects, [and] the 
self-financing options … that … [Chinese SOEs] give to the Ethiopian 
government owing to the support they get from the Chinese government.”120 
 With regard to the security of communications for world leaders and 
African diplomats based in Ethiopia, ZTE and Huawei have successfully 
embedded themselves in African diplomatic channels. If the backdoors, virtual 
switches and routers are exploited, the Chinese government has the capability to 
access in-bound and out-bound communications in Addis Ababa, giving them an 
edge in negotiations, commercial and military activities. While the 
aforementioned dynamics address shorter-term concerns, the longer-term 
humanitarian issues, such as population displacement and regional conflict, have 
the potential to create far graver problems for the region and surrounding states. 
 A cascade of … violence between the Kenyan Turkana and Ethiopian 
 Daasanach … has led to the deaths of … Ethiopians and … Kenyans …. 
 Though the fighting has been localized, it has put pressure on both 
 nations to deal with strife between nomadic groups who are competing for 
 diminishing resources. Both groups are traditionally pastoral nomads living 
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 within the Elemi Triangle … which has dry pastureland, historically used 
 by both the Turkana and the Daasanach, as well as the Didinga, Toposa, 
 and Inyangatom … communities.”121 
  
 While Ethiopia may have made improvements in its infrastructure with the 
help of the Chinese, both Thakur and Adem point out that the PRC has not 
assisted in sectors in Ethiopia, such as agriculture, which would yield the 
greatest benefits to the general population. “[Even though] … China has an 
interest in assisting African countries to achieve food security, Chinese 
engagement in agricultural technology transfer remains negligible ….”122 It 
becomes apparent that China’s interaction with Ethiopia, either via financing or 
infrastructure projects, has mixed effects. 
  “Overarching judgments as to whether China’s engagement is a blessing 
or a curse for the country are still unclear …. In terms of issues of governance, 
China has a very clear policy of non-intervention, and this is strictly exercised in 
Ethiopia. The lack of censure by China … of the current Ethiopian regime’s 
stalling of the democratization process, human rights violations and closing up of 
political space may have troubling long-term political implications.”123 China’s 
“record so far is mixed at best, and the structural dependency and vulnerability of 
[the] Ethiopian economy have not changed much as a result of China’s 
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arrival.”124 Furthermore, the impending humanitarian issues created for multiple 
countries by recent dam construction may sway the balance and vitiate any of 
the positive aspects of China’s involvement in the region. 
Case Study Three - Infrastructure Financing and Development in Sudan 
and South Sudan 
  
 In Case Study Three, Chinese infrastructure projects will be examined in 
both Sudan and South Sudan. South Sudan gained its independence from 
Sudan in July 2011, and some of the infrastructure projects carried out by 
Chinese SOEs span both Sudan and South Sudan. Furthermore, due to 
internecine conflicts within South Sudan, which have been compounded by 
North-South hostilities, data on Chinese infrastructure projects in the South is 
relatively limited. 
 According to a 2011 Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), 
“Two-thirds of [pre-liberation] Sudan’s spending … [consisted] of investment, with 
Chinese funds accounting for 40 percent of investment finance125 …. Capital 
investments in Sudan … [were] heavily skewed toward the power sector, [and] 
much of this [was] funded by China.”126 While the PRC “has an active presence 
in neighboring countries … [it has] yet to make substantial investments in [post-
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liberation] South Sudan.”127 However, in the past several years there has been a 
gradual increase in infrastructure projects in South Sudan, which have been 
financed by Chinese institutions.  
Infrastructure Financing and Development in Sudan 
 China’s infrastructure projects in Sudan date back to 2000, with Chinese 
financing institutions infusing more than $US2 billion by 2010. In 2007, Sudan 
signed a bilateral framework agreement for $US3 billion with the PRC, which has 
proven to be one of the largest on the continent to date, underscoring the 
importance China places on its relationship with Sudan’s president, Omar al-
Bashir.128 “Chinese projects … [have provided] some 2,200 MW of new thermal 
power generation, and the country is responsible for the now-completed 1,250 
MW Merowe Dam and associated 1,800 km transmission line .... [The PRC] has 
also been involved in the reconstruction of some 1,500 km of roads.”129 
 China has also been involved in extensive port expansion projects in Port 
Sudan. The China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) subsidiary, 
China Harbor and Engineering Company (CHEC), indicates on its website that it 
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is presently involved in the construction of a new container terminal, in addition to 
extensive dredging operations.130 “The project is located at the entrance of 
Sudan Port, planned with [two] … 70,000TEU [Twenty-foot equivalent unit] 
Container Terminal[s] and … dredging works.”131 CHEC is also involved in the 
Sudan Sinnar Bridge Project which “….is located … 5km down the Sinnar Dam 
… [and includes] a road bridge across the Blue Nile River, and 2 rail bridges 
across the water channel.”132 CHEC also constructed the 50,000DWT 
(Deadweight tonnage) Dammar Oil Terminal in the Port of Sudan, but the 
operational capabilities of this project have not been documented to date. 
 The majority of infrastructure creation in Sudan by Chinese SOEs appears 
to be related to petroleum exports and is relatively limited in comparison to both 
Ethiopia and Angola. Furthermore, data availability regarding project quality has 
not been published. As the conclusion to this section will demonstrate, the 
infrastructure projects in Sudan, with Chinese backing, have had little positive 
impact on the general population. 
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Infrastructure Financing and Development in South Sudan 
 Compared to Sudan, South Sudan has relatively limited infrastructure. 
There are two reasons for this, President Bashir traditionally focused on 
developing the Arab North, rather than the Christian South, and secondly 
because South Sudan has more extensive, conflict-related infrastructure damage 
than the north. Since South Sudan’s liberation from Sudan, China has been the 
most prominent foreign financer and developer of infrastructure in the south. 
Sinohydro, one of the larger Chinese SOEs, has recently taken an interest in 
South Sudan.133 
 Chinese companies, both state-owned and private, have monopolized the 
widening market in the south. This, in part, may be attributed to the prior 
presence of Chinese NOCs in the region, which facilitated additional contacts 
with local leaders in the south. “The field for new contracts is wide open, and 
senior roads ministry officials report being overwhelmed by interested Chinese 
construction firms. A variety of other international firms have expressed interest, 
but the Chinese far outnumber other prospectors.”134 
 While ongoing civil conflicts have prevented rapid infrastructure 
development in South Sudan, some progress has been made, albeit sporadically. 
Forays have also been made into the telecommunications sector, including 
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Huawei’s attempt to create a centralized data and communications center, which 
would have mirrored the Ethiopian telecommunications network, albeit on a 
smaller scale.135 “Five licensed mobile operators are active in South Sudan; most 
receive primary infrastructure, equipment, and operations support from … 
Huawei and Zhongxing (ZTE) …. Huawei also signed a memorandum of 
understanding with South Sudan’s government to build, equip, and connect a 
National Information Centre, but finite government resources … put this project 
on hold.”136 
 China has avoided international and local oversight and bidding processes 
by circumventing Southern Sudanese ministries. This activity is facilitated by 
post-independence disorganization, local conflicts and tribal differences.137 In 
addition to creating an atmosphere conducive to graft and questionable bidding, 
this also allows for questionable hardware and software to be incorporated into 
the fledgling telecommunications grid, which once deployed, will raise issues 
regarding the security of communications in South Sudan as it has in Ethiopia. 
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 In 2010, both Huawei and ZTE were vying for backing from Chinese 
financing institutions to commence telecommunications projects in the south of 
Sudan, a year before the South’s transition to independence. 
 Huawei applied for $120 million from Chinese policy banks to finance the 
 extension of fibre optic cables from Kenya to the eastern portion of South 
 Sudan; however, Khartoum’s central bank declined to facilitate the 
 transaction …. As proposals began to materialise, Chinese commerce 
 ministry officials encouraged telecommunications officials to instead orient 
 business to ZTE, noting that its [stronger] state ties would facilitate rapid 
 [Chinese] government sponsorship and mobilisation.138  
  
 Subsequently, South Sudan’s liberation from Sudan has allowed the 
Chinese to streamline their financing and infrastructure development operations 
in the fledgling state. According to an April 2012 Bloomberg article,  
 China will provide South Sudan $8 billion in development loans over the 
 next two years …. The loans … [would] be used for road construction, 
 agriculture, hydroelectricity, infrastructure and telecommunications, which 
 would [in turn] be built by Chinese companies, according to … [a South 
 Sudan] government spokesman …. [who] declined to reveal the cost of 
 the … [financing].”139  
 Subsequent to the South Sudan government spokesperson’s 2012 
announcement of Chinese financing, one of the largest projects to come to light  
has been the proposal for a railway project, which would connect the new nation 
to coastal East Africa.  
 [In May of 2014] …. CHEC and the Ministry of Transport, Road and Bridge 
 of South Sudan signed … [a] contract for [the] Juba-Nimule Railway 
 Project in South Sudan …. After its completion, Juba-Nimule Railway … 
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 [would] connect to the railways of Uganda and Kenya and become an 
 important component of interconnectivity of the East African region. The 
 successful signing of this contract is a practice of CHEC answering the 
 China’s policy of supporting the interconnectivity of African region.”140 
 
 Since the primary concern of the People’s Republic of China in both 
Sudan and South Sudan is petroleum-related, both countries will be examined in 
detail in the subsequent section dedicated to non-military-industrial and non-
defense-industrial activities. The ramifications of Chinese presence in these two 
countries are more evident in the dynamics created by its petroleum exploration 
and extraction operations. 
Summary of Infrastructure Financing and Development in Sudan and South 
Sudan 
  
 The populations of both Sudan and South Sudan have seen limited 
benefits from Chinese-backed infrastructure development. Given South Sudan’s 
recent independence, the ramifications of Chinese activity in the country are 
difficult to analyze. However, the situation in Sudan, which is more advanced and 
developed, also reveals that the external investment and infrastructure 
development primarily benefits the government and state-owned entities under 
control of Omar al-Bashir’s government, rather than the general population.   
According to Ludovic Wiart, the author of The Chinese Angola-mode in 
Africa: the Case Study of Angola and Sudan, both Sudan and South Sudan have 
benefitted from the Angola-mode in the short- to medium-term since both 
countries needed to rapidly access some manner of financing in order to boost 
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infrastructure renovation. Since Sudan and South Sudan have substantial oil 
reserves, he posits that oil-for-financing has paved the way for economic growth 
for both countries.141 
 In the cases of Sudan and South Sudan, Wiart offers some caveats about 
China’s infrastructure work, which mirror problems in both Angola and Ethiopia. 
“In regards to the infrastructure development, it … appears that local companies - 
and [the] population did not … [reap potential benefits] … generated by [these 
projects].”142 Once again, the Chinese government preferred to grant bids to 
Chinese companies versus local companies, and to employ Chinese laborers 
instead of local laborers. 
 In extremely under-developed countries, like South Sudan (and Ethiopia), 
agricultural projects and the creation of irrigation systems would be especially 
beneficial to the population, yet in these sectors, China’s lack of contributions is 
apparent. “Given declining projections for oil production, agriculture is widely 
viewed as the next centrepiece of South Sudan’s economy, and the transition 
must happen fast. As elsewhere on the continent, Chinese officials often cite 
agriculture as a primary area for cooperation, but little government or private 
investment has materialised so far.”143 
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 Even Bräutigam who is usually quite optimistic about China’s activities in 
Africa has expressed criticism about China’s underperformance in agricultural 
assistance on the continent. “Some experts argue that while agriculture is touted 
as a major Chinese interest in Africa, the reality does not often match the 
rhetoric. Agriculture often features in partnership arrangements with developing 
African states, and is encouraged by Beijing’s ministries and banks, but large 
commercial projects rarely materialise.”144 According to an International Crisis 
Group publication entitled China’s New Courtship in South Sudan, Beijing is 
hesitant to exploit impoverished regions in Africa due to fear of escalating 
regional tensions.145  
 Another issue that is rarely discussed by academics is that roadway 
creation, a major activity of Chinese SOEs in both Sudan and South Sudan, 
facilitates the movement of weapons, military equipment, and troops. Thus, in 
areas that are subject to conflict, limited infrastructure acts as a buffer between 
warring states and different ethno-linguistic groups. In unstable regions, roads 
and bridges streamline the communication lines between different actors, which 
are normally separated by time and distance, which in turn increases the 
capacity for dynamics that inhibit regional stability. 
Chapter 1 Summary 
 The creation of infrastructure for African states serves China in several 
ways. It serves to diminish the perception that the PRC is exploiting the continent 
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for resources in colonialist fashion, while facilitating its guanxi networks with 
African leaders.146 It also imparts the appearance of a humanitarian element to 
China’s activities on the continent while simultaneously providing a convenient 
mechanism for the extension of credit, loans, and repayment arrangements that 
often help to secure exploration rights and raw materials under conditions 
favorable to both the Chinese government and its lender-banks. 
 While infrastructure development may be a mechanism employed by 
China in order to guarantee its SOEs and NOCs unfettered access to raw 
materials, some studies suggest that the majority of these projects are not 
geared towards self-servingly facilitating the transit of raw materials to littoral 
trans-shipment points. 
Negative Aspects of Infrastructure Development 
 Authors such as Wiart posit that the Angola-mode economically benefits 
African host countries, since they are able to rapidly develop infrastructure 
through subsidization agreements far less stringent than what has historically 
been attained through partnerships with western corporations. An Executive 
Research Associates analysis states “Africa is … a major natural resource 
exporter, and with enhanced infrastructure could develop this potential even 
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further, accelerating economic development in … [respective resource-rich] 
region[s].”147 
 However, is Chinese-financed infrastructure development actually a boon 
for these African host-countries? If economic growth were a direct benefit of 
infrastructure development, the Chinese-built bridges, highways, and railways 
could be viewed as pivotal to the economic success of developing African 
countries. Yet one study suggests that infrastructure development is a result of 
economic growth, rather than a cause. 
While “the prevalent view in economics literature and policies derived from 
it is that a high level of infrastructure investment is a precursor to economic 
growth,” in many - if not most cases that is a fallacy.148 The Ansar et al. report 
rebuts the “[myth] that infrastructure creates economic value.”149 
Ansar’s et al’s study is important for two reasons: One, it debunks the 
assumption that infrastructure more often than not plays a role in economic 
growth, or at a minimum is a precursor to growth.150 Secondly, Ansar et al, 
utilized China as their analytical model. The second aspect is important since this 
work, as well as Ansar’s, specifically examined the operations of Chinese SOEs. 
A Sino-African comparison is also beneficial because both African countries and 
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the PRC still face developmental challenges. In that respect, they have more 
similarities than differences. 
 Is it possible the loudly heralded infrastructure development in Africa could 
impede the development of its LDCs, which are so keen to create infrastructure 
in order to strengthen their economies? Ansar’s analysis suggests this might be 
the case. His conclusion regarding heavy, front-end infrastructure creation, 
indicates that the African countries which opted for infrastructure development 
(often with the sole purpose of exporting high-demand natural resources), may 
suffer economic setbacks as a result of their decision.    
“There is ... [a] detrimental boomerang effect of overinvestment in 
infrastructure. Unproductive projects carry unintended pernicious macroeconomic 
consequences: sovereign debt overhang; unprecedented monetary expansion; 
and economic fragility .... China is not a model to follow for other economies - 
emerging or developed - as regards infrastructure investing, but a model to 
avoid.”151  
Furthermore, while the Chinese government is quick to claim that African 
governments have the free will to decide which types of infrastructure projects 
will best benefit the country, the governments of the host counties have little to 
no input regarding the execution and completion of the projects. Gill and Reilly 
also indicate that the activities of Chinese SOEs on the continent have a negative 
impact, regardless of the benefits received from the extension of credit lines, the 
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revenue generated for African countries through the sale of raw materials, or the 
creation of infrastructure in African LDCs. 
 Large Chinese SOEs involved in resource extraction … generate fears of 
 Chinese dominance among some African and international leaders [in 
 addition to historically-proven traditional foreign corporate partners] and 
 among international organizations. Mid-level Chinese manufacturing and 
 construction firms generate tension with African businesses in which their 
 market shares are eroding, and individual Chinese entrepreneurs and low-
 cost workers are criticized for taking African jobs and undermining 
 traditional markets and goods.152  
  
 As previously mentioned, poor working conditions, low pay - even by local 
standards - and the displacement of small indigenous businesses has resulted in 
kidnappings, attacks, injuries and deaths of Chinese managers and laborers 
across the continent for close to a decade. In Angola, China has been able to 
edge out SOEs from other countries (such as Portugal and Brazil) by 
undercutting their bids, and this has resulted in problems, despite apparent, and 
possibly superficial, short-term advantages.153  
 Issues with Chinese construction standards and the materials they utilize 
have become points of contention across the continent. While the activities of 
Chinese SOEs in Uganda are not the focus of this study, the quality of PRC-
subsidized projects in that country has also been called into question. In the 
fourth quarter of 2015, both CRBC and the World Bank were brought into the 
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spotlight in Uganda due to issues arising from contractor bidding and selection, in 
addition to allegations of the rapid degradation of roadway projects which non-
qualified, World Bank designated, CRBC engineers, had supervised.154  
 Among the non-registered engineers was the Project Manager in Uganda 
 of China Road and Bridge Corporation …. [who] began working in Uganda 
 immediately after graduating in China, without any prior experience. 
 Construction of the road started in 2001 but began to break down 
 immediately after completion in 2005 - developing longitudinal and 
 traverse cracks and potholes. The road was supposed to last for a 
 minimum of 20 years, but the commission was told, that within just 9 
 years, the road is in a worse state than it was before the upgrade.155 
 
 As a result of the rapidly deteriorating roadway project, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) began an official inquiry, in 
conjunction with the Uganda National Roads Authority. The “Former Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Works and Transport …. told the … [inquiry] that 
World Bank irregularly influenced the international bidding and selection of CRBC 
as the contractor.”156 Another local (unverified) Ugandan internet publication 
quoted … [the Secretary] as stating that a …. low quality [of] materials were … 
used contrary to those specified.”157 
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 Similar issues have occurred in Angola, as referenced in Case Study One. 
Corkin maintains that while the presence of Chinese SOEs has broken up the 
market monopolization of Brazilian and Portuguese construction companies in 
Angola, while simultaneously triggering cost reduction, “There is … evidence … 
[that] buildings constructed only a few years ago … [are already] showing signs 
of structural damage.”158 
 On-the-ground sentiment regarding Chinese infrastructure projects is 
usually not positive. African-owned companies and laborers claim that the level 
of local involvement is very low and that materials are sourced from China rather 
than locally. Yet according to Corkin, while “the prevailing view is that Chinese 
companies operating in African countries do not use local labor, materials or any 
other inputs in the undertaking of their contracts .... [in actuality] Chinese 
companies have progressively begun contracting more and more non-Chinese 
labor on their [overseas] projects.”159 At this stage, with the exception of a few 
African countries, “so little is produced in-country that often only ‘locally procured’ 
materials, rather than ‘locally produced’ materials are available.”160 
Negative Aspects of Angola-mode Financing 
In addition to issues with general project integrity and quality, there are 
also conflicting viewpoints as to the benefits and detriments of the Angola-mode 
for African countries. While Chinese aid recipients in Africa, may demonstrate 
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positive results from infrastructure expansion, infrastructure-for-resource 
arrangements often result in negative ramifications for the industries in the 
“beneficiary” countries. Chinese imports to LDCs can negatively impact domestic 
markets. According to Habiyaremye, 
 Various case studies commissioned by the African Economic Research 
 Consortium (AERC) to assess the impact of China‐Africa trade flows have 
 … provided useful insights into the welfare effects and development 
 dynamics of … [the Angola-mode] on … African economies …. In total, 
 twelve studies were conducted on the impact of China-Africa trade 
 relations …. [and] the common thread is that most of their findings point to 
 substantial gains for the industries or sectors which have 
 complementarities with Chinese import needs (resources, raw materials) 
 and loss or even knock out effects for the industries that have to compete 
 with cheap Chinese export in their domestic and/or third country 
 markets. 
 
Most of these case studies indicate that countries producing goods highly 
demanded by China (e.g., oil and minerals) may see significant growth in 
their exports; those exporting products in competition with Chinese goods, 
such as textile and clothing will see exports fall, while countries importing 
those goods will gain from lower prices.161 
  
 It is important to note that overall the general population of the African 
host countries usually does not see much trickle-down benefit from the export of 
raw materials. It is important to understand the entrance of Chinese SOEs into 
resource-rich LDCs has several ramifications, which include a negative impact on 
domestic production operations that can result in higher rates of unemployment.   
Research also indicates that the Angola-mode precludes “autonomous 
development” of the countries partnered with China, and furthermore - does not 
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allow for a transparent analysis of local and regional socio-economic impacts 
created by this arrangement.162  
 China’s practice of bundling together aid, trade and investment, makes it 
 difficult for researchers to distinguish between their respective effects. The 
 ‘Angola-mode’, whereby aid and investment are paid back in oil or 
 minerals, minimizes the local content and prevents African economies 
 from effectively participating in major investment projects, which reduces 
 not only the multiplier effect on income but also denies them the 
 opportunity of technological learning and … capability building. The 
 development optimism generated by the positive dynamics of Sino‐African 
 trade must also be tempered by the weak spillover potential of Chinese 
 projects to local African producers.163 
   
 One of the most effective ways to examine these dynamics - which have a 
negative effect on local economies, and thus the general population - can be 
accomplished through the examination of annual Human Development Index 
fluctuations. Both Angola and Sudan, (which are more technologically advanced 
and developed than South Sudan) are cases in point regarding resultant 
development, or lack thereof. The following chart by the United Nations 
Development Program reveals Human Development Index trends in Angola, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Sudan. Since Ethiopia does not export petroleum to the 
PRC, its data has not been included within this comparison.  
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Figure 4 - HDI Selected Indicators and Economies164 
According to Wiart, while Sudan’s petroleum stores contributed to 
economic growth, the Human Development Index did not correspondingly reflect 
a positive evolution, especially when compared to Angola during the same 
period. “Therefore, the oil exploitation [from] … an economic point of view proved 
to have strongly benefited the country. However, the effects of ... [this 
progression is] still expected on the side of development. First, concerning the 
HDI and comparison to Angola, Sudan achieved unsatisfactory results.”165    
164. Wiart, The Chinese Angola-mode, 42.
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 85 
 
While over the past decade Angola achieved an increase of approximately 
10 percentage points; the Sudanese Human Development Index’s 
evolution improved twice as slowly. Secondly, in regards to the poverty 
line, the contrast is even more stringent;166 indeed, while Angola’s poverty 
line decreased from 70% in 2003 to 40% in 2006,167 the poverty rate in 
Sudan increased from 40% in 2004168 to 46.5% in 2009.169  
 
 The aforementioned data extrapolation may substantiate Wiart’s beliefs 
that, if a government is not fully committed to acting in favor of the general 
population, the Angola-mode will prove to be ineffective and subsequently fail as 
a dependable pro-development mechanism.170 Therefore, while the increase in 
infrastructure-for-resources financing packages offered by China, and the short-
term economic evolution which coincides with that type of development do create 
some beneficial results, the effects on the ‘general population,’ as demonstrated 
in Sudan (and thus lesser-developed South Sudan by default), may have longer-
standing negative ramifications for local industries and indigenous businesses. 
 In “less business friendly … [environments such as Sudan and South 
Sudan, Chinese financing] is harmful for … development and …. in this [regard 
evidence reveals] that most of the countries [which engaged in the Angola-mode 
financing mechanism subsequently demonstrated] … a poor business climate 
evolution.”171 In the case of Sudan, while “investments help Khartoum by 
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delivering basic services to its people. Beijing also offers loans to help finance 
Khartoum’s goals.”172  
 However, Khartoum’s “goals,” like the goals of numerous African leaders 
and regimes, are not always in the best interest of its people. While there is 
evidence that China’s investments and infrastructure projects in some cases may 
have a nominal, beneficial trickle-down effect on the population, if Chinese 
activities in Africa subsidize aggressive regimes and governments, the 
stabilization of those regimes may in turn yield dynamics which are conducive to 
socio-economic destabilization, human rights violations, and the facilitation of 
conflict. 
 Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa represent an economic, double-
edged sword. On the surface, the Chinese government does appear to provide 
African LDCs unprecedented opportunities for financing, which Western 
countries and corporations are hesitant to grant them, especially in the unstable 
regions in which the PRC has a proclivity to invest. “China’s engagement is 
[initially] attractive for African governments because China does not attach 
political conditions to its economic relations - unlike Western countries or 
international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund.”173 
 Superficially and in the short term, China creates the appearance of 
bringing regional stability to African countries to which it offers financing 
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packages without attached prerequisites, most frequently through the Angola-
mode. However, the short-term benefits are often nullified by subtle issues that 
are not immediately evident. While China’s non-interference policy and no-
strings-attached financing-packages may appear to offer good prospects, they 
may also serve to increase the level of corruption and exacerbate human rights 
issues.  
 Since the initial results of Chinese credit extensions and infrastructure 
projects appear to benefit local economies and aid in the stabilization of the 
regions whose development they are ‘supporting,’ frequently the longer-term 
negative impacts are either not identified or ignored.  
“Despite the enthusiasm for … China‐fuelled growth … it is important to 
recall that the growing presence of Chinese companies … also entails risks for 
Africa. If not properly managed … [the dynamics created by their financing 
packages and activities] may lead to worsening standards of  governance and 
human rights, more corruption and even a crowding out of Africa’s local 
investment capital.” 174 
 In summary, Habiyaremye also concludes that despite the short-term 
benefits to African LDCs, which are eager to build up their infrastructures, 
strengthen their economies, and provide a higher standard of living for the 
general populace, the resultant effects of China’s Angola-mode infrastructure 
development throughout Africa can have profound negative consequences for 
                                            
174. Habiyaremye, ‘Angola‐mode’ Trade Deals, 645. 
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regional stability. “It is important to keep in mind [that] …. instead of enriching 
African countries, the exploitation of natural resources has often fuelled armed 
conflicts, provoked civil unrest, and caused environmental degradation and social 
disruption in many parts of the continent.”175 
 Academics, financial analysts, and economists offer a wide range of 
opinions on Chinese infrastructure projects and the activities of its SOEs in 
Africa. According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, the 
telecommunication infrastructure, which China has built across the continent, has  
 “contributed as much as one per cent to per capita GDP growth - a bigger role 
than changes in monetary or fiscal policies [which in turn may assist in] … re-
establishing Africa as a source of valuable commodities for the global market.”176  
A Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs analysis 
entitled China and ICT Investment in Africa concluded that China’s “engagement 
in the African telecommunications infrastructure … accelerated general 
development ‘to a degree that would otherwise have been impossible.’”177 Other 
scholars feel that while staggered progress has been achieved in certain sectors, 
the overall impact of Chinese engagement will not lead to long-term progress. 
This dynamic may in turn subsequently contribute to destabilization or conflicts in 
                                            
175. Ibid, 644.  
 
176. New Security Learning, China's Mighty Telecom Footprint.  
 
177. Columbia School of International and Public Affairs (2008). New Security Learning, 
China's Mighty Telecom Footprint. However, “even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult 
to find valid and reliable data on the performance of infrastructure investments,” and in LDCs 
such difficulties are compounded.”  (Roy et al., 2001; Stening and Zhang, 2007; Quer et al., 
2007). Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, and Lunn, Infrastructure Investment, 360. 
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regions such as Southern Ethiopia, where the establishment of hydroelectric 
projects without the usual prerequisite impact studies could result in the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of rural inhabitants. Ansar’s conclusion 
regarding the negative boomerang effect of infrastructure creation on the 
economies of developing countries also leaves room for speculation that African 
nations which heavily invested in infrastructure development may face negative 
consequences in the not-so-distant future. 
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Chapter 2 - Extractive and Non-Extractive Industries: National Oil         
Companies and State-owned Enterprises 
  
Extractive and Non-Extractive Industries: Petroleum, Mining and Timber 
 Before delving into the activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises in 
Africa, it is important to briefly examine the metamorphosis of SOEs in China.  
After the Chinese Civil War ended, Chair of the Communist Party, Mao Zedong 
established the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, and as the country 
evolved, so did its state-owned enterprises.  
 As there was neither private wealth nor any organized structure to take on 
 … [post-war development] it was the state enterprises that gradually 
 undertook all the nation-building tasks …. Since economic reform and 
 opening-up policies  began in 1978, China’s SOEs have undergone a long 
 process of gradual and progressive transformation …. The number of 
 SOEs owned by the central government ... [fell] from 196 in 2003 to 
 115 in March 2013. But many smaller SOEs are still owned by different 
 levels of sub-national (local) government.178 
 
 In 2003, the control of SOEs managed by state ministries was assigned to 
two primary, state-owned divestment companies: The State‐owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council and 
Central Huijin Ltd. This also functioned to separate state financing mechanisms 
from the ministries that controlled the SOEs.179 
                                            
178. Fan Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, The Role of State-owned Enterprises in the Chinese 
Economy, China-United States Exchange Foundation, Chapter 16, 2013, pp. 2 - 6. 
http://bit.ly/2b270bO. Accessed on August 5, 2016. 
 
179. “Reform of the institutional arrangements governing the state’s ownership of the SOEs 
owned by the central government took an important step forward in 2003 when the State‐owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council and Central 
Huijin Ltd. were set up as investors on behalf of the state. Ownership of many SOEs was 
transferred away from line ministries to SASAC and Central Huijin …. Under this framework, most 
major industrial SOEs are now owned on behalf of the state by SASAC, while state‐owned 
financial institutions are owned by Central Huijin.” Gang and Hope, Role of State-owned 
Enterprises, 2-6. 
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While this dissertation does not allow for an analysis of both the central 
government and sub-national SOEs in Africa, it will examine what might be 
referred to as the ‘flagship’ SOEs and NOCs. Thus, it will scrutinize industrial 
activities that are not directly connected to either the defense-industrial or 
military-industrial complex, yet still play a unique role in China’s expansion in 
Africa. National oil companies, and state-owned enterprises have a long history 
of involvement on the continent, and as China’s drive to increase its resource 
security has grown, so has the level of its extractive activities in Africa.  
 “The success of Chinese resource diplomacy in Africa can be measured in 
terms of China’s presence across the continent in … the major resource 
economies there. It has gone from a status of no position in the resource market 
in 1995 to a standing as a significant player … with oil leases from Angola to 
Sudan and mining concessions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) to South Africa.”180 The majority of the PRC’s trade-agreements to date, 
with the exception of South Africa, have been forged with oil-producing states. 
However, while China’s primary resource focus in Africa is oil, it is also seeking 
timber and rare earths.181 “The African continent possesses a generous 
endowment in natural resources, namely hydrocarbons, minerals and timber, 
                                            
180. Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves, China and Africa’s Natural Resources: The 
Challenges and Implications for Development and Governance, SAIIA - South African Institute of 
International Affairs, September 2009, p. 4. http://bit.ly/2av5mPW. Accessed on December 14, 
2015. 
 
181. Ian Taylor, China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa, International Affairs, Volume 82, Number 5, 
2006, p. 2. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/stable/pdf/3874208.pdf. Accessed on December 
4, 2015. 
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which remain mostly untapped due to decades of political instability, poor 
infrastructure and lack of investment.”182  
 As discussed in the first chapter, NOCs and SOEs play an important role 
in Angola-mode infrastructure-for-resources agreements. As stated, these SOEs 
include companies that receive rights to extract and export raw materials as 
payment from African host countries for infrastructure work done by separate 
Chinese SOEs, not necessarily involved in the extractive industries. While 
Chapter 1 focused on the Angola-mode financing mechanism, infrastructure 
projects, and the socio-economic effects they generated in the respective host-
countries, Chapter 2 will examine how Chinese SOEs involved in extraction 
operations affect stabilization and conflict in the regions within which they 
operate, albeit with more of a focus on conflict, human rights violations, arms 
movement and internally displaced persons (IDPs).  
 The first chapter was dedicated to explaining the financing mechanism, 
and detailed the different types of infrastructure projects and their varying effects 
within the different regions. This chapter will focus on the effects of the NOCs 
and extractive-related SOEs versus examining the positive and negative aspects 
of the Angola-mode itself and the correlative infrastructure created as an inherent 
part of the financing mechanism. 
 When Chinese NOCs, mining and logging companies are not involved in 
Angola-mode financing mechanisms, they frequently enter contracts for 
                                            
182.  Alden and Alves, Africa’s Natural Resources, 4. 
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exploration, extraction, and exportation rights with African countries, sometimes 
independent of infrastructure creation projects, and make payments with money, 
weapons, construction equipment, military equipment or a combination of any of 
the aforementioned. In most cases, the SOEs involved in the extraction of natural 
resources primarily focus on projects such as pipelines and roadways by which 
the extracted material can be conveyed to ports-of-departure.  
 “Despite being among the major oil producers ... and being second only to 
the US in refinery capacity and output … China is only able to provide for less 
than half of its domestic oil needs,” thus its drive to secure oil accessions in 
LDCs which Western companies consider to risk-prone to operate in.183  
 Since China’s energy policy is driven by numerous state actors, 
exploration and extraction operations are often complicated by the conflicting 
agendas of various types of SOEs, all of which operate semi-autonomously.184 
In addition to the cloudy dynamics generated by competing Chinese-owned 
SOEs and NOCs, their operational goals are further complicated by the 
complexity and disorganization of Beijing’s ministerial bureaucracy. This appears 
to facilitate a lack of oversight or formation of definitive policies by which China’s 
African-based extraction operations are guided.  
 “Concurrently, four ministries contribute to energy policymaking: the 
Ministry of Land and Resources (oversees natural resources), the Ministry of 
Finance (tax and fiscal policies), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and 
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MOFCOM [Ministry of Commerce].185 The last two play a bigger role not only in 
resource diplomacy formulation, but also in its implementation.”186 Furthermore, 
provincial actors from major Chinese metropolitan areas in which industrial 
operations are based often operate internationally with little to no feedback from 
Beijing.187   
 Bräutigam states that, while the activities of Chinese extractive industries 
in Africa are generally beneficial to the host countries, issues related to “lower 
labor, social and environmental standards” may create risks.188 Other sources 
indicate that Chinese SOE and NOC operations on the continent may create 
more issues than benefits, especially in countries, which lack infrastructure and 
governance. According to a 2013 Chatham House Report, for example, the 
dynamics generated by SOEs with conflicting agendas in Africa do pose various 
threats to lesser developed, resource rich nations.  
 Home-country governments of extractives companies … need to 
 implement and enforce the standards to which they sign up at the 
 international level such as those pertaining to … human rights …. 
 [Secondly] Even for … [states] with sophisticated institutions and 
 experience, careful choices need to be made where projects would 
 degrade national assets such as major forest or … ecosystems.189 
                                            
185. While the four ministries referenced contribute to energy policy-making, the Chinese 
Communist Party maintains ‘administrative control’ of SOEs through the State Council, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5. 
 
186. Ibid, 10. 
 
187. Ibid. 
 
188. Deborah Bräutigam, China in Africa: What Can Western Donors Learn? Norfund - 
Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries, August 2011, p. 9. http://bit.ly/2a3J1Lh. 
Accessed on March 24, 2016. 
 
189.  Paul Stevens, Jaakko Kooroshy, Glada Lahn and Bernice Lee, Conflict and Coexistence 
in the Extractive Industries, A Chatham House Report, November 2013, p. 109. 
http://bit.ly/2aiAJgS. Accessed on March 28, 2016. 
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 This chapter of the dissertation will examine the impact of extractive 
industries on regional conflict and stability through an analysis of several types of 
state-owned enterprises in different geographical locations, commencing with 
NOCs. Subsequently the author will examine mining and logging operations. 
National Oil Companies 
 Even as NOCs have increased their international presence in least-
developed regions such as resource-rich African states as part of China’s ‘Going-
out’ policy, the Chinese Communist Party remains at the helm of their 
operations.190  
 The ownership and control of shares and assets of SOEs fall on the 
 authority of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
 (SASAC) …. Although the SASAC’s responsibilities do not extend to the 
 company operations, production and development, it holds the majority of 
 shares of SOEs and has executive control over corporate policy and 
 executive appointment …. The decentralization of … [China’s] petroleum 
 industry [which began in the late 1990’s gave] substantial autonomy to 
 NOCs and diluted the central government’s regulatory control.”191  
  
 Figure Six diagrams Chinese Communist Party administrative control over 
the three state holding companies, which represent China’s three largest oil 
companies and their respective limited liability companies: the Chinese National 
                                            
190. “As the NOCs gain more assets domestically and internationally through their mother 
companies and subsidiaries, their financial and political clout are also expanding. However, this 
study argues that major national oil companies … still remain under the authority of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).” Ellenor Grace M. Francisco, Petroleum Politics: China and Its National 
Oil Companies, Centre Internationale de Formation Europèenne, June 26, 2013, p. 19.   
http://www.ie-ei.eu/Ressources/file /memoires/2013/francisco.pdf. Accessed on March 14, 2016. 
 
191. Ibid, 12-20.  
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Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).192 
Figure 5 - Administrative Control of NOCs193 
It is generally agreed that the exploration and extraction operations of 
Chinese NOCs do facilitate an influx of funds for the governments of the host-
countries; however, the effects of NOC-operations on the populations of the 
states in which they maintain a presence are complex and enigmatic. In many 
cases, deals between African governments and Chinese NOCs are a 
192. PetroChina is a subsidiary of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation is the “parent” corporation of Sinopec. It is common
for the names of the subsidiary NOCs and their parent companies to be used synonymously
which often confounds the understanding of Chinese SOE activities in Africa and other least-
developed regions.
193. Francisco, Petroleum Politics, 21.
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springboard for other Chinese activities in those particular regions, and frequently 
those areas are within conflict-prone territories. 
Chinese NOC Activity in Sudan and South Sudan 
 While South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, I am going to 
examine both Sudan and South Sudan together since their respective regional 
security issues remain integrated. Sudan represents the PRC’s NOC-activity 
prototype model in Africa.  
 According to Daniel Large, exploration and extraction agreements 
between the PRC and African host-countries such as Sudan, open the door for 
Chinese imports, exports of other natural resources, and an increase in 
diplomatic and military cooperation. While Large’s work focuses primarily on 
Sudan, his examination of Sino-Sudanese interaction provides a general 
framework by which Beijing’s energy policies and petroleum extraction 
operations can be assessed across the continent.  
China’s role entails a full spectrum of political, economic and military 
relations, as well as educational, cultural and social relations of the 
Chinese population in Sudan. The most manifest thrust of the Chinese 
role may be economic, but this has long been intertwined with multiple 
levels (central states, Chinese provinces or Sudanese states) and types 
(government, corporate and political party) of formal and informal political 
relations. The drivers of the Chinese government’s policy engagement 
involve a fusion of central state political imperatives and economic 
interests, in Sudan and its neighbouring regions, as well as corporate oil 
diplomacy. The result, like that of other powers, is not always unified or 
coherent policy, let alone actual engagement.194 
 
                                            
194. Daniel Large, Between the CPA and Southern Independence: China’s Post-Conflict 
Engagement in Sudan, South African Institute of International Affairs, Global Powers and Africa 
Programme, Occasional Paper 115, April 2012, p. 7. http://bit.ly/2cnnWfq. Accessed on October 
27, 2015. 
 98 
 
 China’s investment in Sudan’s petroleum industry began in the 1990’s.  “In 
1996 … Sudan became the first country to receive Chinese aid to finance oil 
exploration, in a joint venture with China National Oil Corporation [also referred to 
as CNPC]195 …. [S]ince 1999, China National Petroleum Company [CNPC] … 
has invested more than $15 billion in Sudan.196 Currently, it’s estimated that 
CNPC owns half of Sudan’s refineries.”197  
 Until the late 1990’s, Chinese NOC-activity was limited primarily to Sudan, 
however at the present time “Chinese oil companies are operating in nearly 20 
African countries … and pose a significant strategic and economic 
challenge to … [petroleum extraction operations owned by other countries] which 
for many years enjoyed unparalleled ascendancy in the continent’s energy 
sector.”198  
 In addition to CNPC’s burgeoning activities in Africa, SINOPEC and 
CNOOC have also expanded their operations over the last decade and a half, 
                                            
195. Deborah Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 2009, p. 81. Bräutigam refers to CNPC as the 
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and the amount of their investments has been substantial. CNPC and SINOPEC 
are the principal Chinese NOCs operating in Sudan and South Sudan, and they 
maintain a presence in the most conflict-ridden areas within the region. The 
location of these two SOEs is demonstrated in Map 3 below, which also denotes 
concession block numbers and the conflict zones within Abyei Province and Blue 
Nile State. 
100 
 Map 3 - CNPC and SINOPEC Operations in Sudan and South Sudan199 
199. Figure 6 has been modified for this analysis to reflect the activities of China’s major
NOC’s in the region: CNPC and SINOEC. Conflict zones in Blue Nile State and the Abyei
Province are indicated by the long gun icon. European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) (2007).
Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining http://bit.ly/2bSH8PA. Accessed on April 30, 2016.
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 Even though South Sudan declared its independence from the Sudan in 
July 2011, both countries remain tied to one another. The majority of the oil-rich 
blocks are located in South Sudan; however, Sudan controls the pipelines that 
lead to Port Sudan. “The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) receives 98% of 
its revenue from oil. Sudan, on the other hand, owns the entire pipeline 
infrastructure required to transport the oil out of Sudan so it can be exported. Oil 
also provides over half of the Government of Sudan’s (GoS) revenues …. 
Chinese aid and investment are intertwined making it difficult to quantify dollar 
amounts for either but it is clear that Sudan has been a large recipient of both, 
with South Sudan … [receiving aid] also.”200 
 The PRC has subsidized both governments. China’s financing and 
support of Sudan’s government, led by Omar al-Bashir has injected Sudan’s 
economy with billions of dollars: “China has been generous in its loans and aid 
packages to Sudan as part of a strategy to build goodwill, sweeten bids and 
increase its leverage over the government.”201 Subsequent to South Sudan’s 
independence, China began to funnel funds to the new nation, which included 
$43 million dollars for geological studies, in the belief that the funding would help 
its SOEs to obtain mining licenses.202 
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 102 
 
Ramifications of Chinese NOC Activity in Sudan and South Sudan 
 There is no question that China has been a major benefactor to both 
Sudan and South Sudan, however the effects of its activities on both countries 
are contentious.  
 Khartoum’s government … has benefitted from the sale of Sudan’s oil to 
 China …. These benefits have come in different forms. Sudan has been 
 paid billions of dollars by … Chinese oil companies which sounds like … [it 
 would be a] good thing for Sudan’s economy. Unfortunately, it has not 
 been the case. The new found wealth has helped Bashir’s regime to wage 
 relentless civil wars in Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, 
 Abyei and Darfur. Since Khartoum began signing oil deals with Chinese
 oil companies, Sudan has acquired more weapons which exponentially 
 has increased the intensity of civil wars across the country. In places like 
 Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, [the] Khartoum government has 
 carried out many atrocities some of which have been labeled as a 
 genocide or crimes against humanity.203 
 
While Map 3 indicates the location of conflicts and ethnic clashes in 
relation to Chinese NOC operations in Sudan and South Sudan (specifically 
Blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7), Map 4 reveals the scope of conflicts across both                           
states. There are fifteen different conflict locations designated by red stars in     
Map 4, and the ethnic groups in most if not all of these locations are using 
weapons and equipment supplied by China. 
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  Map 4  - Conflicts and Ethnic Clashes in Sudan and South Sudan204 
 Despite the fact the PRC infuses money into least-developed regions, it 
appears as though in many cases the benefits to the host states are 
overshadowed by collateral damage experienced by the local populations. The 
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presence of Chinese NOCs in Sudan and South Sudan creates several 
problems, which are related to each other. They include but are not limited to an 
increase in ethnic conflicts, ethnic cleansing or genocide, loss of ancestral land, 
internally displaced persons, and damage to the environment resulting from 
extractive operations of multi-national corporations (MNCs). 
 Map 4 reveals the extent of conflict in both Sudan and South Sudan, and 
while the onus for these inter-ethnic tensions cannot be placed solely on the 
Chinese, the PRC has made funding, weapons and military equipment available 
to the GoS, which inevitably facilitated regional destabilization in regions such as 
Darfur, Abyei Province and the Blue Nile State. 
 In LDCs, it is difficult to put forward an accurate account of conflict-related 
fatalities and casualties, however a 2008 BBC Article entitled China is Fuelling 
War in Darfur notes that GoS troops, funded, weaponized and in some cases 
trained by China were responsible for 300,000 deaths in the Darfur Region alone; 
and “prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC) … [stated] war crimes 
by Sudan's Arab-dominated government … included summary executions, rape 
and torture.”205 According to Eric Reeves, the last official mortality assessment in 
the Darfur region in 2008 was a gross underestimate. He calculated the mortality 
rate to be closer to 500,000 by 2010.206 
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As previously discussed, the regional destabilization and inter-ethnic 
conflict in these areas has resulted in millions of IDPs in both countries. By 2008, 
it was estimated that fighting in Darfur resulted in more than two million people 
fleeing their ancestral land from GoS troops and the pro-government (GoS) Arab 
Janjaweed militia.207 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
estimated that more than 1,474,400 people from South Sudan had been 
displaced between mid-December 2013 and March 30, 2015 due to ethnic 
clashes and these figures do not take into account all of the 15 conflict areas 
designated in Map 4.208 Reuter’s published an article which maintained that as of 
July 2014, I total, more than 2.3 million people were displaced as a result of the 
Darfur Conflict.209  
As both Map 3 and Map 4 demonstrate, many of the conflicts in Sudan 
and South Sudan are in oil-rich regions where the PRC has mounted oil 
exploration and extraction-related operations manned by Chinese workers. While 
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the lack of stability and potential for conflicts in these areas pre-dated China’s 
presence in the region, the fashion in which the Chinese assisted the GoS has 
contributed to regional destabilization, conflict intensity, the number of conflict-
related fatalities and IDPs.  
 While the press often covers conflicts and IDPs in Sudan, other negative 
affects of petroleum extraction operations are not given as much attention in the 
media. China has a poor environmental impact record at home and abroad, and 
its activities across both Sudan and South Sudan have created environmental 
issues for ethnic groups whose ancestral has been tainted by extraction-related 
pollution.  
A 2009 CNN report revealed that several of the areas which have come 
under criticism for environmental issues, fall within the boundaries of oil 
extraction facilities operated by Chinese NOCs. Oil fields owned by White Nile 
Petroleum, a joint Sino-Sudanese venture were discovered to be tainted by high 
concentrations of cadmium, lead and chromium - a known carcinogen.210 These 
facilities lie within a swampy region of wetlands in South Sudan called the Sudd. 
 Stretching over 30,000 square kilometers, the Sudd supports an array of 
 wildlife and waters adjacent pastureland. It acts both as a huge sponge 
 and a filter for much of east Africa and is vulnerable to pollution and 
 degradation. 
 
 The Nuer people who live in the village of Rier, at the edge of the Sudd 
 and the oilfields don't have the means to test the water they and their 
                                            
210. The Greater Nile Operating Company (GNOC), located in South Sudan, has also been 
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 livestock use. Nor does the regional government, which says only that 
 it's "suspicious" of the water quality in this area. 
 
 The villagers just relate what they see. One of them … [stated] that before 
 the oil companies arrived "… cattle didn't die and our children didn't die. 
 Our water was good...now the water is bad." 
 
 [However] there is no independent evidence that the oil companies' 
 operations have caused sickness or death; and they certainly deny that. 
 But … [the Governor of Unity State] told CNN oil exploration here has 
 been characterized by one word: mismanagement ….211 
 
But in March 2016, it was estimated by the German NGO, Sign of Hope, 
that “180,000 people face life-threatening risks from oil-related water  
pollution.”212 According to a May 2016 Wilson Center Report, “beyond conflict, 
South Sudanese communities have … been ringing the alarm bell about pollution 
and health hazards caused by the oil industry … Heavy metals, from leaking 
pipelines and refineries … [as a result of] damage from fighting, have leaked into 
the groundwater.”213 The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has also 
noted that pollution and other environmental issues in Sudan have the potential 
to create ‘conflict flashpoints.’214 
 Targeting of Chinese-owned NOCs by Indigenous Groups 
 In many locations where China is involved in extractive operations on the 
African continent, its facilities and personnel have become targets of violence 
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initiated by local indigenous groups or militias, which oppose the central 
government of the host countries in which Chinese NOCs operate. There are 
several reasons why Chinese facilities and their employees are singled out for 
aggression. 
 Local communities believe the Chinese government uses its national oil 
companies to finance and weaponize African regimes with poor human rights 
records. State-owned enterprises are perceived by regional ethnic groups to be 
strawman-proxies acting on Beijing’s behalf. Furthermore, environmental 
damage and loss of ancestral land that has traditionally been used for grazing 
and subsistence agriculture also foster tensions which may lead to African-on-
Chinese violence. 
In Sudan, the GoS has deployed both military and government-backed 
militias to drive farmers and herdsmen from their ancestral lands in order to make 
room for PRC NOC operations, while simultaneously defending Chinese-owned 
installations with arms and equipment supplied by China.  
  Various human rights groups have repeatedly accused Sudan of 
 systematically massacring civilians and chasing them off ancestral lands 
 to clear oil producing areas. For years rebels have attacked oil 
 installations in Sudan, hoping to deprive the government of any means to   
pursue a civil war that has claimed so many lives. Yet …Chinese laborers   
… [have been] shielded from these attacks, working under the protection 
 of Sudanese government troops armed mostly with Chinese-made 
 weapons.215 
 
 For more than a decade Chinese NOCs and their personnel have been 
targeted in countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and Nigeria. Facilities 
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have been attacked, workers have been taken hostage and in some cases, 
Chinese NOC employees have lost their lives as a result of the violence. In 2004, 
“two Chinese workers … [were] abducted by anti-Sudanese government militants 
in western Sudan”216 and in 2008, “Five Chinese oil workers kidnapped in [the 
Kordofan region of] Sudan … [were] killed.”217 In 2014 more Chinese were 
kidnapped in the South Kordofan region.218 
 While the impact of Chinese-owned NOCS in Sudan and South Sudan 
exemplifies Sino-African petro-dynamics across the continent, it is important to 
briefly discuss other acts of violence directed towards Chinese petroleum 
facilities and personnel in order to demonstrate that China’s extractive operations 
and the personnel which staff them are often not well-received by the local 
communities. 
In April 2006, a Nigerian militia warned that all Chinese citizens were 
considered targets since the PRC government was involved in potentially 
questionable dealings with the Nigerian government. 
 Militants in Nigeria's volatile oil-producing region detonated a car bomb … 
 and issued a warning that investors and officials from China would be 
 ‘treated as thieves’ and targeted in future attacks …. A spokesman for the 
 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta said … the car-bomb 
 attack was ‘the final warning’ before the militants turned their attention to 
 oil workers … ‘soft oil industry targets’ …. [He] specifically criticized the 
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 Chinese …. ‘We wish to warn the Chinese government and its … [NOCs] 
 to steer well clear of the Niger Delta …. Chinese citizens found in oil 
 installations will be treated as thieves. The Chinese government by 
 investing in stolen crude places its citizens in our line of fire.219 
 
 In 2007, there were at least two attacks against employees of Chinese-
owned SOEs in East Africa. Chinese Road and Bridge Construction personnel 
were fatally attacked in Kenya resulting in a fatality,220 and an attack on the 
Chinese-owned Zhongyuan Petroleum facility in Ethiopia’s restive Ogaden region 
in made international news when Chinese nationals working at the facility 
engaged in a firefight with Ogaden-based rebels. 
 In April 2007 nine employees of Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration 
 Bureau, a subsidiary company of China Petroleum and Chemical 
 Corporation (Sinopec), and sixty-five Ethiopians were killed by the Ogaden 
 National Liberation Front (ONLF), a group opposed to the central 
 government of Ethiopia.221 The event was clearly a setback for Chinese 
 companies that sought to explore oil in the Ogaden region of eastern 
 Ethiopia. 222   
  
 In 2009, Afrik News published an article that indicated aggression towards 
Chinese nationals was also increasing in Angola. “The spate of violence against 
Chinese nationals in Angola … [has become] an issue of concern. A sense of 
neocolonialism amongst some Angolans is breeding xenophobia that borders on 
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racism.”223 The trend continued in 2010, when separatists in Cabinda attacked a 
convoy transporting Chinese workers. A Stratfor analysis stated   
 Two soldiers from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), which had been 
 contracted by Angolan state-owned oil company Sonangol to protect the 
 Chinese workers, were killed in the ambush. No Chinese were reported 
 killed or injured …. FLEC rebels … have shown a desire to target Chinese 
 oil workers in the past … [and] this marks at least the fourth such incident 
 in the last 15 months …. In all likelihood [as a result of attacks on Chinese 
 workers], there will also be an increase in Angolan counterterrorist 
 operations against FLEC.”224 
  
 While Boko Haram is principally based in Nigeria, they crossed into 
Cameroon to launch attacks against Chinese facilities and personnel. In May 
2014, “Suspected Boko Haram rebels from Nigeria … attacked a Chinese work 
site in northern Cameroon, killing at least one Cameroonian soldier while 10 
Chinese workers were missing and believed to have been abducted.”225 So from 
2004 to 2015, Chinese personnel working at NOC facilities were attacked in at 
least five different countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Kenya, and Angola.  
Thus in conclusion, it is possible to surmise that while on one hand the 
governments of African host countries encourage the entrance of Chinese-owned 
extractive operations and SOEs, on the other hand, the general population is not 
receptive to the influx of the Chinese. If resentment is commensurate with 
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alienation and displacement, then Chinese-owned NOCs may have a rocky 
future with the average African, regardless of the stance of his or her 
government. 
National Oil Companies Summary 
 Due to the PRC’s pervasive involvement in the region, Sudan and South 
Sudan are the most important templates by which the impact of Chinese NOCs 
may be gauged on a Pan-African basis. Their activities have facilitated 
destabilization and ethnic cleansing, exacerbated conflicts resulting from 
territorial claims, adversely affected environmental conditions in the region, 
contributed to violence which has resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced persons, and triggered aggression from local populations targeting 
Chinese NOC facilities.  
 While China is quick to claim ‘non-interference’ during its interactions with 
LDCs in Africa, the fact that the PRC supplies weapons and provides training to 
the militaries of governments involved in regional conflict makes China’s 
proclamations of non-interference contestable.  
 “What makes China’s involvement in Sudan so controversial … are the 
atrocities … [which have taken] place within Sudan and China’s undying support 
of the Sudanese government. China … [has provided] diplomatic protection to a 
government accused by the United Nations of genocide in the western region of 
Darfur,” writes Cindy Hurst, of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office. 226 
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 A complex argument can be made that while the activities of Chinese 
national oil companies in Africa serve to stabilize the positions of the ruling 
governments (or regimes) of host-states, the socio-economic, environmental and 
human rights effects on the general population actually serve to destabilize the 
regions in which they operate, which in turn creates dynamics which are 
conducive for conflict and unrest.  
 Over the past decade, China has quietly deployed (non-UNPKO) security 
personnel to NOC operations on the continent. “In at least one case,” according 
to the Eurasia Group, “Chinese nationals are providing security for energy 
infrastructure directly. Though their exact numbers are unclear, armed Chinese 
security personnel are routinely present at key oil facilities in Sudan.”227 
According to the same source, in 2006 “decommissioned People’s Liberation 
Army soldiers [were embedded with Chinese NOC personnel in Sudan and] 
charged with protecting China’s investments …. [and] vulnerable oil installations 
… often in concert with Sudanese troops.”228   
 A 2007 Eurasia Group analysis of Chinese NOC operations in Sudan 
noted “China appears more intent upon contributing to efforts to address … 
conflict … though it still prefers solutions that neither draw attention to itself, nor 
put its resources at risk.”229 However, the authors of the analysis do not address 
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either the effects of Chinese NOC operations on the local population(s), 
especially the displacement of local indigenous groups whose areas of habitation 
overlap with exploration and extraction operations, or the reaction(s) of these 
indigenous groups. 
 Although the PRC afforded the GoS with diplomatic support, and 
facilitated an influx of weapons and military equipment to GoS-backed militias, 
there are indications that Beijing has finally begun to recognize its policy of non-
interference has facilitated conflict while negatively affecting regional stability. 
This in turn has threatened the security of its NOC operations in Sudan and 
South Sudan.230 
 The way China engaged with the Darfur crisis provides a case study of 
 how China’s foreign policy has … evolved over time …. In the early years 
 of the Darfur crisis, China, true to its stated policy of non-interference, 
 treated the Darfur situation as an internal conflict. However, over time, 
 China [has] changed its stance - first shifting to passive support of the 
 GoS without opposing international efforts to intervene in Darfur, and 
 eventually beginning to play an aggressive diplomatic role in bringing the 
 UN peacekeeping force into Sudan. China was the only country to engage 
 in direct diplomacy and negotiated directly with Bashir, and successfully 
 pressured Khartoum to cooperate with the UN.231  
 
 China is not adopting a more humanitarian approach in its areas of 
operation due to moral or ethical considerations, but due to a realization that 
funneling arms and military equipment to regions, which have a history of inter-
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ethnic conflict, ultimately threatens its energy security. At some point in the past 
several years, the power brokers in Beijing decided that energy security and 
uninterrupted resource lines of communication trumped revenues from the sales 
of weapons and military equipment to African LDCs.     
 PRC NOCs are not in Africa only to explore and extract oil. They also 
serve as diplomatic flagships and currency funnels to the African elite. The 
Chinese government uses NOC contracts with host-governments as leverage for 
other deals and activities. Setting up oil extraction facilities in African LDCs acts 
as a primer for other undertakings. In addition to securing resources, China 
utilizes petroleum exploration and extraction deals with African countries as 
economic, diplomatic and socio-political force magnifiers. As the Eurasia Group 
noted: 
 Chinese leadership wants to pursue policies that will secure supplies 
 of oil and natural gas and cement a strengthened role for the major 
 Chinese oil [companies] …. While the governments of many Western 
 countries, including the United States, usually take a relatively hands off 
 approach to intervening in oil companies’ investment and purchasing 
 decisions, there is a consensus in China that the state must use policy 
 tools to secure ownership of foreign upstream production assets by 
 Chinese companies.232 
 
Utilizing Sudan and South Sudan to illustrate the impact of Chinese NOCs 
in Africa, what can be concluded? China funnels billions of dollars to African host 
countries, creates infrastructure to facilitate mineral extraction and serves as a 
regime-stabilizer by funding often-authoritarian governments. The benefits of 
these financial infusions to local populations are negligible and PRC NOC 
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operations often result in environmental damage, loss of ancestral land, IDP’s, 
African-on-Chinese violence, and a spike in conflict and regional destabilization.  
In some instances, African officials abandon the official ‘pro-Beijing’ party-
line espoused by their leaders and express their concern over the lack of 
transparency of Chinese-run NOCs, and the corresponding benefits, or lack 
thereof to the local population. The activities of Chinese oil companies in South 
Sudan have not been without criticism, and it is evident that Beijing is beginning 
to have issues with maintaining its policy of ‘non-involvement’ and also with how 
its NOCs deal with the African host countries within which they operate.  
[In] February ... 2012 [the] South Sudan[ese]  ... said it ... [gave] the 
president of Petrodar - a Chino-Malaysian oil company - 72 hours to leave 
the country [after] accusing him of not cooperating with the government 
and continuing to receive instructions from the government in Khartoum 
.... [South Sudan’s] oil minister ... stated ... [Petrodar was] not respecting 
the terms of reference of the memorandum of understanding which ... [it] 
signed in December [2011] .... South Sudan also [accused Petrodar] of  
dishonesty. The ministry of petroleum ... [stated] it discovered that 
the company was producing 40,000 barrels per day (bpd) more than the 
230,000 bpd it was declaring.233 
 
 Subsequently, in May 2016 there was a sharp exchange of words 
between the Chinese ambassador to South Sudan and the South Sudanese 
Minister of Finance and Planning, who criticized Chinese NOC operations in the 
newly-independent country. “[Minister] David Deng Athorbei accused the 
Chinese government of stealing South Sudanese oil and resources without doing 
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anything for the suffering South Sudanese people.”234 The Chinese embassy 
refuted the accusations and responded that Minister Athorbei, a member of 
President Salva Kiir’s administration, had adopted a position that ran counter to 
that which his party held.  
So in reality, what is occurring in countries such as South Sudan? Are the 
operations of PRC-run NOCs in African LDCs benefitting the general population, 
or the respective governments? Viewed through an idealistic Western 
perspective, China’s oil extraction operations are proving to be a hindrance to 
progress on the continent. In The Politics of Oil: China and Sudan - A Well-Oiled 
Relationship, Hurst notes that “China’s policy of not interfering with another 
country’s internal affairs make it an ideal partner for many nations with a history 
of human rights violations. China’s growing influence in Africa is therefore 
counterproductive to western objectives of promoting human rights and 
abolishing corruption. China’s growing involvement in Africa could actually make 
African governments more corrupt.”235  
Mining Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 While there are some similarities between the effects caused by both 
mining and NOC operations, mining operations in some cases generate 
dynamics which while in part may be negative, vary from those created by 
Chinese-owned NOCs. Some of the main differences are related to resource 
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accessibility, transportability, salability and value. Oil is not easy to access or 
transport, it is difficult to sell on the black market in its unprocessed form, and 
finally when its weight and volume are considered, it is not a black market 
commodity that can easily be sold by small groups or independent operators. 
 Compared to oil, strategic minerals, precious metals, and gemstones are 
often easier to access, extract, transport and sell in a clandestine fashion. Even 
though the terms ‘rare earth minerals,’ ‘rare earth elements’ and ‘strategic 
minerals’ are often used synonymously, they have different meanings. Rare earth 
minerals are minerals that are comprised of at least one major rare earth element 
constituent, while “strategic minerals are minerals containing rare elements that 
[specifically] can be used in defense, energy or industry. Because there are a 
limited number of companies and nations that control a majority of the supply, 
strategic minerals are often subject to unpredictable fluctuations in price and 
availability.”236 
  “The unequal geographic distribution of strategic minerals … has led to 
individual nations dominating certain industries. China possesses a near-
monopoly on most [Rare Earth Elements] REEs.”237 In an effort to guarantee 
resource security, China has made major forays into mineral-rich area such as 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC contains 40 percent of the 
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world’s cobalt and 64 percent of the world's coltan and is also host to large 
deposits of “tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold; collectively known as ‘3TG 
minerals.’”238  
 In addition to oil, Beijing has also targeted 3TG minerals and cobalt for 
extraction in Africa. Thus, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Copper Belt has 
seen a surge in the presence of Chinese mining companies since the early 
2000’s. “China’s consumption of coltan is part of its “go global” strategy of 
sourcing overseas raw materials, particularly from Africa.”239 According to a prior 
Governor of Katanga Province in the DRC, “more than 60 of Katanga's 75 
processing plants are owned by Chinese companies and adds that 90 percent of 
the region's minerals go to China.”240 
 As the first section of Chapter 2 revealed, Chinese-owned SOEs involved 
in extractive industries often generate serious issues for the populations of their 
African host-countries, and in the cases of REE and strategic minerals extraction 
operations, the negative impact may be even more substantial. 
 Valuable mineral deposits in developing countries can create nearly as 
 many problems as they solve. Artisanal or small-scale mining (ASM) 
 accounts for nearly a quarter of all non-fuel minerals mined worldwide, 
 generally in developing countries where regulations are lax. These 
 operations are largely run by individuals unaffiliated with any government 
 or regulatory body. Working conditions in these small-scale mines are   
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 typically unsafe and environmentally unsound. Additionally, large multi-
 national corporations operating in underdeveloped countries may take 
 advantage of relaxed regulations to the detriment of local communities.241 
 
Health and Safety Issues 
 Since mining operations are often in remote locales, the conditions, which 
are created by such operations often escape scrutiny. In many cases, the mines 
are run with little to no regard for the safety or health of the workers. If and when 
protective clothing is issued to mining employees, it is often sub-standard or has 
been used to the point that it is ineffectual. “Health and safety issues are the 
main concerns for workers. At all stages of mining, from extraction to processing, 
workers are directly exposed to various toxic substances, as well as to the risk of 
accidents.”242  
 Health risks and accidents could be reduced by providing workers with 
 decent protective equipment (e.g. boots, mask, gloves, clothing, hard hats, 
 etc.), which should of course be regularly replaced. Workers handling 
 unprocessed copper and cobalt are exposed to radioactive elements but 
 in most cases they work with their bare hands, without a mask. 
 Companies do not provided [sic] sufficient equipment and even when 
 workers have been given some protective gear it is worn out. 243 
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 Local workers are often forced to work long in dangerous conditions, 
underground in carelessly constructed and poorly ventilated passageways, or 
near smelters without protective clothing. “Sources [have] confirmed that there 
are frequent injuries and some fatal accidents as a result of landslides, falling 
boulders or asphyxiation due to a lack of adequate ventilation. Ventilation 
systems are rarely put in place and, where they are used, they depend on small - 
often manual - pumps. Miners also described several cases where men had 
been seriously or permanently injured while mining.”244 While the DRC’s 
enforcement of safety standards is weak, Chinese mining companies operate in 
what are considered a haphazard fashion even by local standards. “Chinese-
owned smelters … are particularly prone to accidents that maim or kill 
workers.”245 
Most mining operations have no provisions for work-related injuries, and 
rarely provide their African employees with health insurance.246 “Chinese 
companies are failing to register workers with the INSS [the Congolese Social 
Security Institute] thereby depriving them of state insurance benefits. By refusing 
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to provide sick pay or to cover the costs of medical treatment for work-related 
accidents and occupational illnesses the Chinese mining companies are in 
breach of Congolese law.”247 
 Another aspect of Chinese presence in the region is the facilitation and 
enablement of the local sex trade, and the spread of disease, through sex 
workers. “Prostitution, promiscuity, lack of sanitation and hygiene contribute to 
high levels of disease and health problems in the miners’ camps. The presence 
of current and demobilized soldiers, a group with elevated levels of HIV/AIDS 
infection, also increases the risk of dissemination in the local population.”248 
 While some Chinese companies do provide nominal health care for 
Chinese employees, HIV testing is usually voluntary and the PRC-owned SOEs 
will often let their personnel continue working as long as they are physically 
capable. Other Chinese-owned companies have no contingency policy for the 
transmission of communicable diseases between employees and locals, or vice 
versa. These conditions create unique transmission networks in which Chinese 
employees, African laborers, women, and girls from local communities are all 
potential biological vectors. 
 For example, “in Zambia, CCCM [Chinese Collom Coal Mine] 
management sees no need for an HIV/AIDS workplace policy, insisting that 
Chinese staff are disciplined and do not indulge in extramarital affairs. This 
obviously implies that the health of local employees is of no interest. The 
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perception that the Chinese are disciplined and do not engage in sexual activities 
with locals is not correct. In Luansha … Chinese workers are dating young girls 
of 12 and 15 years old … [and have been] arrested.”249  
Employee Abuse and Human Rights 
In addition to dangerous work conditions in all stages of the mining process, 
there is evidence that Chinese managers and supervisors have acted in a 
chronically negligent manner and failed to observe basic human rights of their 
indigenous employees.  
 Not only are health and safety standards in Chinese mining companies 
 woefully inadequate but also …. the behaviour of many Chinese 
 managers and supervisors amounts to gross negligence. The 
 treatment of the Congolese workers ranges from verbal aggression  and 
 bullying to beatings and in some cases extreme physical abuse. A 
 number of cases of serious assaults … [have also been] reported.”250   
 In many instances, due to corruption, bribes and cronyism, neither 
Chinese SOE managers, nor the companies themselves are held accountable for 
worker-abuse or human rights violations. Not wanting to upset the status quo, 
government employees and law enforcement are hesitant to interdict abuses 
perpetrated by Chinese nationals working for a powerful corporate entity. 
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 Indigenous employees have no legal recourse, which in turn imparts a 
sense of impunity to Chinese supervisors running mining operations. 
Thus, “local work inspectors, police and magistrates are not usually willing to 
prosecute a company or Chinese staff member even for flagrant violations of 
workers’ rights and Congolese law. The workers are powerless and do not have 
access to lawyers willing to take on cases …. NGOs do their best to help but 
often lack resources .... [Therefore] there is a complete absence of an effective 
remedy.”251 
Child Labor 
 The utilization of child labor in extremely dangerous conditions is another 
problematic aspect of Chinese mining operations in the DRC. While the 
exploitation of children by Chinese mining companies in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo is difficult to document, a 2012 report compiled by a DRC-based United 
Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) researcher revealed that in 
Katanga province alone it was estimated that, “40,000 children under the age of 
16 years … [were] believed to be working on mine sites in Kolwezi, Kipushi and 
Likasi.”252 Additionally, young children are also used for prostitution at mining 
operations.253  
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 According to the director of the Rights and Accountability in Development 
Project, Patricia Feeney, “Chinese smelters have no regard for the health and 
safety of the children who dig the ore” at poorly constructed, Chinese-run 
artisanal sites which have high injury and fatality rates in comparison to non-
Chinese-owned extractive operations.254  
 Despite allegations of the utilization of child labor in its DRC-based, 
extractive SOE operations, a Chinese Ministry of Commerce spokesperson 
maintained, "Chinese companies need to observe local labour laws and 
regulations and fulfil their social commitments."255 However, during the same 
time-period, China's foreign minister partially negated his colleague’s statement 
and conversely maintained, “countries should be allowed to set their own 
standards for development and choose their own social systems.”256  
 According to “Law No. 16/010 ... [July 2016, which amended and 
supplemented] Law No. 015-2002 ... [of] the Labor Code .... the determination of 
the capacity to contract at 18 [years of age],” implying that in most cases, in the 
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have increasingly paid more attention to the effects of their operations on local populations. This 
is a result of Beijing’s recognition that human rights violations, conflict, and regional 
destabilization have a negative economic impact on Chinese SOE operations in Africa, not as a 
result of a preoccupation with adhering to internationally acceptable norms. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, it is prohibited to hire anyone younger than 18 
years of age.257 
Environmental Issues 
In the People’s Republic of China, which maintains a higher level of 
government oversight than the DRC, Chinese mining companies have a very 
poor environmental record, which is also in evidence in Africa. Uju Okoye, the 
Special Assistant to the Permanent Secretary at the Federal Ministry of 
Environment in Abuja, Nigeria notes that China’s lack of compliance with 
environmental standards should serve as a warning to African countries. 
 “While China’s presence on the African continent is rather new and African 
leaders are enthusiastic at basking in Beijing’s deep pockets, the example of 
several Southeast Asian countries [such as Malaysia and Vietnam] should give 
them a moment of pause …. Because in ... [its] mad dash for resources, Beijing 
has turned a blind eye to the massive environmental damages done by mining 
companies.”258 
 Considering the high degree to which Chinese-owned extractive industries 
are involved in the DRC, there is a dearth of information regarding pollution and 
environmental damage. “Many cobalt deposits of the [Katanga Province] Copper 
                                            
257. “In order to comply with the Education Act, the legislator [sic] ... determine[d] the [legal] 
capacity to [enter a] contract ... [to be]18 instead of 16 years.” Joseph Yav Kashtung. 
Promulgation of Law No. 16/010. 2016. https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=42557. 2016. Accessed 
on March 29, 2017.  
 
258. Uju Okoye, The Long Term Dangers of Chinese Investment in Africa, The Diplomatic 
Courier, December 16, 2015. http://www.diplomaticourier.com/2015/12/16/the-long-term-dangers-
of-chinese-investment-in-africa. Accessed on May 30, 2016.  
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Belt include uranium ores, which - during artisanal mining activities - are partly 
disseminated in the environment through water and dust, exposing 
workers to radiation and causing long-term contamination of the food chain.”259 
This issue also affects local indigenous community members who fish, graze 
their cattle, and engage in subsistence agriculture. 
 Mining operations contribute to deforestation, which in turn leads to 
erosion during the rainy season, which lasts for several months at a time. Trees 
need to be cleared for roads to transport the extracted material, and for 
easements leading into the mines. Secondly, large amounts of wood are needed 
for the smelters, and the food that mining-operation employees consume, is 
cooked over open fires.260  
Mining … [causes] environmental damage through the deterioration of 
landscapes …. One of the concerns … [is] large-scale deforestation: 
miners are chopping down forests to make land available for mining and 
living-space. Wood is also needed to build mining structures and camps 
near the mine sites, and as firewood for cooking and heating …. 
Deforestation has had several negative effects on plant and wildlife. The  
rapid development of mines has put rare plant species at risk and 
destroyed the natural habitat of … [endangered and threatened fauna]. 
Deforestation has also contributed to soil erosion and subsequently to 
silting in rivers.261 
 
According to a 2011 Center for International Forestry Research report, in 
the DRC, “the involvement of Chinese companies, particularly in the small-scale 
                                            
259. Tsurukawa, Prakash, and Manhart, Social Impacts, 45. 
 
260. Artur Usanov, Marjolein de Ridder, Willem Auping, and Stephanie Lingemann, Coltan, 
Congo & Conflict, Polinares Case Study, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, Number 20, 
March 2013, p. 28. http://www.hcss.nl/reports/download/125/1763. Accessed on December 11, 
2015. 
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and artisanal mining segments of the mining sector, is potentially a significant 
source of deforestation and especially forest degradation in areas that attract 
large numbers of migrant diggers.”262 One of the issues that the Katanga 
Province faces is the lack of oversight of Chinese mining activities. Yet even 
when environmental damage is noted, in most cases the SOEs are not held 
responsible. Other African countries hosting Chinese extractive industries have 
also suffered environmental damage resulting from Chinese mining company 
operations. 
 Africa’s environment has suffered … at the hands of its Chinese investors, 
 and illegal gold mining has led to a number of issues …. As many as 250 
 rivers in Ghana have been polluted by … cyanides and heavy metals that 
 are a by-product of the local Chinese community’s illegal gold mining 
 activities …. Laws introduced disallowing foreign nationals to either mine 
 or sell gold have been circumvented by dubious practices lower down the   
retail chain. However, despite the evident risks associated, African 
governments continue to embrace vast Chinese investments in their 
commodity industries. 263 
 
Conflict Minerals 
  
 Although child labor, safety and health issues, environmental damage and 
pollution are rather serious ramifications which result from PRC-owned extractive 
industries operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the greatest cause for 
concern is over the loss of human lives and creation of internally displaced 
persons which the rush for rare earths and minerals has facilitated in the country. 
                                            
262. Louis Putzel et al., Chinese Trade and Investment and the Forests of the Congo Basin: 
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Paper 67, Center for International Forestry Research, 2011, p. VII. http://bit.ly/2a3Mn0z. 
Accessed on May 28, 2016. 
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Minerals accessed, sold or transported, which profit armed groups are commonly 
referred to as ‘conflict minerals.’264  
 “In many recent conflicts, valuable or scarce resources - land, water, 
timber, or minerals - have played a central role in both causing and sustaining 
violence. In particular, valuable minerals took center stage after "conflict 
diamonds" or "blood diamonds" became a prominent feature of Sierra Leone's 
civil war. Unfortunately, competition over minerals in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo has followed a similarly brutal course.”265 
 Many conflicts, which arose from territorial disputes or ethnic differences, 
decades or even centuries ago, may subsequently be perpetuated by the 
presence of mineral resources within the region, since it “can also become a 
further point of antagonism fueling the conflict.”266 Furthermore, as with mining-
related environmental damage and pollution, the remote situation of many 
extractive operations in many instances allows for regional conflicts, casualties, 
and IDPs to remain hidden from the media and international scrutiny.267  
                                            
264. Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 
Humanitarian Assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),  
Minerals and Conflict, April 2005, p. 5. http://bit.ly/2aftzI7. Accessed on December 11, 2015. 
 
265. Ibid, 1. It should be noted that in areas where there is authoritarian oppression and 
fatalities have occurred during the mining process, that the diamonds are referred to as “blood 
diamonds,” regardless of whether or not there is a recognized civil war. 
 
266. Ibid. 
 
267. “Even if controlling mineral resources is not the original cause of conflict, it can become 
the focus of fighting. The presence of minerals in remote regions can also reinforce secessionist 
tendencies. Conflict over resources within those remote regions often stays under the radar of 
international attention, allowing the conflict to fester.” Ibid, 3.   
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 A report of the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation of the United 
States Agency for International Development notes mining and mineral wealth 
have the potential to facilitate and exacerbate destabilization. Mineral wealth 
finances arms purchases, which in turn has the capacity to increase the severity 
of the conflict and level of both military and civilian casualties.268 It also has an 
adverse effect on corruption-prone LDCs.269 
 As discussed in the beginning of this section, the DRC contains 40 
percent of the world’s cobalt and 64 percent of the world's coltan270 and is also 
host to the 3TG minerals.271 “These minerals have helped to fund the continued 
fighting in the region for years,”272 and armed militias, which demand bribes for 
extraction rights, control many of the mines in the Eastern Democratic Republic 
of Congo.273 These circumstances suggest that Chinese mining operations most 
likely maintain some level of cooperation with local warlords, especially if one 
                                            
268.  Ibid, 3.  
 
269. “Mineral wealth can increase vulnerability and corruption, which weaken states and their 
ability to effectively govern and maintain security, thereby opening the door to violent conflict.”  
Ibid.  
 
270. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Strategic Minerals. 
 
271. “While [cobalt and] tantalum … [represent] an alarming link between global consumption 
and human insecurity in Central Africa … other minerals including cobalt, cassiterite (tin), 
tungsten and gold … [are also] drivers of conflict in the DRC." Ma, China and Congo’s Coltan, 6.  
 
272.  Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), Conflict Minerals and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo: Responsible Action in Supply Chains, Government Engagement and Capacity Building, 
May 2010, p. 5. http://bit.ly/2brRDvz. Accessed on December 11, 2015. 
 
273. “Over 50% of the mines in the eastern DRC are controlled by armed groups, who 
demand taxes, bribes or other payments for the minerals extracted from the mines.” Ibid.  
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considers that “more than 60 of Katanga's 75 processing plants are owned by 
Chinese companies and … 90 percent of the region's minerals go to China.”274 
 While there is not a lot of documentation which directly links Chinese 
extractive enterprises in the Democratic Republic of Congo to regional militias; 
Tiffany Ma, states Chinese mining companies and local groups involved in 
conflict and regional destabilization do indeed work together. Ma notes “China’s 
purchase of minerals from sources linked to armed groups further entrenches the 
opaque nature of the conflict mineral trade and ultimately finances the rebel 
groups that create insecurity within the DRC.”275 
Mining Summary 
 As has been demonstrated throughout this dissertation, China’s presence 
has mixed effects on local populations, regional stability and conflict. Chinese 
extractive industry operations in such remote and under-developed areas 
generate their own particular set of dynamics. Labor pools drawn from 
indigenous workers contribute to a communal sense of self-determination while 
simultaneously injecting rural economies with cash. Yet, while mining operations  
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275.  Ma, China and Congo’s Coltan, 1. “Widespread and ongoing human rights abuses 
documented in the DRC since 1998 include the extensive use of child soldiers and labor, 
indentured labor, gender‐based violence and mutilation against women and children as well as 
indiscriminant and unlawful killings. These atrocities have been attributed to almost all the armed 
groups in the conflict, some of which … are still active in eastern DRC today.” Ma, China and 
Congo’s Coltan, 1-2.  
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have provided locals with a means to generate a greater income than what they 
customarily have made, the collateral effects of PRC-based industries in rural 
regions have also created negative ramifications for the populace.  
 A 2011 Institute for Applied Ecology analysis entitled Social Impacts of 
Artisanal Cobalt Mining in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo also states 
that foreign-owned extractive operations in remote African regions create issues 
if mining operations are not ‘well-managed.’ 
Interactions with mining communities are often reported to lead to 
negative social impacts within … [local] indigenous group[s], such as 
increase of polygamy and prostitution, excessive consumption of drugs 
and alcohol, and deterioration of familial and social cohesion …. Despite 
these  negative impacts, it is also reported that well-managed artisanal 
mining can convey a sense of ownership and participation to populations 
who felt deprived from control over their ‘own’ resources by foreign 
industrial companies.276 
  
The Institute for Applied Ecology report indicates that in cases in which 
mining operations are well-managed, that the local populations do see benefits, 
however in many, if not most cases, PRC-owned mining operations in the DRC 
are notoriously mismanaged and abusive towards their employees, which 
exacerbates the negative impacts of the operation on local communities. “Many 
Chinese companies do not … care about the well-being of their Congolese 
workers. They retain them through the ever-present threat of dismissal …. Any 
work is better than nothing and companies exploit the  fact that there are plenty of 
people willing to fill vacancies.”277 
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 As previously mentioned in this section, when there are issues between 
indigenous workers and Chinese-run mining operations, there are no avenues for 
redress by the Congolese. Politicians and law enforcement personnel who are 
not involved in graft are hesitant to upset the status quo, and the Chinese take 
advantage of these dynamics. “Africa's weak law enforcement makes … [local 
populations and indigenous workers] vulnerable to Chinese companies with lax 
practices.” 278 
 If PRC-owned mining operations were well-managed, they could greatly 
benefit the indigenous populations in their regions of operation. However, at this 
point in time, the activities of Chinese extractive industries in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which has no operative oversight mechanisms for industrial 
activity, are facilitating regional destabilization and conflict through health and 
safety issues, human rights abuses, child labor, prostitution, environmental 
damage and the funding of local militias via the sale of conflict minerals.  
 [While] the main … [cause of conflict] in the DRC is the weakness of 
 governance and the inability of the state to fulfill its basic functions,  
 violent conflict in the DRC …. has [always] been closely linked to the 
 predatory exploitation of natural resources. These resources have played 
 a lethal role in the lives of the Congolese people. Minerals and forest 
 products, instead of being engines of growth, development, and well-
 being, have largely been to blame for most of the past and current 
 misfortunes visited on the Congolese people …. Without the development   
 of stable institutions, legitimate governance structures, and enforcement of 
 regulations aimed at controlling natural resources … the DRC will be 
 doomed to repeat … [its] tragic cycle.279 
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279. John Katunga Murhula, Minerals, Forests, and Violent Conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Woodrow Wilson Center, Environmental Change and Security Program, 
July 7, 2011, p. 18. http://bit.ly/2afttAc. Accessed on December 11, 2015. “Ending the violence 
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If regional destabilization and conflicts have historically been facilitated by 
the sale and transport of conflict minerals from local mining operations, the long-
term prognosis looks bleak at best. Indigenous communities engaged in 
subsistence farming, fishing, hunting, and herding before the arrival of extractive 
industries. As in South Sudan, tens of thousands of acres in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo are now polluted and not suitable for agriculture, fishing or 
cattle grazing. Many areas are barren and subject to erosion, landslides and 
flooding during the rainy season due to deforestation. 
 The incidence of HIV and disease are higher in these regions; decent 
health care is not available, and the local communities are managing, or remain 
reasonably content, only because their local economies have been injected with 
cash from the wages of indigenous workers. However, issues like a global 
economic downturn, regional conflicts or local mineral supply depletion could see 
PRC-owned mining companies abandon their DRC-based operations in the 
future. This in turn most likely would create dynamics which would serve to 
perpetuate destabilization and conflict for decades to come.  
 With Chinese investment offering significant promises for developing 
 African nations, cooperation with China is proving to be a significant 
 stepping stone on the road to development. However, with the negative 
 long term social and environmental impact that this cooperation potentially 
 threatens - regarding … mining, or any other venture - it would wise of 
 African governments to tread cautiously before committing to a course of   
action which might have entirely the opposite effect to that intended.   
                                            
efforts, with a particular emphasis on building capable and legitimate institutions, restoring the 
state’s monopoly on violence, and promoting economic development that is not based on illegal 
activities.” Usanov et al., Coltan, Congo & Conflict, 10. 
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China’s rise on the African continent might indeed provide an opportunity 
 not to be missed, but denied the proper checks and balances it could 
 prove less a win-win relationship.280 
 
 In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, local populations have 
unknowingly traded their environment, their health and social values for an 
opportunity to reap the financial benefits of hosting Chinese mining operations 
within their region. Yet if for any reason those operations halt, those communities 
may find themselves destitute and battling other ethnic groups for quickly 
diminishing resources in environmentally damaged areas which once housed 
profitable extractive industries for the People’s Republic of China.  
 Furthermore, as the resources diminish, and mining-related incomes dry 
up for local populations, inter-ethnic tensions for agricultural, fishing, hunting and 
grazing rights will increase as locals return to their old means of subsistence 
living. Simultaneously, the demand for strategic minerals would increase 
proportionately to the diminishing supply, which in turn increases the funding to 
local militias, which control mineral-rich areas.281  
 Thus ‘resource-conflict’ loops would inevitably be initiated, which would 
result in an increase of regional destabilization and conflict. “Given the defensive 
and industrial advantages afforded by strategic minerals … drastic inequality of  
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281. To this day, “the revenues collected by these armed groups through the production and 
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civil unrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” United Nations Security Council (2014). 
Omayra Burmúdez-Lugo, Conflict Minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Global 
Tungsten Processing Plants, a Critical Part of the Tungsten Supply Chain, United States 
Geological Service, August 1, 2014, p. 1. http://on.doi.gov/2aAvXOh. Accessed on December 11, 
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these resources has caused much economic and political tension, a conflict that 
will surely escalate [in the Democratic Republic of Congo] as these materials 
become scarcer.”282 
Logging Operations 
 As China’s economy has grown, its demand for timber has also increased 
monumentally. Along with petroleum and minerals, one of China’s biggest 
imports from Africa is timber. According to a 2015 International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) report, “China is the largest importer of 
tropical timber in the world - possibly accounting, in recent years, for half of all 
tropical trees logged and exported, and over 75 percent of Africa’s timber 
exports.”283 Additionally, China has also become the world’s largest purchaser of 
smuggled timber over the past decade.284   
 The damage that results from deforestation at the hands of logging 
companies operating illegally, may have graver and longer-term environmental 
impacts than either mining or petroleum extraction operations.285 Least 
developed countries are especially at risk since corruption and lack of oversight 
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283. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), The Dragon and the 
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284.  “Over the past decade [2001 - 2010] China has emerged as the world’s leading trader in 
illegally logged timber.” Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), Appetite for Destruction: 
China’s Trade in Illegal Timber, November 2012, p. 1. http://bit.ly/2ahE0tw. 
 
285.  “Illegal logging and the trade in stolen timber are among the most destructive 
environmental crimes occurring today and directly threaten the world’s vital forest and peatland 
ecosystems." Ibid, 2. 
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accelerates the sale and export of illegally harvested timber, which undermines 
development and in turn can create dynamics, which facilitate regional 
destabilization. 
 Illegal logging thrives in areas with poor forest governance, where 
 transparency and law enforcement are weak, and fosters corruption. With 
 such problems common in developing countries with natural resource-
 focused economies, these states experience the worst impacts of illegal 
 logging, further undermining development.”286   
 
 The negative impacts of Chinese-run timber operations throughout Africa 
parallel those in other extractive industries. In many cases Chinese SMEs, and 
state-owned enterprises such as the Senlian Corporation and China Meheco, 
take advantage of corruption and lack of oversight mechanisms.287 While the 
focus of this dissertation centers around state-owned and controlled industrial 
and military entities and activities, it is important to note that Chinese-owned 
SMEs also contribute to dynamics which affect regional conflict and stability, 
especially since SMEs are harder to monitor and regulate than SOEs.  
Chinese “Investment [in Africa is also] … coming from harder-to-regulate 
small and medium enterprises. While large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
traditionally the main players in China’s overseas investment [such as in the 
mining and petroleum sectors], privately owned small and medium enterprises … 
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287. The “Senlian Corporation ... [is] a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned firm Shanghai 
Senlian Timber Industrial Development Co. Ltd .... and China Meheco Import & Export 
Corporation …. [is] a subsidiary of the state-owned holdings company [SOE] China Meheco 
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(EIA), First Class Connections: Log Smuggling, Illegal Logging, and Corruption in Mozambique, 
February 2013, pp. 8-10. https://eia-international.org/first-class-connections. Accessed on June 
18, 2016. 
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[play a large] role in the African forest sector.”288 The collateral damage of 
logging operations, from both Chinese-owned SMEs and SOEs can be seen in 
Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique.  
 “China needs raw timber to facilitate the continued growth of its wood-
processing industries, underpinned by exports and domestic consumption of 
timber products. With a logging ban covering most of China’s production forests 
since 1998, China’s timber deficit is increasingly being met by imports from 
emerging economies such as Mozambique.”289 
 While Chinese-owned logging companies may enter into legal contractual 
arrangements to harvest and export timber, in many instances the SOEs involved 
also access and export illegally harvested wood. “Where governance is weak, 
[Chinese] companies … may resort to bribery [and exploit political connections in 
order to facilitate the illegal exportation of prohibited timber]. They may lack 
management plans, under-report their export volume, smuggle raw logs, and 
harvest and transport undesignated species.”290 Mozambique is one of the 
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biggest cases in point for Chinese-facilitated deforestation in Africa today, and 
PRC-owned SOEs play an active role in these operations.291 
 China’s state-owned companies play a strategic role in securing supplies 
 of forest resources from overseas. EIA’s [Environmental Investigation 
 Agency’s] analysis of China’s trade data for 2007 reveals that state-owned 
 companies imported 4.7 million cubic meters of tropical logs, equivalent to  
 46 per cent of the total volume. Overall, state [-owned] enterprises 
 imported 12 per cent of all logs entering China in 2007, including 
 significant flows from countries with weak forest governance. 292  
 
Logging Operations in Mozambique 
 While the most prominent Sino-African template for analyzing the impact 
of Chinese-owned mining companies on regional stability and conflict is the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique has figured most prominently in the 
PRC’s African-based logging operations.293 Ninety percent of Mozambique’s 
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timber exports are shipped to China, are undeclared, and have cost the country 
more than half a billion dollars in losses between 2003 and 2013.294  
 “Mozambique provides a stark illustration of the chronic failure of forest 
management which ensues when China’s insatiable demand for logs converges 
with weak law enforcement and corruption.”295 While LDCs often do not have 
regulations and oversight mechanisms in place to monitor exports, graft and 
environmental impact, Chinese companies have opportunistically exploited these 
loopholes to their advantage. Chinese SOEs operating in Mozambique also 
under-report the true export volume of timber while exceeding the official quantity 
limit, bypass established licensing protocols in order to maximize profits, and 
engage in the exportation of banned species.296 
“China’s increased role in the Timber industry [in Mozambique], has been 
criticized for ... excessive exportation of illegal logs ... exceeding the quantities 
officially allowed on other woods. Through investigations made by Interpol and 
Environmental Impact Agency from Britain, Chinese-owned companies have 
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been fined for containers that were confiscated after inspections revealed that 
they had been exporting timber from areas beyond the limits allowed.”297 
 Chinese logging companies follow a protocol in which local loggers are 
beguiled into informal labor contracts from which there is no escape. “Often, in 
the beginning … [Chinese companies] lend them the money to buy equipment 
such as a chainsaw, locking them into dependency and forcing them to continue 
cutting to be able to pay off their debts. By buying from individual Mozambicans, 
the Chinese [also] avoid the high costs of obtaining a logging … [license] and the 
obligation to replant trees.”298 This in turn leads to a much higher profit margin for 
the PRC-owned companies.299 
 There are various negative impacts on the regions in which Chinese 
SOE’s harvest timber. Many of the effects of these operations will have long-term 
implications for African LDCs such as Mozambique, and China’s state-run 
logging operations across the globe have a poor track record.  
Deforestation and Environmental Impacts 
 “Illegal deforestation [resulting from the operations of Chinese-owned 
logging companies has also occurred] … in countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Gambia, 
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Madagascar, Russia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.”300 The impact of 
deforestation and the collateral environmental damage function as triggers or 
enabling mechanisms for additional problems.   
 “Most of the population in Mozambique remains dependent on agriculture 
for survival and as a source of income. This has often been one of the 
environmental challenges in the country, with land desertification and soil 
degradation being one of the results of poor farming practices and 
deforestation.”301 Deforestation also causes increases in temperature and a 
decrease in rainfall, which in turn negatively impacts local subsistence 
agriculture, as well as rainfall levels in other areas of the continent.302 
 Another issue with … [deforestation] is that there is no accountability for 
 all the activity that takes place outside the allowed areas, which means 
 that there is no attempt to either regulate the rate at which this takes place 
 or reforestation programs taking place. Deforestation is accompanied by   
 devastating impacts such as the loss of wildlife and ecosystems in the   
 area. The loss of ecosystems … is a matter of concern, because the 
 ecosystems do not have the capability, or resources necessary to re-
 establish … [themselves] again.303 
 
                                            
300. Ibid. 
 
301. World Wide Fund For Nature Website (2012). Topsøe-Jensen, Timber Logging, 16. 
 
302. For example ““deforestation in [both] the Amazon and Central Africa was directly causing 
reduced rainfall in the United States Midwest during the growing season …. and complete 
deforestation of the African Congo Basin is predicted to intensify the West African monsoon, 
while increasing temperatures of between 2̊ C and 4̊ C and reducing rainfall by up to 50% in the 
entire region.” Dijkstra, Mozambique Stripped of Forests. 
 
303. Topsøe-Jensen, Timber Logging, 19. “The deforestation and the loss of wildlife has been 
felt by the communities who live in these areas and have been dependent on the forest as a 
source of survival through hunting, wood for charcoal, and other resources that the forest has to 
offer. Therefore the unsustainable extraction from this forest is of concern on the local [and 
regional] level.” Topsøe-Jensen, Timber Logging, 19.  
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 Rural African communities, with the knowledge and involvement of corrupt 
local politicians, forfeited their generations-old practices of hunting, fishing, 
grazing, and agriculture for the opportunity to earn a higher income as 
employees of Chinese logging companies. However, in many cases it will take 
decades for reforestation to occur, the populations will be unable to hunt since 
the forest-dependent food chain has been disrupted, and the yield(s) of 
subsistence farming operations will lessen due to deforestation-related 
environmental changes.   
 All of these dynamics in turn, have the capacity to generate or facilitate 
conflict and regional instability as a result of competition for hunting, grazing, 
agricultural and fishing rights. It should be noted that without corrupt local 
partners, the Chinese companies would have greater difficulties making inroads 
in resource-rich countries such as Mozambique.  
Corruption 
 “The British Environmental Investigation Agency [EIA] also blames corrupt 
Mozambican politicians for the illegal logging …. EIA research … [reveals 
Chinese] state-owned firms have imported logs from countries where such 
exports are banned, such as Mozambique and are [often] directly involved in 
logging operations in countries where illegal logging is rife.”304   
                                            
304. “In a recently published report, the … [British Environmental Investigation Agency 
recorded] Chinese timber traders explaining to undercover researchers how to get assistance 
from Mozambican MPs and the country’s current minister of agriculture …. The agency calculated 
that 93% of all logging in Mozambique has been illegal in recent years, making use of 
Mozambican export and Chinese import numbers. Most of the hardwood was shipped to China 
…. [while] China itself banned commercial logging in 1998.” Dijkstra, Mozambique Stripped of 
Forests. 
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 Regardless of what type of mineral extraction operations Chinese state-
owned enterprises are involved in, they are either ignoring or not considering the 
long-term implications for the local populations. While Chinese-owned logging 
companies have the option of extracting timber in a manner which would allow 
for sustainable, longer-term operations, they have employed what amounts to a 
scorched-earth methodology in Mozambique and other LDCs, frequently with the 
assistance of local politicians.305 
 Corruption being prevalent amongst the Chinese companies is of major 
 concern on a local and global level, since they have a monopoly of the 
 industry. Having most of the shares in this market, Chinese companies 
 should lead the example on sustainable exploration of the forest and not 
 be the destructive hand in the business stretching its allies throughout the 
 country to assure the maximum exploitation of the resources.306 
 
 However, other environmental impact experts maintain, “the combination 
of short term illegality leading to longer term forest sector collapse is less a 
consequence of Chinese investment in the Mozambican sector - but instead is a 
consequence of the weak forest governance of the Mozambique government and 
a lack of investment by Chinese forestry companies and timber traders in 
sustainable forest management.”307 In reality, it is a combination of dynamics to 
which both Chinese companies and Mozambican contribute. 
                                            
305. “Mozambican politicians and officials are quickly becoming rich thanks to the Chinese 
bribes, while the inhabitants of the forest remain desperately poor.” Dijkstra, Mozambique 
Stripped of Forests, 2015. 
 
306. Topsøe-Jensen, Timber Logging, 20. “Various investigations have pointed at Chinese 
companies being involved in the illegal trade of timber and have revealed linkages between 
Chinese companies and [Mozambican] political allies.” Environmental Investigation Agency 
(2012). Topsøe-Jensen, Timber Logging, 20.  
 
307. Muianga and Macqueen, Exploring Options, 1.  
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Logging Summary 
 In one respect, the indigenous populations in Mozambique do benefit from 
logging operations in the short term. Many of them engaged in subsistence 
farming prior to the arrival of the logging companies and are now making 
considerably more money than they were previously. Local women make 
additional money for their household by preparing food for the laborers, but many 
of the negative aspects, which plague mining operations in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, are also in evidence in Mozambique. Prostitution is prevalent, 
transmission of sexually communicable diseases has increased, and locals have 
abandoned their traditional jobs for short-term employment, at the expense of the 
ecosystems, which supported their villages for centuries. 
 The “current forms of forest management are chaotic, corrupt, and 
unsustainable, and the major beneficiary of the timber trade is not Mozambique 
but China.”308 These activities have taken a major toll on countries like 
Mozambique, and their ability to recover from such extensive exploitation of their 
forests is questionable.309 One community leader in Mozambique maintains that 
the Chinese have looted the local forests without adhering to their promises of 
                                            
308. “The Chinese sell … rare exotic hardwood trees such as chanate, ebony, monzo 
(leadwood), panga panga, pau preto and wenge for a hundred times as much [in China] ….” 
Dijkstra, All Africa, Mozambique: Half a Billion U.S Dollars Lost in Illegal Wood Exports, July 24, 
2015. http://allafrica.com/stories/201507250021.html. Accessed on June 2, 2016. 
 
309.  “Since 2013, Mozambique has been China’s biggest wood supplier on the African 
continent. Because of illegal timber exports, the country has lost … money that could have 
financed Mozambique’s national forest programme for 30 years.” Dijkstra, Mozambique Stripped 
of Forests.  
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compensation to the local populations, and have engaged in bait-and-switch 
tactics.  
 There is no more timber. The Chinese … have taken everything. They 
 come to our forest without our consent and they cut everything. They don’t 
 even respect the sacred sites. They promise schools, hospitals and roads   
 and [then] they dock 25% off our salary to contribute to these 
 ‘constructions’. But in the end they don’t honour their promises. We don’t 
 want to see more … [Chinese] coming to cut [timber] in our community.310 
 
 Even before Chinese state-owned logging operations were mounted in 
Mozambique, the country suffered from tribalism, corruption and violent conflict. 
However, in the past, local populations had the ability to hunt, fish, graze their 
livestock and engage in subsistence farming, but these activities are in part 
dependent on the forest sector. Yet now “impoverished rural communities are 
bearing the burden of Mozambique’s ongoing illegal logging crisis, a crisis that 
will not end without immediate and credible action by all concerned parties.” 311 
 Despite the on-the-ground, real-time evidence that Chinese, state-owned 
logging companies are causing irreparable damage to Mozambique’s economy, 
the environment, and the livelihood of local populations, some academics 
maintain that the Chinese government has made headway in addressing some of 
the issues.  
 According to a 2014 Chatham House Assessment by Laura Wellesley 
entitled Trade in Illegal Timber: The Response in China, “the Chinese 
                                            
310. Muianga and Macqueen, Exploring Options, 1.  
 
311.  Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), China’s Illegal Timber Imports Ransack 
Mozambique’s Forests, July 23, 2014. https://eia-international.org/chinas-illegal-timber-imports-
ransack-mozambiques-forests. Accessed on June 15, 2016.  
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government has made notable progress in its efforts to tackle illegal logging and 
the associated trade. This has included the development of a draft national 
timber legality verification system (TLVS) and its [the Chinese government’s] 
active engagement with a number of consumer countries …. Reflecting the 
growing awareness of the impact of Chinese companies overseas, the 
government has also been developing further guidance to promote sustainable 
forest products trade and investment.”312 
 Despite the drafting of the TLVS, the situation in Mozambique in great 
likelihood will worsen, and based on recent import figures and investigations, the 
illegal harvesting of Mozambican timber at the expense of its economy and 
population has not subsided.  
This veritable epidemic of crime and environmental mismanagement has 
deprived [one of] the world’s … least developed … [countries] of … tax 
revenues … and without major reforms, Mozambique’s forests and forest 
economy are staring down the barrel of very a bleak future …. The pattern  
and scale of crime by Chinese companies is unfortunately consistent with 
the findings of EIA’s February 2013 report [entitled] First Class 
Connections, with Chinese-owned timber companies … continuing to 
smuggle illegal Mozambican timber to China.313 
  
China’s exploitation of Mozambique’s timber sector is creating tension, 
which will inevitably result in an increased capacity for conflict and regional 
destabilization. As with revenue generated from the sale of other scarce 
resources, the funds from illegal timber extraction operations also have the 
capacity to fuel conflicts. “The huge financial flows generated by illegal logging 
                                            
312. Laura Wellesley, Trade in Illegal Timber: The Response in China, A Chatham House 
Assessment, December 2014, p. 2. http://bit.ly/1UV9jwZ. Accessed on June 15, 2016. 
 
313.  Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), China’s Illegal Timber Imports.  
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have also exacerbated armed conflicts in numerous countries …. Violence and 
murder are often associated with the illegal timber trade, with loggers, journalists 
and local activists being targeted.”314  
The rural communities in Mozambique are already feeling the impact of 
Chinese exploitation and the likelihood of conflict and destabilization are likely to 
increase in the future as competition for scarce resources increases. “The tax 
revenue lost to this trade harms Mozambique’s capacity to fund improved forest 
management and law enforcement, as well as community poverty alleviation 
schemes …. The fact that these problems continue to blight the proper 
management of the forest sector is a travesty for Mozambique’s forests and for 
those poor communities who rely on them for their survival.”315  
 In the case of Mozambique, Chinese have damaged the ecosystem to 
such an extent that recovery will take decades, while simultaneously depriving 
rural communities of a means to survive during the interim period.  “With the 
exports of illegal timber increasing over the years, Mozambique can be seen as a 
victim of exploitation, as China’s illegal activities, seek the benefits of the 
Chinese companies with higher extraction of timber than the limits allowed, 
helping to maximize the companies’ revenue, whilst causing negative 
environmental impact at local level.”316 
                                            
314. Global Witness (2012). Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), Appetite for 
Destruction, 2.  
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Chapter 2 - Summary 
 Before discussing the overall impact of Chinese SOEs in Africa, it needs 
to be noted that regardless of any predispositions or tendencies of Chinese 
companies to contribute to destabilization or regional conflict, whether 
intentionally or inadvertently, the resource-rich locations in which Chinese SOEs 
operate in African LDCs are confronted with issues which cannot be blamed on 
external actors.  
 States with an abundance of natural resources are prone to corruption, 
conflict, and destabilization irrespective of whom their leaders allow to access 
their petroleum, minerals, or timber.317 “Recent studies of contemporary civil war 
have found a strong and positive relationship between lootable wealth and 
conflict. To explain this finding, these studies argue that lucrative, easy-to-
procure resources, such as gems [and] precious hardwoods … ‘breed’ civil war 
by supplying the means and motive for armed conflict.” 318 
 Natural resource wealth is … strongly associated with undemocratic and 
 illegitimate governance. Roughly 70 percent of the world’s resource-rich 
 states are categorized as autocracies. This pattern is not a coincidence. 
 The steady flow of natural resource revenues funds the patronage and 
 security structures these governments rely on to remain in power without 
 popular support. Nearly without exception, Africa’s resource-rich states 
 also exhibit high levels of public sector corruption. States heavily reliant on 
                                            
317. Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered 
Framework for Explaining Political Order, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4,  
August 2005, pp. 563-564. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045131. Accessed on February 10, 
2015. 
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 the export of oil and minerals, moreover, face a greater risk of civil conflict 
 than their resource-poor counterparts.319  
 
 Conversely speaking though, as this research has revealed, there is a 
strong argument that Chinese state-owned enterprises operating in Africa are not 
shouldering corporate responsibility to the extent that they should be and are 
more focused on extracting the product and generating profits than the potentially 
negative collateral effects of their activities. “The Chinese don't tie African aid and 
investment to requirements that governments respect human rights and labour 
standards ….”320 This stance on the part of the Chinese government and its 
proxy SOEs in turn exacerbates preexisting socio-economic conditions, which 
results in increased levels of conflict and regional destabilization.  
  In peaceful societies, conflict is channelled into nonviolent means and 
 institutions for both its expression and resolution. Economic and human 
 development cannot occur without a large measure of social stability, 
 which in turn requires the nurturing of institutions for nonviolent conflict 
 resolution. Conflict in low-income countries makes the objective of poverty 
 reduction all the more difficult, since not only is growth retarded, public 
 money is taken for military spending from basic social services, and the 
 poor are themselves disproportionately the victims of conflict. Economists 
 are increasingly concerned with how badly designed economic policy 
 raises the vulnerability of low-income developing countries to conflict, and 
 how economic policy reinforces, or weakens, the social contract that   
                                            
319. J.R. Mailey, The Anatomy of the Resource Curse: Predatory Investment in Africa’s 
Extractive Industries, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 2015, p. 1. http://africacenter.org. 
Accessed on November 1, 2015.  
 
320.  Ana Maria Gomes (2008). Clark, Smith and Wild, African Kids, 2008. “Good governance 
can be questioned, as China has previously been criticized for its willingness to enter fragile 
states such as the case of the Sudan, with only business intentions and no intervention in the 
country’s political situation. In the case of Mozambique, China has played a major  role in 
the trade of illegal timber, with all of the confiscations of containers with illegal timber, being 
directly linked to Chinese-owned companies operating in Mozambique.” Topsøe-Jensen, Timber 
Logging in Northern, 23. 
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underpins peace. Fundamentally, violent internal conflict is a symptom of  the 
absence or breakdown of the implicit or explicit social contract that  sustains 
peace.321  
  
 Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and other 
African LDCs are all susceptible to the aforementioned dynamics which are more 
often than not aggravated by external actors (states) that wish to exploit the 
target-countries resources. In its haste to acquire raw materials for its rapidly 
growing economy, it is apparent that in many cases, if not most - that local 
populations suffer the consequences of China’s activities across the continent.  
 “Many critiques have described China as an exploiter of the African 
resources, and by looking only at the revenues generated from this precious 
product, it is to be observed that the possible profits at local level are not being 
maximized.”322 This hearkens back to the concept that “…. badly designed 
economic policy raises the vulnerability of low-income developing countries to 
conflict.”323 
 Poorly designed economic policies, Sino-African corruption, an increase in 
internally displaced persons, deforestation, the spread of infectious diseases and 
a decrease in the capacity for localized subsistence agricultural projects are in 
evidence, while the majority of the population in areas of Chinese operation see 
no tangible benefits from the presence of Chinese SEOs.  
                                            
321. S. Mansoob Murshed, Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction,   
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 4, July 2002, pp. 387-388.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555273. Accessed on November 18, 2015.  
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China has disappointed many Africans. As Okoye writes, “China is Africa’s 
largest trading partner by far …. However, despite pledges by Beijing to invest 
…. in strengthening infrastructure and development projects, there are those who 
have been swift to point out that China’s resource hungry nature is something 
less to be welcomed than to be wary of. In its greed to exploit the continent’s 
resources, some are asking, what might the social and environmental 
consequences of its policies be?” 324 A reasonable answer to that question might 
be: The likelihood of future destabilization and conflicts in African countries is 
increased by the operations of Chinese state-owned extractive enterprises.  
 These precursors of destabilization and conflict are evident throughout 
Africa and are taking their toll on local communities across the continent: the 
destruction of water supplies and agricultural land from chemicals and toxins, the 
displacement of entire populations due to the ‘scorched-earth’ style mineral 
extraction operations of Chinese SOEs, and the deforestation of millions of acres 
of ancestral land. In some cases, the Chinese themselves become victims of 
conditions of the operational environment, which they have aggravated. Chapter 
2 focuses on the impacts of Chinese state-owned enterprise activities in South 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique, however other 
African states are also experiencing what can be considered negative effects 
from PRC owned companies.  
                                            
324. Okoye, Long Term Dangers. 
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 African on Chinese violence is growing more prevalent, and in some 
cases politicians have abandoned their diplomatic posturing and are now voicing 
concern over the unbridled and unchecked behavior of Chinese SOEs and their 
personnel. In some instances, such as Zambia, Chinese SOEs and their 
employees have suffered repercussions from poor working conditions and 
abusive behavior towards African employees. Human rights violations and 
abusive treatment of locals by Chinese appears to be a Pan-African 
phenomenon. Zambian workers have experienced instances of physical abuse at 
the hands of Chinese managers, and in some cases, it has resulted in violence, 
injury and death of Chinese nationals. According to a Strategic Studies Institute 
report, “In July of [2004] … violent protests erupted at the Chinese-owned 
Chambisi copper mine in Zambia, resulting in five deaths and severe material 
damage.”325  
 Seven years later Deborah Bräutigam revealed that Sino-Zambian 
tensions had not abated. In 2011 she published a small op-ed on her website 
which detailed the injury and possible death of a Chinese manager at a Zambian 
                                            
325.  Jonathan Holsag, China’s New Security Strategy for Africa, United States Army War 
College, 2009, p. 24. http://bit.ly/2e9vC3K. Accessed March 15, 2016. In October of 2006, 
“Chinese shopkeepers barricaded their properties against gangs of looters in Zambia's capital, 
Lusaka … as a presidential election sparked a backlash against Beijing's growing influence in 
Africa. Michael Sata, an opposition candidate … [accused] China of ‘exploitation’ and turning 
Zambia into a ‘dumping ground …. for their human beings …. Their labour relations are very bad. 
They are not adding any value to what they claim is investment. Instead of creating jobs for the 
local workforce, they bring in Chinese workers to cut wood and carry water.’” David Blair, Rioters 
attack Chinese after Zambian Poll, The Telegraph, October 3, 2006. http://bit.ly/2eqoTV3. 
Accessed on December 9, 2015. 
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mine in 2010, triggered by attacks on local workers at the hands of Chinese 
personnel.326 A Zambian with knowledge of the incident stated: 
During a strike, less than one year earlier, more than 300 miners opened 
the doors and entered the Chinese premises to fight the Chinese. The 
manager said about 10 people were injured and alleged that the aim of the 
workers was to kill the Chinese managers …. Last year both a Chinese 
and a Zambian miner died in an underground mine blast, with a time 
difference of less than one week. And this … [occurred] at a time that the 
[Chinese-operated] mine was … “closed” for failing to comply with the 
safety regulations …. [The] working conditions approach … exploitation.327 
 
In many instances, local officials will refrain from speaking their mind 
about Chinese activities so as not to fall out of favor with their leadership. 
However, after the aforementioned strike, Zambian officials were unusually 
outspoken about China’s activities in the country, and did not adhere to the oft-
maintained diplomatic script. They expressed concern over poor working 
conditions, the treatment of African employees, and the fact that Chinese 
companies seemingly had carte blanche to circumvent acquiring work permits for 
Chinese personnel.328 
                                            
326. Laura Bräutigam, Murder of Chinese Manager at Zambian Mine, January 13, 2011. 
http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com /2011/01/murder-of-chinese-manager-at-zambian.html. 
Accessed on December 9, 2015. 
 
327. Ibid. 
 
328. Zambia, with a population of 15 million, granted “over 13,000 Chinese nationals … 
employment permits by February [2015],” - This number does not take into account the Chinese 
laborers brought in over the past decade, primarily for coal mining operations, and references 
only the first two months of 2015. One Zambian parliament member noted, “Our people working 
under the Chinese are made to work like donkeys.” A second parliamentarian “wondered why 
[Chinese] investors are allowed to bring [Chinese] workers without permits.” Jimmy Chibuye and 
Steven Mvula, Zambia has 13,000 Chinese, The Daily Mail. March 21, 2015. https://www.daily-
mail.co.zm /?p= 23914. Accessed on December 9, 2015.  
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 As was revealed in Chapter 2, the effects of Chinese SOEs in their 
respective areas of operation have been devastating to the environment and the 
local populations that depend on the land for their survival. I previously noted the 
Chinese government’s statements that efforts were underway to diminish the 
adverse environmental and socio-economic impacts of its SOE operations in 
Africa, such as through the timber legality verification system that has 
supposedly been facilitating the regulation of Sino-Mozambican logging 
operations. However, in reality these moves are not going to be sufficient to stop 
the snowballing collateral damage its overseas operations have inflicted on the 
continent and its populace.  
 “As China’s domestic experience demonstrates, economic growth should 
… not come at the cost of environmental destruction. As a responsible global 
actor and a long-term partner in Africa’s development, China has a self-interest in 
strengthening the rules on the social and environmental impacts of its 
overseas projects.”329 
 China’s ability to establish regulations and operational norms in order to 
mitigate damage and diminish the capacity for destabilization and conflict on the 
continent may prove to be very difficult to realize. One of the issues affecting the 
regulation and impact of Chinese industrial activities in Africa is the large number 
                                            
329. Bosshard, China in Africa Policy, 8. Bosshard notes, while “China has begun the process 
of establishing guidelines for overseas investments .... Given the speed of its global expansion, 
these guidelines will need to become more comprehensive (in terms of the sectors and types of 
companies they cover) and deepened through binding regulations. China Exim Bank is an 
important actor in China’s expansion in Africa and a key instrument for influencing the investment 
decisions of Chinese companies more generally. Strengthening China Exim Bank’s … policies 
will help mitigate the … impacts of Chinese investments in Africa.” Ibid. 
 156 
 
of various, government run enterprises on the continent. Effective damage 
mitigation will be impossible to establish due to the wide range of ‘state’ actors 
exploiting natural resources in Africa. In addition to preventing the 
implementation of any coordinated resource security strategy, the conflicting 
agendas of different Chinese SOEs, whether run by the central or  
provincial governments, contribute to haphazard policies which result in socio-
economic and environmental issues, which in turn contribute to regional 
destabilization and conflict. 
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Chapter 3 - Chinese Military and Defense Industrial Enterprises 
 This chapter addresses the activities of Chinese defense-industrial 
enterprises (CDIEs), which are responsible for the production and supply of 
conventional weapons, military vessels, aircraft and military equipment to Africa. 
Chinese defense industrial enterprises owned and run by the state, play a pivotal 
role in China’s resource acquisition strategy. For purposes of clarification, 
defense industrial activities should not be confused with military-industrial 
enterprises, although they may work in conjunction with each other.330 The best 
description and differentiation of military-industrial and defense industrial 
enterprises to date is a Rand analysis by James Mulvenon, entitled Chinese 
Military Commerce and U.S. National Security. 
 Defense-industrial enterprises are state-owned enterprises, which operate 
 within  the defense-industrial sector. “Analytically, the military and defense-
 industrial institutional hierarchies should be categorized as two distinct 
 systems containing elements of both cooperation and competition. The 
 military side contains those institutions, which can be considered ‘purely 
 military’ …. including the three General Departments (Staff, Political, 
 Logistical) … and the active-duty and reserve forces of the Army, Navy, 
 [and] Air Force …. Each of these organs, within carefully defined 
 parameters, has authority over a variety of economic enterprises. These 
 enterprises, known as jundui qiye or “military enterprises," are formally 
 affiliated with the PLA and engage in increasingly diversified and civilian- 
 oriented commerce, both in China and abroad. On the other side is the 
 defense-industrial system, which is made up of civilian industrial ministries 
 related to ordnance, aviation, space, shipbuilding, nuclear weapons, and 
 electronics production." 331 
  
                                            
330. James C. Mulvenon, Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security, The Rand 
Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, July 1997, pp. 5-6. Emphasis added. Appendix 3 details the 
differences and structures of defense industrial enterprises versus military-industrial enterprises. 
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Throughout the 1980’s and mid-1990’s, the People’s Liberation Army was 
engaged in a multitude of business enterprises (more than 20,000), the profits of 
which were supposedly used for reinvestment and to offset military 
expenditures.332 Bromley et al. maintain the PLA was no longer involved in any 
commercial activity as a result of party-mandated restructuring of the PLAs 
commercial endeavors subsequent to 1998. 
 Since the late 1990’s, the responsibility for weapons transfers to foreign 
countries has fallen within the realm of defense-industrial enterprises, not 
military-industrial enterprises. “While the PLA … historically played a central role 
in Chinese [heavy weapons, military equipment, and Small Arms and Light 
Weapons] exports, the creation of SASTIND [State Administration for Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense], the rise of powerful SOEs and 
1998 reforms prohibiting the military from conducting economic activities have 
diminished [or nearly alleviated] its role … in arms exports.”333 But that 
assumption has been called into question by several sources. It is possible in a 
few circumstances the ‘divestment’ may have been a mechanism to shield some 
of the PLA’s more questionable activity abroad. Poly Technologies, China’s 
largest arms exporter, is the most likely case in point.334 
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Complex of the PRC, Summer 2003. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/com84.html. Accessed April 
18, 2015. 
 
333. “Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel, and Paul Holtom, China’s Export of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, SIPRI Policy Paper 38, October 2013, p. 27. http://bit.ly/2ayAY8F. Accessed on 
April 8, 2014.  
 
334. Poly Technologies is a subsidiary of [China] ‘Poly Group,’ a massive state-owned 
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 The two major arms-export companies are Poly Technologies and 
Norinco. Preceding their autonomy, Poly Technologies and NORINCO were the 
PLA’s two primary corporate commercial weapons arms, which specialized in the 
manufacture and export of SALWs, conventional arms and military equipment. 
Presently, the connections between the PLA, NORINCO, and China Poly Group 
(and its weapons-exporting subsidiary Poly Technologies) are opaque, however 
most analysts classify both companies as CDIEs versus CMIEs.335  
 According to interviews and analyses conducted by Bromley et al., as of 
2013, “11 authorized companies are allowed to conduct exports on behalf of 
[Chinese] arms producing firms.”336 Appendix 4 is comprised of the Bromley et al. 
list, on which both Norinco and Poly Tech are included. Before examining the 
effect of the arms flow into Africa, which these two Chinese SOEs facilitate, a 
brief review of the history and activities of both Norinco and Poly Technologies, 
and an exploration of the possibility that Poly technologies and the PLA still 
maintain commercial connections are in order.  
 
                                            
Investment Corporation (CITIC), a state-owned investment company …. [It was] set up at the 
behest of Deng Xiaoping in 1979.” Cain Nunns, China's Poly Group: The Most Important 
Company You've Never Heard of, The Minnesota Post, February 26, 2013. http://bit.ly/2bAyu7n, 
Accessed on August 12, 2016.  
 
335.  It is difficult to definitively categorize Poly Technologies. It could be either a hybridized 
military-defense industrial enterprise, or a PLA front-company for a ‘pure’ Chinese defense 
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336. “In some cases, the arms-producing company belongs to the same conglomerate as the 
authorized company. In other cases, the arms producing company is part of another industrial 
group.” A list of the eleven, state-licensed Chinese arms exporters (CDIEs) based on Bromley et 
al. is provided in Appendix 4.  
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Norinco 
China’s largest arms exporter Norinco, had its genesis as a front company 
for the Chinese military in the late 1970s, with the dedicated purpose of 
“import[ing] advanced machinery.337 Norinco - known formally as China North 
Industries Group Corporation (CNGC) was [re]established in 1999 [as a CDIE] 
and consists of at least 46 member units, which [in turn] have several 
subordinate companies, joint ventures and associate companies.”338 At the 
present time, Norinco maintains “operations in more than 100 countries.”339 
 CNGC’s main purpose is to research, develop, and manufacture weapons 
 and military equipment for the Chinese armed forces. To accomplish this 
 primary task CNGC combines military research objectives with civil 
 development and production enterprises and often the two are difficult to 
 separate. CNGC is also involved in other industries such as mining and 
 petroleum (often overseas) as well as the associated processing 
 industries – which provide raw materials for CNGC and other Chinese 
 companies as well as giving China and CNGC access to international 
 markets.340 
  
 The product base of China’s most well-known arms dealer has grown 
rapidly over the past decade and a half and the world’s defense industrial giants, 
which once dominated the market, are slowly getting edged out by Norinco’s 
                                            
337. Kong (1994). James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, China North Industries 
(NORINCO), September 1, 2009. http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/49. Accessed on August 5, 
2016.  
 
338.  “[NORINCO] is the main import-export company for China’s largest arms manufacturer, 
China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGC) … as well as China South Industries Group 
Corporation (CSG) … both own 50 percent of the NORINCO’s shares. www.norinco.com (2009). 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, China North Industries (NORINCO). 
 
339. Ibid.  
 
340. Omega Research Foundation and the International Peace Information Service, Working 
Paper on China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGC), October 2014, p. 5. 
http://bit.ly/2aHxEXe. Accessed on January 28, 2015. Appendix 5 details Norinco Group and 
Subsidiary Member Activities. 
 161 
 
favorably priced offerings, even as the quality of its weapon systems is 
improving. “NORINCO’s defense products include precision strike systems, 
amphibious assault weapons and equipment, anti-aircraft & anti-missile systems, 
information and night vision products, anti-terrorism & anti-riot equipment, as well 
as small arms.”341 
 Norinco has a long history of flouting laws, sanctions and embargos in the 
Americas, in Asia and in Africa. Like Poly Technologies, Norinco has a tendency 
to infuse conflict zones with their inexpensive SALWs. They have also run afoul 
of Western Countries for selling (or attempting to sell) larger conventional 
weapons, dual use technology, and vital arms components to countries such as 
Iraq, Iran, and Libya.  
 Norinco … [has come] under U.S. scrutiny for sales of missile components 
 to sanctioned states. In … 2000, Iraq sought 200 gyroscopes which were 
 suitable for Russian and Chinese cruise missiles.342 [In] 2003 the U.S. 
 State  Department announced that the U.S. government had imposed 
 sanctions against NORINCO for supplying materials to Iran’s missile 
 program343.... [Between] 2002 to 2007 the U.S. government sanctioned 
 NORINCO seven times344 .... Reports in September 2011 indicate that 
 NORINCO [subsidiaries] … may have attempted to sell arms, including 
 surface-to-air missiles (SAM), to  Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s former 
 regime in Libya in violation of UNSCR 1970.345 
                                            
341. www.norinco.com (2009). James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, China North 
Industries (NORINCO). 
 
342. Central Intelligence Agency (2004). James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
China North Industries (NORINCO). 
 
343. Saunders and Lieggie (2003). James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, China 
North Industries (NORINCO). 
 
344. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2008). James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, China North Industries (NORINCO). 
 
345. Wines (2011). James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, China North Industries 
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 As will be discussed below, both Norinco and Poly Tech have also 
supplied the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe with arms, munitions, vehicles, and 
aircraft. On three different occasions, SALWs and ammunition sales from these 
two companies have been made in advance of Zimbabwe’s national elections - 
with dire results. To the detriment of Chinese NOCs operating in South Sudan, 
both companies have been accused of funneling conventional weapons and 
ammunition into South Sudan, to support the embattled GoSS in its fight against 
the South Sudanese opposition. 
Poly Technologies 
 A declassified, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) report in 
2003 maintained there were still substantial ties between the PLA and Poly 
Group. If still true, this would mean that Poly Group’s subsidiary, Poly 
Technologies could be operating as a military industrial enterprise in the guise of 
its ‘civilian’ cousin, a defense industrial enterprise. According to CSIS:  
 There are two distinct components to the production and sale of arms in 
 China: military and former military enterprises such as Poly Group, and 
 civilian defence enterprises, both state-owned …. In 1998 … the 
 leadership ordered the PLA to divest itself of its profit-oriented businesses 
 … and shortly thereafter declared the divestiture a success. But the PLA 
 has not completely withdrawn from the economy, nor have divested firms 
 completely severed their ties with the PLA.346 
                                            
346. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Weapons Proliferation.  While CSIS has access 
to classified materials, its distinction between CMIEs and CDIEs lacked specificity, since “former 
military enterprises” were technically re-categorized as CDIEs subsequent to the PLA’s 1998 
divesture process. This is an indication of how difficult it is to discern between CMIE and CDIE 
operations. “Poly Technologies was known to be closely tied through family relations to various 
senior members of the Chinese government. These ties to high-level government officials and its 
direct military links made it difficult for the … [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to control Poly’s arms 
export activities. Yet, the extent to which this situation persists is unclear.” Evan S. Medeiros and 
Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players and Process, Strategic Studies Institute, 
August 2000, p. 43. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ doctrine/chinarms.pdf. Accessed on 
December 2014. 
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While there is scant information regarding Poly Technology’s non-defense 
related business in Africa, its parent company - Poly Group, has been involved 
with building roads in the Darfur region, and setting up resource extraction 
operations in Darfur and in Ogaden region, near the Somali border in Ethiopia.347 
If Poly Group still acts as a proxy company for the PLA, this would imply that the 
PLA has in part returned to its pre-1998 commercial agenda. With this 
information on the two largest Chinese arms exporters to Africa, we can now turn 
to CMIE-CDIE mining activity in one of the world’s largest alluvial diamond fields 
located in Zimbabwe.   
The Zimbabwe-mode: The PLA, Arms and Blood Diamonds 
 Of all the African countries analyzed for this research, Chinese defense- 
and military-industrial dynamics in Zimbabwe are the most enigmatic and 
convoluted, albeit revealing. Over the past several years Zimbabwe President 
Mugabe’s regime has engaged in mining operations with several Chinese firms, 
at least one of which appears to be a front company for the People’s Liberation 
Army. 
 This activity has coincided with Zimbabweans reporting PLAN ‘boots-on-
the-ground,” on several occasions. Even as the Mugabe regime was waiting for 
                                            
347. “In January 2013, four Chinese nationals were .... abducted … near the North Darfur 
capital El-Fasher. They were all working for China’s Poly Group Corporation.” Sudan Tribune, 
Sudan Frees Chinese Oil Worker Abducted in West Kordofan, October 24, 2014. 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52833. Accessed on April 24, 2015. “Poly-GCL 
Petroleum is a joint venture of state-owned China Poly Group Corporation … and Hong Kong-
based Golden Concord Group …. [Their Ethiopian] project involves developing … [Liquid Natural 
Gas] fields, building a pipeline from landlocked Ethiopia to the coast of neighbor Djibouti, where it 
will build an LNG plant and export terminal.” Aaron Maasho, Ethiopia Says China's Poly-GCL to 
Start Gas Drilling by July, April 16, 2015. http://bit.ly/2b2v1iW. Accessed on April 25, 2015. 
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Poly Technologies’ pre-election weapons shipment to arrive in 2008, armed 
Chinese soldiers were observed patrolling the streets of Zimbabwe’s third largest 
city (Mutare), along with Zimbabwean military personnel.348 This sent ripples of 
alarm through the local population. According to an article in the U.K’s 
Independent, “Chinese soldiers armed with pistols, checked in … [to the] city's 
Holiday Inn along, with 70 Zimbabwean troops” and were subsequently “seen on 
the streets … in full regalia … patrolling with Zimbabwean soldiers before and 
during … [the] strike called by the opposition movement.”349 
 Subsequent to the 2008 Mutare incident, several journalists reported the 
PLA had set up a ‘secret’ base in Zimbabwe. These reports occurred while the 
Chinese military was actively involved in mining for diamonds. According to a 
September 2010 article in the Daily Mail, Andrew Malone stated PLA personnel 
were working in conjunction with high-level Zimbabwean officials in an arms-for-
diamonds mining operation in the Marange diamond fields.350  
When the government discovered the extent of the deposits in Marange, 
locals were driven from their homes and fields. “Mugabe’s military … [responded 
by] shooting hundreds of people, setting … dogs on others, and raping women 
and children. The carnage had the desired effect: the … [locals] were driven from 
                                            
348. Ian Evans, Chinese Troops are on the Streets of Zimbabwean City, The Independent. 
April 19, 2008. http://bit.ly/2aQMxa7. Accessed on February 27, 2015. 
 
349. Ibid. 
 
350. Andrew Malone, Mugabe's Darkest Secret: An £800bn Blood Diamond Mine He's  
Running with China's Red Army, UK Daily Mail, September 17, 2010. http://bit.ly/2coTPEf. 
Accessed March 2, 2015. 
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… [their] fields, leaving the way clear for Zimbabwe’s military chiefs to move 
in.”351 Artisanal miners were also dealt with harshly to clear the way for state-run 
mining operations. “Originally there were at least 30,000 diamond prospectors … 
[working] the fields, but [they] were … evicted from their mining activities by the 
army using two helicopter gunships … [which shot and killed] at least 140 
prospectors.352  
 After the Zimbabwean military gained control of the area, conditions 
rapidly deteriorated. Interviews with locals reveal they were warded off the 
perimeter of the operation at gunpoint and were attacked by the Zimbabwean 
military personnel, who provided security for the PLA operation. Malone 
personally recorded testimony of villagers who maintained neighbors had been 
brutally killed by dogs and dumped in conspicuous locations as a warning to 
trespassers. According to Malone, “soldiers set their dogs on one girl, who was 
mauled and killed in front of her parents …. [and] a local man, showed me the 
wounds on his back where he was attacked by dogs after the military caught him 
by the fields.353   
 The journalist maintains he met with at least one of Mugabe’s security 
personnel, and the individual relayed to him the diamonds were being paid for 
                                            
351. Ibid. 
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on August 6, 2016. 
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with Chinese-fabricated arms, and that those weapons in turn helped Mugabe to 
keep his grip on power.354 In Angola, resources were purchased via the Angola-
mode, with cash or credit being utilized as the designated tender. I believe that 
the heretofore-undesignated arms-for-resources, or arms-for-blood-minerals 
deals, could suitably be referenced to as the ‘Zimbabwe-mode.’355 In addition to 
engaging in a Zimbabwe-mode payment mechanism, the Chinese also 
remunerated Mugabe’s regime with a percentage of the diamonds they had 
mined and sold. This is an important point, because it indicates that the PLA 
generated profit from a downstream purchaser before remitting any funds to the 
government of Zimbabwe. So in essence the PLA also acted as the exporter and 
middleman for the rough product. 
 One of Mugabe’s most senior intelligence chiefs …. [stated] “There is a 
 memorandum of understanding between China and Zimbabwe - Beijing 
 supplies weapons to us, and we allow them to mine diamonds.” As well as 
 paying a share of the diamond profits to Mugabe’s regime, he confirmed 
 that China has agreed to supply military hardware to Zimbabwe. “It is a 
 government-to-government deal …. It has been signed at the highest 
 level.”356 
 
                                            
354. “During … [the interview] the intelligence source … also admitted that, without the 
Chinese pact, the ruling junta would have been driven from power. ‘But now we have all the guns 
we need.’” Malone, Mugabe's Darkest Secret.   
 
355. While other countries such as Sudan and South Sudan have used oil revenue to 
purchase arms and equipment, the Marange Field ‘blood-diamonds-for-weapons’ is the most 
overt of all such transactions and represents a ‘precedent case’ for ‘Zimbabwe-mode’ financing. 
356. “The arms-for-diamonds deal between Zimbabwe and China was set up by General 
Constantine Chiwenga … one of the … military chiefs who run the country for Mugabe.” Malone, 
Mugabe's Darkest Secret.  
 
 167 
 
 It was reported that Zimbabwean soldiers forced locals, including children, 
to mine for them.357 Witnesses maintain the Marange fields became a secured 
military zone, with armed military personnel guarding the operation. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the activities, the Chinese military and the government of 
Zimbabwe attempted to maintain a veil of secrecy over the operations.  
 The reason for the secrecy became apparent during an undercover 
 investigation  at the fields … [the investigative reporter discovered] 
 conclusive evidence of collusion between China and Mugabe. In an 
 official - but highly confidential -  agreement between the two countries, 
 the … [PLA] and Mugabe’s military chiefs are plundering this diamond 
 find, believed to be the biggest in the history of the world and worth an 
 estimated £800 billion.358 
  
 The journalist states that in addition to statements from Zimbabwean 
officials, the Daily Mail obtained documents verifying a silent partnership between 
the People’s Liberation Army and Mugabe’s government.359 “High-ranking 
officials of … [the] People’s Liberation Army … have been striving to escape 
detection for their role in this blood-thirsty- but hugely lucrative trade.” 360 
 From 2012 to 2015, there were numerous reports from locals that the 
Chinese were ‘setting up a military base in Marange, some of which was being 
                                            
357. Global Witness, Return of the Blood Diamond, July 14, 2010, p. 6. http://bit.ly/2aXyrow. 
Accessed on August 6, 2016.  
 
358. “So vast are the riches that diamond experts believe the gems from Marange … could 
account for more than a quarter of all diamonds mined around the globe, and could … trigger a 
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Darkest Secret.  
 
359. “Secret documents obtained by the Mail reveal that the company given the rights to the 
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military officials as silent partners.“ Ibid. 
 
360. Ibid. 
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constructed underground.’361 In fact, the airstrip cleared in the Marange fields 
was used by the PLA to ship weapons in to the Mugabe regime and to fly out the 
diamonds. “In the bush, in [the] middle of nowhere, at Marange diamond fields, 
the largest airport in Zimbabwe was constructed to facilitate the import of 
weapons that Mugabe’s regime uses against the … people and at the same time 
take out diamonds and minerals without accountability to the state.”362 
  Carved out of the African bush, is a runway … for huge cargo planes …. 
 sophisticated radar equipment, a fully-operational control tower and … 
 barracks for the Chinese officials overseeing the … operation. Twice a 
 week … [Chinese planes ferry in] men and equipment .... Chinese military 
 officials … work overseeing members of the Zimbabwean military, as well 
 as local … [laborers who] work at gunpoint in slave [-like] conditions …. 
 Departing flights leave with rough, uncut diamonds worth millions …. no 
 flight plans are filed and there are no records of these trips.363 
 
 One of the most remarkable and unfortunate aspects of the mining activity 
in Zimbabwe is that the Kimberly Process was circumvented.364 The PRC has 
been a Kimberly Process member since 2003. By circumventing the Process, 
Mugabe’s regime was able to sell blood diamonds, and those funds were used to 
purchase arms, ammunition and military equipment, giving his regime the ability 
to maintain its grip on power. Locals were driven from their homes and fields, 
                                            
361. Itai Mushekwe and Mary-Kate Kahari, China Begins Secret Underground Airbase 
Construction in Zimbabwe, December 16, 2014. http://bit.ly/2aV5g48. Accessed March 15, 2015. 
 
362. New Zimbabwe Vision, Mujuru Demands Investigations.   
 
363. Ibid. 
 
364. The Kimberly Process “is an import-export certification scheme which requires 
participating governments to certify the origin of rough diamonds, and put in place effective 
controls to prevent conflict stones from entering the supply chain …. [It] aims to exclude conflict 
diamonds from international markets and prevent diamond-fuelled wars.” Global Witness, Return 
of the Blood, 5. 
 169 
 
villagers were raped or killed, and others were forced to work artisanal mining 
operation at gunpoint.  
 The Kimberley Process rough diamond certification scheme (KP) is 
 credited by some with ending the scourge of blood diamonds. However, 
 the extreme violence that has characterised life in Zimbabwe’s 
 Marange diamond fields … has shattered this myth.365 Over the past … 
 [few] years, the Marange diamond fields in eastern Zimbabwe have 
 witnessed a series of violent assaults by government security forces 
 against diamond diggers and local communities. Hundreds of people have 
 been killed, and many more have been beaten, raped, and forced to mine 
 for the army and police.366   
 
 Malone also notes that Zimbabwean military and intelligence personnel 
involved in the operations killed whistle-blowers who reported the deaths and 
human rights abuses in the Marange area to Kimberley Process officials. When 
one of Malone’s high-level interviewees was asked whether the Marange 
diamonds were blood diamonds, he responded, “this is a military operation, not a 
civilian operation… [Yes] they are [blood diamonds].” 367  
Thus the Sino-Zimbabwean mining operation “make[s] a mockery of the … 
Kimberley Process.”368 What happened in the Marange fields? In defiance of the 
Kimberley Process, the PLA traded arms for blood diamonds, which enabled 
Mugabe’s regime to shore up its capacity to oppress the population, while the 
respective members of the Sino-Zimbabwean military-industrial complex wreaked 
havoc in Marange. 
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  While the PLA has historically hidden its commercial activities, its 
partnership with the Zimbabwean government, while opaque, did not disguise its 
role in the Marange mining operation. Sources allege that Chinese ownership of 
the concession(s) ranges from 40 to 60%. It “is a ... joint venture between [a] 
Chinese [MNC] … Anhui Foreign Economic Construction [Company] (AFECC) 
and the … [Zimbabwean] military.”369 AFECC is “a large construction company 
which sources say is connected to the military-industrial complex in China370 
 Anhui is a provincially-owned371 Chinese SOE with billions of dollars of 
assets and revenues372 and numerous local sources in Zimbabwe state that 
Anjin, like its parent-company AFECC, has PLA links.373 The Zimbabwean side of 
the joint venture is partially comprised of highly placed military and intelligence 
personnel.374 There are details, which suggest the PLA may have used the 
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guanxi connections of Beijing’s secretive front man Sam Pa, to facilitate the 
acquisition of the mining concessions for the Marange Field in Zimbabwe.375 
 In addition to villagers being uprooted from their homes to make way for 
wide-scale operations, a multitude of more complex issues plague the area, and 
much of the resulting anger is directed towards the Chinese. In an interview with 
a local paper, one resident claimed “[the Chinese] have forgotten about us and 
are only interested in mining diamonds. [Our] government should open its eyes 
and see that the Chinese are exploiting us. They are failing to fulfill what they 
promised …. At times we go for days without access to water.”376 
 The relocation exercise has been described as haphazard and disruptive 
 …. Local communities have been relocated to an unsustainable new 
 environment - unable to get even the most menial jobs … [at] the mine. 
 Their  drinking water is polluted, harming people and killing livestock …. 
 [villagers] accuse the company of failing to give them food, provide clean 
 water, education and health facilities as initially promised.  
 
 They … have been living hand-to-mouth … having been driven from their 
 fields …. [Their] houses are not suited to their polygamous family units, 
 resulting in conflict, overcrowding, and deteriorating standards of living. 377 
  
Anjin was subject to legal action and fines for polluting local rivers with 
toxic chemicals, heavy metals and raw sewage which resulted in the deaths of 
                                            
375. Sam Pa entered a joint venture in conjunction with the Zimbabwean government called 
Sino Zimbabwe Development, which also mined for alluvial diamonds in the Marange fields - 
alongside Anjin. Pa was arrested in October 2015 by the Chinese government on allegations of 
corruption. 
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377. “The majority of relocated [Marange] villagers are members of the Apostolic Church, 
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livestock, all aquatic life in the waterways and the ecosystem surrounding the 
riverine areas. Furthermore, the villages downstream from Anjin’s discharge 
points were also adversely affected. Women in the area also saw a rise in the 
percentage of stillbirths. In response to these grievances, the Zimbabwe 
Environmental Law Association (ZELA) ran tests on three rivers in the area with 
the assistance of a local university. The results verified the extent of ecosystem 
damage.  
[The] Odzi, Singwizi and Save Rivers …. showed high concentrations of 
iron, chromium and nickel in the water, elements which are the major 
constituents of ... [ferrosilicon], a chemical compound  used in diamond 
extraction …. Chromium and nickel are potentially carcinogenic agents … 
[and] pose an immediate health risk to people and livestock …. There is 
also a high level of bacterial contamination in the rivers, ‘posing an 
immediate risk of outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as diarrhea, 
cholera and typhoid.’”378 
 
 Villagers also complained that once they were pushed out of their homes 
and villages, for the most part the Chinese refused to hire them. They 
complained Anjin brought in its own laborers and refused to hire any indigenous 
personnel, even for the most trivial tasks.379 Furthermore, all project-related 
materials were brought in from China. No resources or supplies were purchased 
in Zimbabwe. “Local companies … [failed] to get contracts from the Chinese 
diamond mining … [company] because … [it was] importing everything from 
spare parts to toilet paper .... The Chinese-Zimbabwe partnership in Marange … 
                                            
378. Caiphas Chimhete, Villagers Sue Diamond Firms for Pollution, The Standard, September 
9, 2012. http://bit.ly/2b7ehp0. Accessed on August 13, 2016. In 2016, news of the legal actions 
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[is] a ‘one-sided affair,’ where millions of dollars were being made, with no visible 
development on the ground.”380 
 There is sufficient evidence that indicates the PLA has indeed begun to 
engage in commercial operations. Rarely are PLA interactions with industrial or 
commercial entities made public, especially since the 1998 divestment edict 
issued to the PLA by Beijing’s power-brokers. However, there is additional proof 
the PLA partnered with the government of Zimbabwe. An investigation “by the 
Daily Mail in London found … comfortable barracks had been built for Chinese 
military officers working at the mines.”381 Based on what has been observed of 
the living conditions of Chinese laborers in Africa, it is very unusual for 
“comfortable barracks” to have been constructed by a Chinese company for its 
employees, especially in the case of mining operations. 
  Additionally, a photograph contained in Appendix 7 shows five individuals, 
including President Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwean Minister of Defence, and 
three Anjin executives. Two of the Anjin executives are dressed in business suits 
while the third is identifiable as senior colonel of the People’s Liberation Army, 
via the four stars on his green epaulettes.382 The partnership has also been 
confirmed by several local news sources, one of which notes “Anjin is … jointly 
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owned by the brutal Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Chinese Army.”383 
According to a 2012 publication, “Zimbabwe’s Deputy Mines Minister Gift 
Chimanikire .... told parliament ... that Anjin ... is a [Chinese] defence industry 
company.”384  
 This statement and Malone’s assertion that “members of the Chinese 
military are overseeing the blood diamond mine and Beijing’s investment within 
it” contradict the claim that the PLA is no longer involved in commercial 
enterprises.385 Indeed, it is unlikely that Beijing would be unaware of the large-
scale operations in the Marange fields that could generate billions of dollars and 
affect the global diamond market. This indicates that it is possible the ruling elite 
in China have decided to once again allow the PLA to offset military expenditures 
through commercial operations.  
 In addition to paying the Mugabe regime with cash, weapons and military 
equipment, Anjin’s parent company, Anhui Foreign Economic Construction 
Company, built the Zimbabwe National Defence College in Harare. A June 2011 
article notes “controversy [arose] over a US$98 million Chinese loan to 
Zimbabwe to build a defense college, funded by Harare's share of revenues from 
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a diamond mining deal with a Chinese firm [Anjin].”386 However there was a 
caveat to the loan:  An agreement was made that the construction would be done 
by a Chinese company - AFECC in this case. 
 The Zimbabwe Public Works Ministry cited several issues with the AFECC 
construction project. Since the construction of the defense college was done 
through a “government-to-government” agreement, it allowed AFECC to 
circumvent work permits.387 Furthermore, inspectors from the ministry indicated 
that the buildings were constructed with low-quality material in an obviously 
hurried fashion, and were already displaying signs of “structural defects” as a 
result of “poor workmanship.”388 Sources within the Zimbabwean bureaucracy 
indicated that the Chinese involved in the AFECC project had such extensive 
connections that the ministry was powerless to enforce any labor laws or building 
codes. The “Chinese ‘are too powerful to control as they seem to have a network 
of … political connections.’”389  
 Arms and Blood Diamonds: The PLA in Zimbabwe - Summary 
 In February 2016, several mining companies with opaque lines of 
ownership and control were ousted by the Zimbabwean government and are 
presently under ‘investigation.’ The primary target of the investigation is called 
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Anjin. A 2016 investigation revealed, that over several years, “Anjin Investments 
… smuggled 3.7 million carats of diamonds from … Marange worth … US $200 
million to … Shanghai …. [The Zimbabwean] government is frantically 
scrambling to recover the diamonds … but the Chinese are not co-operating.”390 
However other sources are stating that the losses are much greater than $200 
million. Estimates have been made which state up to $15 Billion dollars’ worth of 
diamonds have been ‘looted’ by the Chinese.391 “The [Zimbabwean] Minister Of 
Finance …. warned that Zimbabwe … [had lost] billions worth of diamond 
revenue in clandestine business activities at [the Marange Fields within a few 
years].”392 
 In the case of the exploitation of the Marange Fields, it appears as though 
the PLA through Anjin assisted and financed one of the most corrupt and brutal 
governments in Africa. Mugabe and high-ranking military and intelligence 
personnel circumvented their own system and worked with Anjin to launder 
hundreds of millions of dollars of profits generated through the sale of blood 
diamonds. The land surrounding the mines is poisoned; the rivers are devoid of 
aquatic life and the levels of toxins, pollutants, and pathogens threaten the health 
of humans, livestock, and the surrounding ecosystem. 
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 The exploitation of the Marange Fields provided the government with 
currency, weapons, and military equipment, while displacing tens of thousands of 
people and completely devastating the environment. Through Anjin, Beijing 
reaped profits while simultaneously destabilizing an entire region. Their front-
man, Sam Pa, through Sino Zimbabwe Development, provided Zimbabwe’s 
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) with two hundred Nissan pickup trucks 
and $100 million between 2009 and 2010.393  
  “The likely part-ownership and part control of Anjin by the Ministry of 
Defence, military and police and the apparent part-ownership and part-control of 
Sino Zimbabwe Development, by the CIO, create vehicles for off budget 
financing [through the sale of blood diamonds] of the security sector and by its 
very nature this undermines Zimbabwean democracy.” 394 
 This section of Chapter 3 is one of the most significant parts of this 
analysis. It demonstrates the elaborate nature of Chinese activities on the 
continent, especially those of CMIEs, while allowing for a rare glimpse of the role 
of cut-outs such as Sam Pa, and the pivotal role which guanxi dynamics play in 
Sino-African relations. Even though some may harbor the opinion that Sam Pa is 
not an agent of the People’s Republic of China, it appears as though Anjin 
followed his lead and utilized his connections to establish boots on the ground in 
Zimbabwe. If that is the case, then in essence Pa acted as a ‘shadow diplomat’ 
for Beijing’s Marange operation. And so this would be one of many cases in  
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which the ‘guanxi aspects’ of Sino-African transactions are more important and 
pivotal to winning concessions and closing deals than what the general public 
assumes.  
 Resources, Power Projection and Conventional Weapons Transfers 
 In China’s quest for resources and power projection in Africa, its defense 
industrial enterprises often offer the initial ‘bait’ or incentive for resource and 
extraction deals. China acquires resources in a series of steps, which give it a 
greater regional presence at each stage of its acquisition process. CDIEs “…. 
identify [African] states with significant natural resource reserves and work 
closely with Chinese diplomats to design an engagement program with apropos 
economic and diplomatic benefits.”395  
Once needed resources have been identified, China initiates the second 
stage of the process. “China … packages its diplomatic, defense, and 
development aid into synchronized and synergistic offerings,”396 in exchange for 
mineral exploration rights, extraction rights and concessions.397  
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United States Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Volume 1-09, June 2009, p. 5. 
http://bit.ly/2aINi8P. Accessed on April 18, 2015. 
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397. Amnesty International reported “Arms sales and arms factory construction throughout 
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“Norinco’s [China North Industries Corporation] arms sales help the government protect China’s 
oil interests in … [South Sudan] where China National Petroleum is one of three companies with 
oil-pumping operations. That leaves Norinco [and other Defense Industrial Enterprises] free to 
explore civilian projects.” Bloomberg,Top China Arms Maker Goes Global With Cheaper Tanks, 
September 9, 2014. http://bloom.bg/1OqTXvv. Accessed on March 14, 2015. 
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 “For instance, ‘Zambia has used its copper resources to pay China in a 
number of military deals … Kenya has … [negotiated] with China to trade fishing 
rights for arms’398 …. [and] in August 2005, Beijing supplied 220 [military] trucks 
[to Khartoum], with payment in oil.”399 Frequently, defense offerings provide 
China the opportunity to either sell or trade arms to the host country in which the 
PRC’s resource extraction operations are established. Thus, Chinese Defense 
Industrial Enterprises play a unique role in China’s African investment protocol.   
 CDIEs have a long history of involvement on the continent, which includes 
activities in the Great Lakes Region (GLR), Sudan, and South Sudan. According 
to Bräutigam, “Beijing [through CDIEs] helped Sudan build its own arms 
factories, supplied the bulk of Sudan’s small arms imports, [and] sold military 
aircraft to Sudan ….”400 Human Rights Watch made similar observations about 
the Great Lakes Region. “[In the 1990’s] weapons, including landmines and 
ammunition, produced in the Nakasongola arms factory401 … [were 
simultaneously] provided to the [warring] Burundian government and Tutsi 
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militias.”402 This activity facilitated SALW and munitions access prior to, and 
during regional conflicts – including the Rwandan Genocide. 
 Chinese defense industrial enterprises may opt to use Chinese 
businessmen as cut-outs, to clandestinely initiate arms-for-resources projects 
throughout Africa, if they do not have their own representatives negotiate the 
deal, or to maintain a certain level of plausible deniability. “As globalization 
replaced ideology as the dominant force in geopolitics, the mission of [China’s 
intelligence operatives] … in Africa …. is … [to access] natural resources …. Oil, 
diamonds, and weapons go together.”403 Some Chinese businessmen have close 
connections with China’s intelligence apparatus and act as middlemen for 
defense industrial enterprises such as Norinco. 
 If CDIEs have difficulty entering African resource markets through their 
own connections, they resort to utilizing tightly-knit guanxi networks. In The 
Looting Machine, Tom Burgis states that subsequent to Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reform in the late 1970’s, the PLA’s two major arms companies 
NORINCO and … [Poly Technologies] worked in conjunction with private 
businesses in order to facilitate surreptitious transactions with authoritarian 
regimes and militias.  
 In order to detail the full scope of Chinese defense industrial enterprises in 
Africa, this chapter will examine the proliferation of SALWs, heavy weapons, 
munitions, military vehicles, aircraft, vessels and equipment in several different 
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areas, including countries within the Great Lakes Region, Sudan, South Sudan 
and Zimbabwe.404 Generally speaking, there is a slight difference in the research 
focus between the GLR, Sudan and South Sudan across the board with 
academics, which may be related to the type of data available.  
 In the case of Chinese arms sales to GLR states, a lot of emphasis has 
been on detailing upstream transit routes and the regional effects of the weapons 
and equipment infusion in the Rwandan Genocide and Burundian Civil War. In 
Sudan and South Sudan, there is a lot of information with regard to weapons-
types, munitions, and regional effects such as intra-ethnic conflict, civil war and 
IDP’s, however when compared to the GLR, there has not been a substantial 
focus on the weapons pipeline. This could in part be due to the fact that the 
Great Lakes Region is landlocked, while Sudan has been afforded an ingress of 
arms and military equipment through Port Sudan. 
Great Lakes Region 
 Amnesty International noted “[China’s] routine export of conventional 
weapons … has been contributing to human rights violations including in brutal 
armed conflicts.”405 Other NGOs have made similar claims, and state that 
Chinese weapons and military equipment have contributed to destabilization and 
conflict in areas such as the Great Lakes Region (GLR).406 Great Lakes Region 
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states have a history of conflict and tribal tensions, which were initially 
exacerbated by colonialism, and then in modern times, through an infusion of 
weapons supplied by external actors.407 “The worst outbreaks of violence in 
Black Africa in the 1990s occurred …between the Hutu and the Tutsi.”408 
 While weapons sales and transfers are usually opaque by nature, their 
supply to the Great Lakes Region states and ethnic groups has been especially 
mired in obscurity. The clandestine nature of arms shipments to militaries and 
factions within the GLR have been facilitated by agents in other countries 
operating at the points of arrival, or by neighboring states acting as a depository 
or transit point for the recipient states.409  
 Human Rights Watch maintains China “[was] a major source of arms to 
Burundian government forces and Tutsi militias …. [The PRC] … supplied 
weapons to both sides …. In the case of Rwanda … China supplied arms to both 
the forces of the government ousted in 1994 - and subsequently based in eastern 
                                            
407. In Africa - like the Middle East - tribal ties and tribal politics are not constrained by 
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Zaire - and the RPF-led government …. In violation of the international arms 
embargo on Rwanda.”410  
 The Burundian Civil War, which began in October of 1993, was a 
precursor to the Rwandan Genocide, which began less than a year later.411 The 
conflict served to fan the regional flames of inter-ethnic tensions, and 
subsequently the Hutu-Tutsi struggle spilled over into Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The arming of the warring factions in Burundi 
was one of the first stepping-stones to regional destabilization, apart from 
colonialization and Balkanization, which can be attributed to external actors.412 
 Although several countries chose to sell Burundi SALWs, heavy weapons, 
and military equipment prior to the commencement of its civil war, China played a 
central role in the “arms [flow] … to all Burundian belligerent parties.”413 
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“Many of the arms transported to the Burundian government forces or 
[Burundian] Tutsi militias via Tanzania arrived from China at the port of Dar es 
Salaam. While at least some of these shipments carried discreet markings to 
indicate their final destination as Burundi, the end-destination of other shipments 
was concealed by listing instead neighboring states, including Rwanda and 
Uganda, as the recipients.”414 While a 2006 Council on Foreign Relations report 
indicates that some of the intercepted arms shipments to Burundi were 
designated for the Burundian army, other sources were convinced that they were 
slated to be delivered to militias, as will subsequently be discussed.415 
 In the case of GLR-based conflicts, there is a near linear connection 
between the arrival of the weapons and the regional expansion of conflict. In the 
mid-1990’s, COSCO vessels laden with Chinese arms arrived in Dar es Salaam 
or in Mombasa, Kenya. They were subsequently escorted by the recipient-
country’s military to its border with Uganda, at which time the Ugandan military 
secured the shipments (often misleadingly labeled), stockpiled them, and then 
facilitated their transfer to parties in Burundi.416  
                                            
414. Ibid, 101.   
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“China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) is the [state-owned] 
enterprise responsible for maintaining the Chinese merchant marine fleet; it 
ultimately reports to the State Council.” 417  COSCO vessels are frequently used 
by CDIEs to transport weapons and military equipment.  
One case of Chinese arms arriving in Tanzania for Burundi in the spring of 
1995 received international attention. In part this was because the 
weapons destined for Burundi were on board a [COSCO-consigned] ship, 
the Shun Yi, which also contained a partial charter consignment of food 
supplies for the U.N. World Food Programme …. The food supplies had 
been earmarked for refugees fleeing from conflict in the Great Lakes 
Region.  
 
After the Shun Yi arrived in Dar es Salaam … Tanzanian authorities 
refused to permit its cargo of 152 tons of Chinese-made arms and 
ammunition to be off-loaded …. The Tanzanians were particularly 
concerned about the mass of refugees pouring into their country …. [and] 
also wanted to avoid getting enmeshed in the controversy that enveloped 
arms transfers to Burundi when it became unclear whether the actual 
recipients were the Burundian military or Tutsi militia forces.418 
 
China’s weapons consignments to the GLR did not consist of only SALWs 
and ammunition. In 1995, at least one of the shipments destined for Burundi 
contained tanks and military vehicles. “On October 16, 1995 [a Chinese] … ship 
… arrived in the port of Dar es Salaam and … delivered a cargo of arms that 
included tanks and Chinese-manufactured dual-use vehicles for Burundi. [While] 
other records … indicated that the cargo contained just three cases of 
ammunition.”419 
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 In September of 1996, a European diplomat working in Uganda reported 
to Human Rights Watch that “weapons, including landmines and ammunition, 
produced in the Nakasongola arms factory, a Chinese-built arms production 
facility in the Gulu area of northern Uganda … [were] provided to the Burundian 
government and Tutsi militias.”420 It was also alleged that some of the inbound 
weapons shipments from China, which were channeled through Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania and then Uganda before being rerouted to Burundi, were secured in 
Dar es Salaam (versus at the Ugandan border) by Ugandan military personnel. In 
response to these allegations, the Ugandan government denied routing any arms 
to Burundi, from the Chinese-built factory in Nakasongola, or from inbound 
weapons arriving in Dar es Salaam.421  
 While most data sources do not indicate who owns the Nakasongola arms 
factory, a 2010 report from Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network indicates the 
“Nakasongola Arms Factory, is held by Chinese (government and private sector) 
interests.”422 It appears that, at minimum, Chinese defense industrial enterprises 
contracted the Ugandan government to be middlemen for GLR weapons 
production and rerouting. Uganda acted as the proxy in the China-Tanzania-
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Burundi pipeline, as well as allowing the Chinese to produce SALWs and 
landmines for redistribution to other GLR and Central African states.  
 The activity of CDIEs served to saturate the Great Lakes Region with 
small arms, ammunition, and military equipment, enabled the inter-ethnic conflict 
to spill over the borders from Burundi into Rwanda, while simultaneously 
triggering a refugee crisis in both Burundi and Rwanda. In Burundi alone, “more 
than 300,000 people died” 423 as a result of the civil war, and “at least … [one] 
million [were] displaced.”424 “Chinese [SOEs] ... falsified information on arms 
shipments to Burundi in an effort to hide both the destination and the content of 
arms cargoes [and] .... similarly ... sought to conceal weapons deliveries to the 
Rwandan government in 1994 and 1995 at a time when an international arms 
embargo remained in place against Rwanda.”425 
In a situation which had parallels to what had occurred in Burundi, “the 
Rwandan genocide … resulted in the extermination of 800,000 principally Tutsi 
civilians in just 100 days [and] was the culmination of a long-running conflict 
raging between [the] two ethnic groups.”426 In her 2004 book entitled Conspiracy 
to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, Melvern stated that “After combing through 
bank archives and government documents [she discovered] ... that in 1993 [prior 
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to the genocide], the government of Rwanda imported, from China, three 
quarters of a million dollars-worth of machetes. This was enough for one new 
machete for every third male” in Rwanda.427  
Additionally, she noted in the years leading up to the genocide, China 
exported one million dollars’ worth of “mortars, machine-guns, multiple rocket 
launchers and grenades.”428 Chinese hand grenades were so common in 
Rwanda, that they could be purchased in local vegetable markets for as little as 
three American dollars.429 
There are some interesting anomalies in the data. According to the World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) analysis of 1990 - published 
by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency - the People's Republic of 
China cumulatively exported more than twenty million dollars of arms, munitions 
and military equipment to Rwanda alone, between 1985 and 1989. Subsequent 
WMEAT analyses indicate that between 1990-1992, Rwanda either did not 
import any arms or munitions, or failed to report what had been imported over 
that three year period.430  
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 In conclusion, despite U.N. and regional (East African states) arms 
embargos on both Burundi and Rwanda, China provided large consignments of 
SALWs, conventional weapons, ammunition, tanks and military vehicles to the 
GLR through well-established transit lines. Companies like Norinco leveraged  
the opaque nature of the local bureaucracy to facilitate the trans-shipments of 
arms and equipment to conflict zones, after refugee crises and regional ethnic 
conflicts, which resulted in the death of more than a million people. 
Great Lakes Region Summary 
 In many instances the transfer of weapons systems from the PRC to the 
Great Lakes Region took place without transparency – or with falsified 
documentation. Sino-Tanzanian shipping policies exemplify these dynamics and 
highlight how CDIE operations in Africa can also facilitate corruption as well as 
conflict and destabilization. 
 [Throughout the 1990’s] it was standard practice for at least one shipping 
 agent, Sinotaship, based jointly in Tanzania and China, to label arms 
 shipments as ‘cases of ammunition.’ This was done to conceal the nature 
 of military hardware such as tanks and heavy vehicles …. Human Rights 
 Watch learned that certain military shipments from China were deemed so 
 sensitive by the Chinese government that no proper documentation 
 accompanied the goods. In these instances, Chinese officials would fly 
 from China to deal directly with the consignee, and the transaction was 
 concluded at the Chinese embassy [in the recipient country].431 
 
 The evidence in the preceding paragraph thus excludes any claim the 
Chinese government may have had to lack of involvement at that time. In fact, it 
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demonstrates that that powerful CDIEs acted intentionally, despite the negative 
impact of their regional weapons infusion program. Furthermore, the Chinese 
government displayed a pattern of indifference over an extended period, as its 
arms shipments to a region engulfed in violence and genocide were not isolated 
incidents.432  
 After the Rwandan Genocide, the PRC continued to supply the Hutu 
rebels who had perpetrated the genocide and subsequently fled to eastern Zaire. 
In 1995, Human Rights Watch reported that a Kigali-based Chinese embassy 
official said that China “would not discourage the provision of arms to the 
Rwandan extremists if that was what the Zaire government was planning, and 
that there was no international arms embargo against Zaire …. China practices 
the politics of allowing people to solve their own problems.”433 
 In April of 1994, tens of thousands of refugees had already fled the 
violence in Burundi and thousands had perished. 600,000 machetes had been 
funneled into Rwanda the preceding year, and 152 tons of arms destined for the 
GLR were blocked from being off-loaded in Tanzania three days before the 
genocide began in April of 1994. Yet after more than 800,000 Rwandans lost 
their lives - many at the hands of machete-wielding Hutus, the Chinese 
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Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, Volume 7, 
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government continued to supply the aggressors who had relocated to Zaire - with 
weapons. 
 Once a region has been infused with SALWs, incidents of violence and 
aggression are easy to reignite. A 2007 report published by the Small Arms 
Survey referencing Burundi states, “one of the consequences of [Burundi’s civil] 
war has been the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the 
civilian population on … [an] unprecedented scale. The government, civil society, 
and Burundi’s partners are aware of this problem and believe that lasting peace 
will not be restored while these arms remain in the hands of civilians.”434 This is 
an important point. The downstream use of SALWs does not necessarily cease 
with a cessation of conflict or hostilities since most SALWs do not have a ‘shelf 
life.’ 
 While Chinese diplomats frequently back-peddled or voiced denials in 
defense of Beijing’s policies, the ethnic violence, civil wars, IDPs and 
humanitarian crises occurred as Chinese defense industrial enterprises infused 
the GLR with conventional weapons, military equipment tanks and vehicles, often 
in defiance of international and regional embargos. “In August 1996 … a coalition 
of seven states from Central and Eastern Africa, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, agreed to place sanctions and 
an arms embargo on Burundi,”435 and “In May [of] 1994 Security Council 
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resolution 918 imposed an arms embargo on the sale or supply of arms to the 
territory of Rwanda.”436  
 As the Rwandan government was battling the Hutus involved in the 
genocide in Zaire, China off-loaded more than a dozen vessels packed with 
weapons, ammunition, and military equipment. Chinese defense industrial 
enterprises utilized neighboring states as forwarding agents for the 
consignments, effectively bypassing the embargo placed on Rwanda, which 
functioned to exacerbate the ethnic conflict and humanitarian crisis in the region. 
Sudan and South Sudan 
 Comparatively speaking, the role of the People’s Republic of China in 
supplying weapons to conflict zones has garnered the most media attention in 
Sudan and South Sudan. As in the Great Lakes Region, ethnic differences 
between the Arab North and South Sudan led to decades of fighting, which was 
exacerbated by weapons brought into the region by external actors such as 
China, and other countries hungry for revenue from arms sales.437  
                                            
Burundi, August 1996. http://bit.ly/2akSMG7. Accessed on July 30, 2016. 
 
436. “In June 1995 Security Council resolution 997 extended the embargo to non-
governmental forces in the states neighbouring Rwanda intending to use the arms and matériel 
within Rwanda. In August 1995 Security Council resolution 1011 lifted the embargo on the 
Rwandan government, but reaffirmed it on non-state actors within Rwanda or in neighbouring 
states …. It also determined that States should notify all exports of arms or related 
matériel to Rwanda and that the Government of Rwanda … [should] notify the UN about all its 
imports of arms and related materiel …. In April 1996 Security Council resolution 1053 reaffirmed 
the embargo and urged states to prevent military training on their territory by militia groups or 
former Rwandan government forces.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, UN 
arms embargo on Rwanda (Non-Governmental Forces), May 1994. http://bit.ly/2aq7Uwu. 
Accessed on July 30, 2016. 
 
437. The majority of North Sudan is Arabic-speaking and Muslim, while South Sudan is 
comprised of Christians and those adhering to indigenous belief systems who speak in local 
dialects.  
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Initially, the PRC helped arm Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil 
War, against the southern region of the country and Darfurian rebels, even during 
embargos.438  According to the United States Committee for Refugees, by 1998 
more than two million people had died in the Second Sudanese Civil War, which 
began in 1983.439 Conflict and border skirmishes presently continue between 
Sudan and South Sudan, even as the recently established nation contends with 
the possibility of civil war.440 As of 2015 it was estimated that there are more than 
3 million IDPs in both Sudan and South Sudan,441 while according to the U.N. 
more than 50,000 people have perished in South Sudan’s civil war, which began 
in December 2013.442  
                                            
438. “In July 2004 Security Council resolution 1556 … imposed an open-ended arms embargo 
on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states 
of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur. This was in reaction to the ongoing human rights 
abuses and deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region …. In March 2005 Security Council 
Resolution 1591 … expanded the arms embargo to include … Sudanese government forces 
active in the region, [militias] and any other belligerents in North Darfur, South Darfur, and West 
Darfur, Sudan …. In 2010 the embargo was strengthened to ensure states provide the necessary 
end-user documentation to prevent breaches of the prior resolutions when exporting arms to the 
Sudanese Government.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, UN Arms Embargo 
on Sudan (Darfur region), October 25, 2012. http://bit.ly/2aBdAs2. Accessed on July 24, 2016. 
 
439. BBC, Millions Dead in Sudan Civil War, December 11, 1998. http://bbc.in/2amEzpr. 
Accessed on July 22, 2016.   
 
440. Specifically, subsequent to South Sudan’s liberation South Kordofan and Blue Nile have 
seen elevated levels of conflict.  
 
441.  According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center [IDMC], “As of … [January 
2015] IDMC ... [estimated] there were up to 3,100,000 IDPs in Sudan [and South Sudan]. This 
included figures in the region of Darfur and the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.” Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center, Sudan IDP Figures Analysis, January 2015. 
http://bit.ly/2aAKAA7. Accessed on July 18, 2016. 
 
442. As of March 2016, “as many as 50,000 ... [had] died in the two-year conflict, one [U.N.] 
official [stated] … with violence continuing despite peace deal.” Fleur Launspach, UN: Tens of 
Thousands Killed in South Sudan War, Al Jazeera, March 3, 2016. http://bit.ly/1od0bYC. 
Accessed on July 18, 2016. 
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Since South Sudan broke away from the North, China has walked a 
tightrope, and maintained its links with the North, while simultaneously supplying 
weapons to South Sudan’s military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). 
Following its liberation, South Sudan began to use oil revenue to vigorously arm 
itself against Khartoum. However, growing tension between two South Sudanese 
factions comprised of the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups has the capacity to 
metastasize. Thus, weapons which were originally imported to help South Sudan 
defend itself against its northern neighbor, could potentially facilitate an 
intranational conflict, or at the minimum augment the casualty level in South 
Sudan should civil war break out.443 Since South Sudan did not win 
independence until 2011, and the conflict(s) span the two countries irrespective 
of their borders, I will be examining PRC-weapons movement in both countries in 
this section. 
Domestic Arms Production 
 China’s technology transfers and arms factory construction in Khartoum 
were addressed in a 2007 Human Security Baseline Assessment which notes “In 
addition to helping finance Khartoum’s acquisition of weapons on the 
international arms market through oil revenues, China has also acted as a major 
arms seller to Sudan and assisted in the development of domestic arms 
production with technology transfers and technical assistance.”444  
                                            
443. The power struggle in South Sudan has pitted President Salva Kiir’s ethnic group (Dinka), 
against the Nuer, the ethnic group to which ex-Vice President Riek Machar belongs. The Dinka 
population is approximately 4.5 million, while the Nuer number approximately 1.8 million. 
 
444. Small Arms Survey, Arms, Oil and Darfur, 9.  
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Former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, David Shinn, 
claimed that the weapons and technology transfer played an implicit role in 
conflicts in both Darfur and Chad. The link provided by Shinn demonstrates that 
Chinese arms, weapons and munitions manufactured and supplied by CDIEs, in 
addition to the technology transfers from the PRC to Sudan have facilitated 
conflict and destabilization in the region.  
 According to Shinn, “China … helped build three weapons factories 
outside Khartoum …. Chinese small arms [many of which were manufactured in 
Khartoum] became [more] widely used in Darfur and found their way to the 
conflict in neighboring Chad. Most ammunition used by all parties in Darfur … 
[was] manufactured in Sudan or in China.”445 Additionally, it was discovered that 
the Beijing-based defense industrial enterprise responsible for assisting with the 
North Sudanese arms plant construction, also arranged for Chinese experts to 
oversee operations. “One account of the Giad industrial complex near Khartoum 
indicated that Chinese engineers were [even] supervising the facility’s work.”446  
 Arms experts from the Small Arms Survey documented machine guns 
domestically-manufactured by Sudan’s state-owned Military Industrial 
Corporation (MIC). “Sudan’s MIC claims to produce general-purpose and heavy 
                                            
445. David Shinn, China Brief, Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones, The Jamestown 
Foundation. Volume IX, Issue 7, April 2, 2009, p. 8. http://www.bit.ly/2bZR1tS. Accessed on 
February 12, 2015. David Shinn, was ambassador to Burkina Faso (1987-1990) and Ethiopia 
(1996-1999), and is presently an adjunct professor of international affairs at The George 
Washington University. 
 
446. Christian Aid, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, 2001. http://bit.ly/2aggjbh. 
Accessed on April 4, 2015. 
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machine guns, which appear to be identical to those manufactured by China … 
these are copies of the Chinese Type 80 and Type 85 machine guns, 
respectively.”447 Since the Chinese Type 80 and Type 85 machine guns that MIC 
purports to produce are identical in construction to those manufactured in the 
PRC, it is possible to conclude that either MIC-run factories are using technology 
transferred from China to domestically produce some of their SALWs, or that 
Chinese defense-industrial enterprises have continued to infuse the region with 
arms. As of 2016 South Sudan has no domestic SALW-production capacity and 
relies on external actors for arms. 
PRC-manufactured SALW’s and Munitions 
 U.N. arms experts discovered post-embargo, Chinese-manufactured 
munitions in Darfur, leading them to conclude that the CDIE responsible for the 
manufacturing and export of the munitions was knowingly ignoring the sanctions 
against Sudan. 
 In May 2011, a team of U.N. arms experts collected several high-explosive 
 incendiary cartridges in the Darfur town of Tukumare, where Sudanese 
 armed forces had recently battled rebels, according to a confidential report 
 that was produced by three U.N. arms experts and first publicly disclosed 
 by the London-based newsletter Africa Confidential …. China 
 [subsequently] rebuffed requests by a U.N. panel to attempt to trace the 
 cartridges back to their manufacturer.448 
                                            
447. “It is not clear whether Sudan manufactures these weapons under licence from 
China or whether it assembles them in Khartoum.” Chinese Type 80 and Type 85 machine guns, 
“whose markings had been fully removed, which made it difficult to identify them as Sudanese or 
Chinese” were documented in South Sudan by Small Arms Survey researchers. Leff and Lebrun, 
Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan, 71-72. 
 
448. “The cartridges - which were manufactured in China in 2010, more than five years after 
the arms embargo first went into effect - were compatible with weapons systems used in Sudan’s 
Russian-made Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-25 ground attack aircraft …. [As] it is in the case 
of Darfur, where Chinese ammunition has become a feature of annual U.N. reports, China has 
moved most aggressively to clamp down on … [the] findings. In 2011, China blocked the release 
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 In addition to the Darfur-based conflict, the North-South Sudanese Civil 
War was also affected by the influx of Chinese weaponry. In a 2014 Small Arms 
Survey, Leff and Lebrun noted “Field inspections in … South Sudan have 
revealed a large variety of Chinese equipment, including assault rifles, general-
purpose and heavy machine guns, RPG-7-pattern launchers, automatic grenade 
launchers, antitank missiles, various types of rockets, and small-calibre 
ammunition….”449 Furthermore, some arms which have been exported from 
China to Khartoum have been transferred to conflict regions in neighboring 
states, such as the Central African Republic.   “These findings … shed new light 
on regional mechanisms of the diversion and retransfer of weapons [to conflict 
zones] …. Chinese-manufactured ammunition [and artillery] supplied to Sudan 
appears to have been repackaged in Sudan and re-exported in potential violation 
of Sudan’s end-user agreements with the Government of China.”450 
                                            
of the Darfur panel’s report, then singled out the arms expert … who had uncovered boxes of 
Chinese cartridges, and dismissed his work as unprofessional …. In January 2011, China placed 
a hold on the U.N. decision to renew … [the arms expert’s] contract, effectively shutting him out of 
the [U.N.] Security Council panels.” Colum Lynch, China's Arms Exports Flooding Sub-Saharan 
Africa, The Washington Post, August 25, 2012. http://bit.ly/2aOhdHH. Accessed on April 6, 2014.  
 
449. Leff and Lebrun, Following the Thread, 40. “Amnesty International has also gathered 
evidence of the use of Chinese manufactured weapons and large calibre ammunition elsewhere 
in Sudan during 2011. In particular, QLZ87 35mm grenade launchers and grenades, supplied to 
Sudan by a Chinese company under a contract dated 2008 (according to packaging markings), 
were captured from SAF forces in Southern Kordofan in June 2011.” Amnesty International 
Publications, Sudan: No End to Violence in Darfur, February 2012, p 16. http://bit.ly/2ais3Hp. 
Accessed on April 5, 2015. 
 
450.  Conflict Armament Research, Non-State Armed Groups in the Central African Republic: 
Types and Sources of Documented Ammunition, p. 25, January 2015.  http://bit.ly/2aBdLDO. 
Accessed February 12, 2015. “Sudan and China produced the majority of the recently 
manufactured (post-2000) weapons and ammunition documented in CAR on all sides. Chinese … 
manufactured small arms ammunition and larger munitions have been re-transferred from Sudan 
to CAR.” Conflict Armament Research. p. 6. 
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Heavy Weapons 
 In addition to SALWs, the PRC has provided more sophisticated and lethal 
weapons systems to the Sudanese. According to a February 2008 Sudan 
Tribune Article, “Chinese weapons currently in service in the Sudanese forces 
include Type 54 122-mm howitzers, Type 59-I 130-mm cannons, Type 81 122-
mm rocket guns, Type 59 57-mm air-defense guns, [and] mortars of different 
calibers.”451 Information subsequently released through different sources 
indicates that this trend has continued, especially since South Sudan declared 
independence. Chinese companies have armed both Northern and Southern 
Sudanese militaries, despite years of embargos, in place as a result of human 
rights issues. These weapon systems have been encountered along the border 
between Sudan and South Sudan, from Ethiopia in the east to Chad n the west. 
In December 2012, Small Arms Survey analysts encountered Chinese-
manufactured, Red Arrow-8 anti-tank guided missiles in Kadugli, South 
Kordofan.”452 According to the May 2014 Small Arms Survey, “although small-
calibre weapons and ammunition comprise the bulk of Chinese manufactured 
military equipment in circulation in Sudan and South Sudan … more advanced 
weapons … [have been deployed] particularly in South Kordofan and Blue Nile 
                                            
451. The Sudan Tribune, China sells arms to Sudan, February 15, 2008. 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25992. Accessed on July 26, 2016. 
 
452.  Leff and Lebrun, Following the Thread, 55. “The timing of … [the arrival of the] 
consignments, totaling 450 [Red Arrow-8 anti-tank guided] missiles combined, may suggest that 
Sudan purchased the missiles from China for potential use against the South Sudanese military 
and its newly procured fleet of tanks that arrived around the same time as the order, rather than 
for an internal counterinsurgency against [Sudanese] rebel groups.” Ibid, 57.  
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…. [examples are] … long-range 302 mm Weishi [WS-1] rockets,” and anti-tank 
guided missiles.453   
In 2013 and 2014 as the inter-ethnic tensions in South Sudan increased, 
China continued to move weapons into the world’s newest country. According to 
a September 2016 publication by “The Sentry,” in a fashion reminiscent of the 
Rwandan Genocide, NORINCO attempted to funnel weapons into the region 
prior to the outbreak of the South Sudanese Civil War, and was successful in 
delivering military hardware on at least two occasions subsequent to the 
outbreak of the civil war on December 15, 2013.454 
The transfer process of the weapons from NORINCO to the SPLA was 
also questionable, as it appears that both NORINCO and the GoSS attempted to 
maintain a veil of secrecy during the transfers through the utilization of a South 
Sudanese front company.  Within the correspondence between Zheng Yi, Vice 
President of NORINCO, and Lt. General Malek Reuben Riak Rengu (SPLA), the 
arms are designated as ‘farming equipment.’ 
 
                                            
453. Leff and Lebrun, Following the Thread, 55. “Satellite images taken by the Satellite 
Sentinel Project (SSP) [in April 2014 [revealed] the Sudanese military deployed a Weishi-01 ... 
[Weishi-1] multiple rocket launcher [and] .... a [WS-1] resupply vehicle .... along with another type 
of artillery to ... South Kordofan .... [The WS-1] is a Chinese-made weapons system that launches 
rockets with a maximum range of 100 km or more. The rockets can be fitted with various types of 
warheads .... The size and range [of the Chinese-manufactured WS-1] clearly had ... [a] 
psychological effect on the civilian population and, to some extent, on SPLM-N fighters.” Radio 
Tamazuj, Sudan Moves Rocket System to South Kordofan Front, April 18, 2014. 
https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/sudan-moves-rocket-system-south-kordofan-front. Accessed 
on March 12, 2015.   
 
454.  The Sentry (Enough Project), War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay: Stopping the Looting and 
Destruction in South Sudan, September 2016, p. 45. http://bit.ly/2cA6C6q. Accessed on 
September 9, 2016.   
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Records obtained by The Sentry show that, at least on paper, NORINCO 
did not appear to deliver weapons directly to South Sudan’s military or 
government. The “notify party” listed on the bill of lading for the NORINCO 
shipment was not South Sudan’s defense ministry but rather “Loid 
Investments,” a company owned by two South Sudanese businessmen 
that was formed in October 2013, just a few months before the shipment 
arrived. Correspondence between NORINCO and the SPLA reveals that 
... [a SPLA general] was the person signing off on ... [the] transactions.455. 
 
 In July 2014, Jane’s Defence Weekly confirmed a delivery of heavier 
weapons systems. It reported that “South Sudan … [had] taken delivery of a 
large shipment of Chinese infantry weapons that … [included] anti-tank guided 
missiles …. carried by the COSCO (Chinese Ocean Shipping Company) cargo 
ship Feng Huang Song.”456  
 Jane’s was most likely referring to a massive arms shipment from Norinco, 
which made the international news, spurred a U.N. Security Council resolution, 
and caused the Chinese Government to halt further Norinco shipments to war-
torn South Sudan as it fended off allegations of fueling civil war in the region. The 
consignment consisted of both small arms and heavy weaponry. Norinco sold 
missiles, rifles, machine guns, pistols, anti-tank rockets, grenade launchers and 
nearly 25 million rounds of ammunition to the SPLA, despite the fact the region 
was still destabilized from the civil war.457 “South Sudanese officials … 
                                            
455.  The Sentry (Enough Project), War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay, 45.  
 
456. Jerry Binnie, South Sudan takes delivery of Chinese ATGWs, HIS Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, July 9, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/40621/south-sudan-takes-delivery-of-chinese-
atgws. Accessed April 3, 2015. 
 
457.  “In July 2014, SPLA received a shipment of arms, ammunition and related materiel from 
Norinco … The consignment indicated on the packing list included 100 HJ-73D anti-tank guided 
missile-launching and guidance systems, including batteries and spare parts, and 1,200 rounds of 
the missile; 9,574 type-56 automatic rifles, as well as 2,394 under-barrel 40mm grenade 
launchers and 20 million rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition; 319 type-80 general-purpose 
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acknowledged the delivery of the materiel publicly and in private conversations 
with the .... [U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts].”458  
 As a communiqué from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army to NORINCO 
reveals, NORINCO was already engaged in negotiations with the SPLA to 
transfer 42 sets of VT Main Battle Tanks, and 3 sets of VT2 Command Tanks to 
the SPLA in November 2013.459  
 Subsequently a diplomatic representative who claimed to be speaking on 
behalf of the Chinese Government in Juba stated that Chinese SOEs - including 
Norinco, were prohibited from shipping any more arms to Sudan. In return, a 
“South Sudan army spokesman … said in a … [September 21, 2014] interview … 
he was unaware that the Chinese had stopped arms sales.”460 Jonah Leff, 
rejected the Chinese government’s statement and claimed “China’s decision to 
halt the weapons sale … [came] “conveniently” after one shipment arrived in 
South Sudan.”461 However, according to the 2016 Sentry publication, NORINCO 
was successful in delivering two shipments of arms to South Sudan, which were 
used during the ethnic conflict. 
                                            
machine guns and 2 million rounds of 7.62x54 ammunition; 660 NP-42 pistols delivered with 2 
million rounds of 9x19mm ammunition; and 40,000 rounds of type-69 high-explosive anti-tank 
rockets.” United Nations Security Council, Statement of U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206, August 21, 2015, p. 20. 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2206. Accessed on July 26, 2016. 
 
458. Ibid.  
 
459. See Appendix 6B. 
 
460. Ilya Gridneff, China Halts Arms Sales to South Sudan After Norinco Shipment, 
Bloomberg, September 30, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-29/china-
halts-weapons-after-norinco-shipment. Accessed on July 25, 2016. 
 
461. Ibid.  
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 The impact of the civil war on the South Sudanese population triggered a 
humanitarian crisis. “Human Rights Watch … accused South Sudan’s army and 
rebel forces of crimes against humanity including massacres and rape during the 
fighting. Civilians had been purposefully targeted and killed, child soldiers 
recruited and towns pillaged …. The violence … displaced 1.8 million people and 
left 4 million, almost a third of the population, in need of urgent humanitarian 
assistance, according to the UN.”462  
Tanks and Vehicles 
 In the early 2000’s there were reports that the PRC had begun to supply 
Sudan with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). “TV video footage of a 
military parade during the 52nd anniversary of Sudanese independence … [in 
2007 showed] that the country already had new-generation Chinese T96 and 
upgraded T59D main battle tanks [MBTs], and T92 wheeled infantry fighting 
vehicles fitted with Russian 2A72 30-mm’s …. The technological standard of this 
equipment is far superior to ground force equipment China has previously 
exported to Africa”463 China has also supplied other African states with tanks, 
                                            
462. Ibid. 
 
463. “China acquired the technology from Russia to produce 2A72 30-mm cannon guns, which 
is believed to have been used to upgrade the Chinese PLA ground forces’ T86 infantry fighting 
vehicles, or IFVs. Installing 2A72 guns on T92 wheeled IFVs for export to Sudan is a recent 
development. So far the T-92 wheeled IFVs have been known to be provided only to the Chinese 
No.38 Group Army. This appears to be the first time China has exported T92 wheeled IFVs and 
T96 MBTs [Main Battle Tanks] to an African nation.” The Sudan Tribune. China sells arms to 
Sudan. February 15, 2008. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25992. Accessed on 
July 26, 2016. “The 50 ton, Type 96 [MBT] has three man crews and modern sensors and 
electronics.” James Dunnigan, New Tanks in Sudan, Strategy Page, March 5, 2008. 
https://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200835223139.asp. Accessed on July 26, 2016. 
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albeit not the more advanced Chinese T96’s.464 Another source states that until 
2008, Sudan’s tank force consisted of approximately 200 Chinese T59’s.465 
 Chinese-manufactured military vehicles and IFVs have been used to 
transport troops, arms, munitions, and heavy artillery to conflict zones. The PRC 
shipped hundreds of vehicles to both Sudan and South Sudan, which were 
utilized during the civil war, and also in the ethnic cleansing that occurred in 
Darfur.  
In … August 2005 a UN panel … investigating violations of the 
international arms embargo … saw a shipment of green DongFeng 
military trucks in the Port of Sudan. New green trucks of a similar type 
were also seen on the Sudanese air force premises in Darfur in October 
…. A total of 222 vehicles … were procured from DongFeng Automobile 
Import and Export Limited in China, makers of military equipment and  
vehicles. The consignee was the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy of the Sudan. Further reports received indicated that the 
vehicles were consigned on behalf of the Ministry of Defence.466 
  
                                            
464. “At the International Defense Exhibition and Conference [in] 2007 China introduced the 
upgraded variant of the T59D tank. African countries that … [use] T59 tanks include Zambia and 
Tanzania.” The Sudan Tribune, China sells arms to Sudan, February 15, 2008. 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25992. Accessed on July 26, 2016. “The Type 96 
entered service with Chinese army in 1997 …. Production of the original Type 96 ceased in 2005 
…. [and to date] the only export customer of this MBT is Sudan.” Military-Today.com, Type 96 
Main Battle Tank. http://www.military-today.com/tanks/type_96.htm. Accessed on July 26, 2016.  
 
465. “Sudan has, until recently, had a tank force consisting mostly of about 200 Chinese Type 
59s, but some of these appear to have been upgraded by the Chinese …. Most of these have 
been upgraded from being … clone[s] of the Russian T-54, to T-54 clones equipped with Western 
guns … British L7 105mm’s … [capable of] firing depleted uranium shells … [and are also 
outfitted with] …modern electronics.” Dunnigan, New Tanks in Sudan. 
 
466. Amnesty International USA, People’s Republic of China, 21. During pre-liberation north-
south conflicts, SAF troops transported by Chinese-made military vehicles were involved in 
conflicts. As the International Herald Tribune in 2006 noted: “…. [Chinese-manufactured] military 
trucks have been used to transport Sudanese soldiers to sites where civilians have been 
attacked.” International Herald Tribune, Murder Made in China, July 4, 2006. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/04/opinion/edchina.php. Accessed March 7, 2015. 
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Some of the military vehicles the People’s Republic of China exported to 
Sudan were used to transport heavy artillery and long-range rockets - such as 
the Chinese-manufactured Weishi-01 on the South Kordofan Front.467 Similar 
tactics were also observed in Darfur. After an extensive investigation by the BBC 
(British Broadcasting Corporation) it was discovered that anti-aircraft guns, -- 
some Chinese, mounted on Chinese-manufactured army vehicles, captured from 
the GoS by Darfur-based rebel groups, had been used in attacks on civilians in 
the region. The trucks that were tracked and investigated were manufactured by 
the Chinese SOE/defense-industrial enterprise, Dong Feng.  
The BBC ... [interviewed] witnesses who said they saw ... [one of the 
vehicles] being used with its anti-aircraft gun in an attack in a town called 
Sirba, in West Darfur .... [The truck's] powerful anti-aircraft gun fired 
straight into civilian houses .... [It used] high calibre shells that explode on 
impact, spreading hot shards of metal and [capable of] causing terrible 
wounds .... The BBC established through independent eyewitness 
testimony that ... rebels had captured it from Sudanese government 
forces. 
 
[Two] vehicles ... [were] carrying anti-aircraft guns, one … [of which was a] 
Chinese gun. Markings showed that … [the trucks] were from a batch of ... 
[Chinese-manufactured vehicles] that the UN had traced as having arrived  
in Sudan after the arms embargo was put in place. The ... [trucks] came 
straight from the factory in China to Sudan and were consigned to Sudan's 
defence ministry. The guns were mounted after ... [they arrived] from 
China.468 
 
Aircraft 
 While the deployment of Chinese aircraft in the region has so far been 
eclipsed by the use of PRC-manufactured SALWs, artillery and munitions, there 
                                            
467. See footnote 453. Radio Tamazuj, Sudan Moves Rocket System.   
 
468. Andersson, China is Fueling War.   
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is evidence that Chinese-made aircraft have also played a critical role in 
Sudanese and South Sudanese conflicts. As early as the “1990s, China … sold 
aircraft including helicopters to Sudan. In 1996, China was said to have supplied 
Z-6 helicopters, manufactured by Changhe Aircraft Industries and designed to 
carry troops.”469 China has also shipped other types of aircraft to Sudan. One of 
the units most commonly exported by China, the K-8, is “…. a multi-role aircraft 
that can serve as a trainer, fighter, or light ground attack bomber.”470 While K-8 
aircraft can be manufactured for training or patrol and surveillance, China has 
exported weaponized versions to Sudan.471 
 In addition to supplying combat and attack aircraft to Sudan, it has also 
been alleged that Chinese Military, specifically the People’s Liberation Army Air 
Force, has also trained Sudanese pilots who have subsequently used Chinese-
manufactured aircraft to attack civilians. The BBC verified that in February of 
2008, Chinese Fantan fighters (synonymous with Nanchang Q-5’s) belonging to 
the GoS “were flying on missions out of Nyala airport in south Darfur,” and 
engaged in attacks on civilians.472 According to a 2015 report by Flightglobal, the 
                                            
469. Amnesty International USA, People’s Republic of China, 19. 
 
470. GlobalSecurity, K-8 Karakorum Program Developments, January 7, 2015.  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/k-8-dev.htm. Accessed March 15, 2015. 
 
471. “The K-8 trainers are like standard attack aircraft, and their tactical application in the 
Sudanese Air Force is for training but also for land attack operations. Although all trainer aircraft 
have some land-attack capability, the K-8 aircraft that China has sold to Sudan are different from 
those in service in China's PLA Air Force in that they are fitted with 23-mm machine-gun pods.” 
GlobalSecurity.org. China has also exported weaponized versions of the K-8 to Zimbabwe. 
GlobalSecurity, K-8 Karakorum Program Developments. 
 
472. These attacks, some of which took place in Beybey, Darfur resulted in fatalities and 
dismemberments from bombing runs over soft-targets. “The Chinese Fantan jets are believed to 
have been delivered to Sudan in 2003 before the … UN arms embargo was imposed on Darfur 
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Sudanese Air Force is still outfitted with Chinese fighter and attack aircraft: 
twenty Nanchang Q-5’s, twenty Chengdu J-7’s, and eight Shenyang J-6’s.473   
Sudan and South Sudan Summary 
 The fact that Chinese defense industrial enterprises will supply weapons, 
munitions, vehicles and military equipment to war torn regions, despite embargos 
and human rights violations, indicates that in cases such as Sudan and South 
Sudan, the influx of tools of war contributes to destabilization and exacerbates 
pre-existing conflicts. “This raises serious concerns about … [China’s] willingness 
or capacity to implement responsible arms export mechanisms, and to undertake 
effective risk-assessments before licensing arms and ammunition transfers to  
[countries such as] Sudan and [South Sudan].”474 This indicates that the activities 
of Chinese defense industrial enterprises, which export arms and munitions to 
these regions - such as Norinco, lessen stability and in some cases exacerbate 
pre-existing tensions and conflicts. 
                                            
…. The BBC … [was] told by two confidential sources that China … [was] training [Sudanese] 
Fantan fighter pilots [in K-8’s which] are designed to train pilots of fighters like Fantans …. A 
former member of the UN panel on Darfur [stated] …. Clearly this is what they used to train for 
operations with the Fantans …. [And] this represents another Chinese violation of the UN arms 
embargo.” Andersson, China is Fueling War.  
 
473. These models are basically Chinese versions of Russian MiGs with minor modifications.  
The Nanchang Q-5 and Shenyang J-6 are based on MiG-19 designs, while the Chengdu J-7 is a 
Chinese version of the MiG-2. FlightGlobal, World Air Forces 2015, p. 29. http://bit.ly/29Yjd2O. 
Accessed on July 26, 2016.  
 
474. “The repeated appearance of this ammunition in Darfur [and also Southern Kordofan] so 
soon after its manufacture suggests that its ongoing supply to Sudan has been entirely unaffected 
by [embargos and] the presentation of strongly-documented evidence to the UN … [Security 
Council] of its transfer into Darfur, in violation of the UN arms embargo, and its use by both 
government forces and armed opposition groups in Darfur.” Amnesty International Publications, 
No End to Violence, p 16.  
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 In many of the conflicts in South Sudan, Darfur and Kordofan, Chinese-
made military transports were used to move men, SALWs, and heavier weapons 
systems into unstable regions where hundreds of thousands of people were 
internally displaced due to fighting. It was during this period that Norinco infused 
the region with enough armaments and munitions to trigger a humanitarian 
crisis.475  
 Based on statements from Norinco, it is possible that it provided the SPLA 
in South Sudan the weapons consignment as a mechanism to further its goals 
through one of its subsidiaries in order to gain exploration, access, and extraction 
rights to some of South Sudan’s oil. Norinco has a subsidiary company called 
Zhenhua Oil Company, and it has “cited the ‘spillover effect’ of military trade in its 
efforts to get contracts for its [subsidiaries].476 Meanwhile … [Norinco] is free to 
explore civilian projects in the country. Its Shenzhen-listed engineering and 
construction unit, Norinco International Cooperation Ltd., opened an office … [in 
South Sudan] in March.”477 While not verified, it is possible that Norinco may 
have entered into a discrete partnership with either Sinopec or CNPC in South 
Sudan.478  
                                            
475. See footnote 457 for weapons and munitions inventory. 
 
476. Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Arms Flows to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 30, 2011, p. 
14. http://bit.ly/2ap56BW. Accessed April 24, 2015. 
 
477. Sina.com (2014). Shai Oster. Top China Arms Maker Goes Global With Cheaper Tanks. 
Bloomberg. September 9, 2014. http://bloom.bg/1OqTXvv. Accessed on March 14, 2015. 
 
478. One of Norinco’s recent corporate agreements reveals a high level of cooperation 
between Chinese NOCs and CDIEs. According to Norinco’s website: “In [2013], China North 
Industries Group Corporation … signed a strategic cooperation … agreement with China National 
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 However, given the huge quantity of weapons and ammunition, there is 
also reason to wonder what the real intent of Norinco was. Given the facts of the 
weapons transfer, such a large infusion of arms and munitions to a region prone 
to conflict is beyond the bounds of poor judgment or negligence to the point that 
one might state that the transaction defies logic. It also demonstrates that the 
agendas of non-related Chinese SOEs are often at odds with one another. Thus 
revenue for Norinco via arms sales in South Sudan may in turn negatively impact 
CNPC’s and Sinopec’s security and operations.  
 In places like Sudan and South Sudan, technology transfers and the 
infusion of Chinese-manufactured weapons, munitions, vehicles, tanks, 
transports and aircraft have been major factors in contributing to conflict and 
regional destabilization. “The ongoing supply of arms and ammunition to 
insurgents, rebels, tribal groups, and civilians [in Sudan and South Sudan] has 
demonstrably affected levels of violence, both organized and individual …. Since 
the end of the civil war, patterns of weapons transfers to Sudan and South 
Sudan, and lines of retransfer within and between the countries, have influenced 
both local fighting and state and national political dynamics.”479 
                                            
Offshore Oil Corporation …. [CEO] Zhang [Guoqing] pointed out that Norinco … spared no efforts 
to enhance the deep cooperation with SOEs … to achieve the development of mutual benefits, 
which is an important approach to promote military and civilian integration.” NORINCO 
Corporation Website,  NORINCO Group Signs a Strategic Cooperation Frame Agreement with 
CNOOC, April 2013. http://en.norincogroup.com.cn/html/2013/newsofng_0502/160.html. 
Accessed on March 3, 2015. 
 
479. Leff and Lebrun, Following the Thread, 108. 
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 In March 2015, Peter Mabior Riiny, a deputy head of one of the South 
Sudanese rebel groups, complained that China had continued to “supply the 
government of South Sudan with lethal weapons through Ethiopia” and that these 
actions were destroying any prospects of peace. He also noted that the arms and 
munitions were paid for with oil revenues.480  
 We in the SPLM-IO leadership confirm that … [the COSCO] vessel Da 
 Dan Xia has brought large quantity of armaments and ammunition to 
 Salva Kiir’s tribal government via Djibouti Port and Ethiopian land …. 
 Among those weapons, according to the opposition youth leader, are 
 missile warheads, heavy artillery shells, casings, and million detonators.   
 
These weapons, he said, are brought to further destabilize South Sudan. 
 Riiny further claimed that Juba … [pays transit] fees to Ethiopia … 
 [through] Chinese oil companies … in exchange for crude oil so that … 
 [the GoSS] they can access the weapons to … [perpetuate] the war. 
 We are calling on [the] United Nations Security Council … [and other 
 international organizations] to detain these weapons and convince China 
 to abstain from supplying … [arms] to the failed government that 
 massacre[s] its own people.481 
 
While the PRC and its CDIEs are still playing catch up with western arms 
manufacturers, their exports to Africa have been gradually increasing over the 
last fifteen years, often with dire consequences.482 Amnesty International 
                                            
480. Sudan Tribune, Claims China Shipping Lethal Weapons to Juba via Ethiopia, March 30, 
2015. http://bit.ly/2b0uNfb. Accessed on August 26, 2016. 
 
481. Ibid. Riiny’s comment referencing the COSCO ship raises the point that certain COSCO 
vessels and crews may be specifically tasked with the shipment of arms, munitions and military 
equipment. In late February 2015, “the Da Dan Xia ... was headed for Cuba when it ... [was 
detained at] Cartagena [Colombia] after .... 100 tonnes of powder, 2.6 million detonators, 99 
projectiles and around 3,000 cannon shells were [discovered] .... Cargo documentation ... did not 
match the load the ship was ... carrying.” Reuters, Colombia Detains China Cosco Shipping 
Vessel over Illegal Arms, March 4, 2015. http://reut.rs/2cpvTRb. Accessed on August 5, 2016. 
 
482. According to Shinn, “from 2000-2003, China delivered by value about 13 percent of all 
arms to Sub-Saharan Africa …. During 2004-2007, Chinese deliveries [to Africa] included 240 
artillery pieces, 370 APCs and armored cars, 29 minor surface combatants, 10 supersonic 
combat aircraft and 40 other aircraft.” Shinn, Chinese Involvement African Conflict, 8. 
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maintains “the [full] extent of [China’s] exports of … battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, missiles and combat aircraft ... [has been] difficult to determine 
…. [Nonetheless, the PRC] has regularly supplied military equipment … to … 
[states] where persistent violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law have occurred for many years.”483  
There is a relationship between the sales of arms, munitions, military 
materiel and spikes in regional conflicts, human rights violations, internally 
displaced persons, and casualties. Recent evaluations, such as the eleven-year 
UN Comtrade analysis (2001-2012) reveal that “The majority [58 percent] of the 
Sudanese government’s total self-reported imports of small arms and light 
weapons ... [its] ammunition, and ‘conventional weapons’ over the [eleven year 
period] period ... originated in China.”484 The Human Rights First Project asserts 
the PRC’s arms sales to Sudan were even higher. “China supplied 89.95% of 
Sudan’s small arms in 2004; 94.16% in 2005; and 87.66% in 2006.”485  
Information on arms sales to South Sudan, like pre-Genocide Rwanda, 
has been ephemeral until this point. Therefore, correlations and trends between 
weapon sales, destabilization, and conflicts are easier to identify in Sudan than in 
South Sudan, in part due to South Sudan’s short history as a state. However, if a 
general arms-sales-to-conflict ratio in the region can be gauged from pre-2001 
                                            
483. Amnesty International USA, People’s Republic of China, 18. 
 
484. Comtrade (2013). Leff and Lebrun, Following the Thread, 24. 
 
485. Human Rights First, China’s Arms Sales to Sudan, April 28, 2008, p. 3. 
http://www.bit.ly/2biP7Ss. Accessed on March 3, 2015.  
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Sudanese arms import data, South Sudan will face increasing levels of conflict in 
the future. 
It is often hard to draw a direct line between cause and effect. However, in 
the previous chapter, I illustrated how the operation of Chinese SOEs in the 
mining and logging sectors were creating conditions which hindered the 
development of states such as Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. In the case of arms sales to both Sudan and especially South Sudan, 
once again Chinese SOEs are reaping benefits from populations that were 
already struggling with issues such as ethnic-based tensions and competition for 
scarce resources, in order to generate revenue.  
Zimbabwe: Arms and Military Equipment 
 Both Poly Technologies and Norinco have found Mugabe an eager 
customer. According to Human Rights First, in 2000 “Norinco reportedly sold 
U.S. $65.9 million worth of arms to the government of Zimbabwe. The shipment 
included small arms … rocket anti-personnel shells, grenades for assault rifles, 
and hand grenades. It may also have included tanks and tank ammunition.”486 
The same year, it was alleged that Zimbabwe paid for one million dollars of AK-
47s with elephant ivory.487 Chinese-manufactured arms and munitions shipments 
                                            
486. Norinco (2008). Human Rights First, China’s Arms Sales to Zimbabwe, April 28, 2008, p. 
1. http://bit.ly/2b61Evi. Accessed on May 15, 2015. While “both Zimbabwe and China submit 
import and export figures to Comtrade … their reported figures are inconsistent and too low to be 
credible.” Human Rights First, China’s Arms Sales, 1.  
  
487. Manthorpe (2004). Human Rights First, China’s Arms Sales, 1. 
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to Zimbabwe have been especially contentious due to the brutality of the Mugabe 
regime, and because they have been utilized in the oppression of the population.  
 “The March 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe was preceded by 
months of brutal repression of opposition supporters, which resulted in 50 
deaths.”488 According to the South China Morning Post, in 2004 the PRC supplied 
Zimbabwe with armored personnel carriers, 100 military vehicles, twelve aircraft 
(fighters) and riot gear and water cannons.489 In 2008, Poly Technologies gained 
international attention for attempting to ship arms and munitions into Zimbabwe 
despite President Mugabe’s history of oppression and human rights violations. 
Poly Tech and Zimbabwe entered into the multi-million-dollar contract months 
before the election and the shipment was supposed to arrive prior to the polling. 
 The Poly Technologies’ shipment was intercepted in South Africa. In April 
of 2008, The New York Times reported that the Chinese vessel An Yue Jiang 
was laden with 77 tons of arms, which included munitions, rockets, mortars, and 
mortar tubes. The shipment was valued in excess of 1.2 million dollars.490 Poly 
Technologies, often working in conjunction with COSCO shipping lines, has a 
history of questionable arms and munitions transfers.491  
                                            
488. U.S. Department of State (2007). Human Rights First, China’s Arms Sales, 1. 
 
489. South China Morning Post (2004). Human Rights First, China’s Arms Sales, 1. 
 
490. Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar, The New York 
Times, April 19, 2008. http://bit.ly/2aYe0Gv. Accessed on April 24, 2005. 
 
491. According to the Cosren Shipping Agency website, the company represents itself as 
“agents for COSCO Container Lines Co. Ltd.” Cosren, December 2016. 
http://www.cosren.co.za/home. In 1996, Poly Technologies “conspired with [a] … NORINCO 
representative … to import 2,000 fully automatic AK-47s into the United States, selling them to 
Customs agents who posed as Miami drug smugglers …. according to the … federal indictment 
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 Appendix 9 contains what can best be called ‘smoking gun 
documentation,’ released by Wikileaks, which obtained them from the Cape 
Town-based investigative magazine Noseweek. The paperwork consists of “an 
arrival notification for the Ministry of Defence in Zimbabwe … the commercial 
invoice from Poly Technologies … the packing list for the shipment … and a bill 
of lading.”492 
 This scenario in 2008 is reminiscent of the pre-Genocide sales of SALWs 
and machetes to Burundi and Rwanda, and the arms consignment to South 
Sudan in 2008. It is possible to make a case that Poly Technologies is still a front 
company for the People’s Liberation Army. Nonetheless, whether the company 
falls within the categorization of a CMIE, CDIE, or some type of military-civilian 
industrial combine is not integral to demonstrating that its activities have the 
propensity to facilitate conflict. 
‘Stabilizing’ Aspects of Chinese Transfers to Africa 
 It should be noted that there are a few instances in which PRC-supplied 
equipment, vehicles, vessels and aircraft has served to assist the recipient 
countries in providing security. In most, if not all cases of Off-shore Patrol Vessel 
(OPV) transfers, the vessels have been used for legitimate anti-terrorism, anti-
                                            
… [the Poly Technologies and Norinco representatives] had to get permission from Chinese army 
headquarters in Beijing to obtain the 2,000 machine guns.” Richard Smith, Smoking Gun: Made 
In China, World News Daily, February 9, 2000. http://www.wnd.com/2000/02/7087. Accessed on 
November 6, 2015. 
 
492. Wikileaks, Zimbabwe Chinese Weapons Shipment Documentation, April 24, 2008. 
http://bit.ly/2aGu1Pr. Accessed on July 25, 2016. Note: the name of the publication is indeed 
Noseweek, and not Newsweek. 
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piracy, and brown/whitewater patrol operations. In similar fashion, the end use of 
Chinese-produced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Africa also seems to fall within a 
legitimate framework.  
 The PRC agreed to provide two OPVs to the Nigerian Navy in 2014, one 
of which has already been delivered. According to Martin Ewence of Jane’s 
Defence, such contributions will benefit security in the area. “The timing [of such 
contributions are] good [since] … from a security perspective; the level of oil theft 
in and off the Niger Delta remains high, Gulf of Guinea piracy continues, and the 
risk of Boko Haram activity spreading south into maritime areas cannot be 
ignored …. In terms of equipment capabilities designed to deal with the offshore 
threats, the addition of the two new [Chinese] OPVs will enhance the [Nigerian] 
navy's capability.”493 
 In 2014 the PRC provided a “new Type 62 Class gunboat …. [to] the 
Seychelles Coast Guard to help boost the operational capabilities of the Indian 
Ocean island nation’s naval force …. [to] protect the country’s Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Indian Ocean and fight piracy, drug smuggling, 
human trafficking and other maritime crimes on the high seas.”494 In an effort to 
                                            
493. Martin Ewence, Steady Course: Naval Capability Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,  
Jane’s Defence, Jane's Navy International, August 1, 2015. http://bit.ly/2bJERnv. Accessed on 
September 20, 2015. In 2014, “the China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Company …  
launched the Nigerian Navy’s first of two P-18N offshore patrol vessels.” The Sun News On-line.  
China Provides Warship to Nigerian Navy, May 25, 2014.   
http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=65076. Accessed on February 27, 2015. 
 
494. According to the Seychelles foreign affairs minister, “the …vessel will be used to protect 
the country’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) on the Indian Ocean and fight piracy, drug 
smuggling, human trafficking and other maritime crimes on the high seas. Oscar Nkala, 
Seychelles Coast Guard Receives New Chinese Patrol Boat, Maritime Security News, May 21, 
2014. http://bit.ly/2al5iWi. Accessed on March 21, 2015. 
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exercise its soft power, while also securing SLOCs (Sea Lanes of 
Communication) on which its own ships often travel, China has either funded the 
purchase of vessels or donated them to several other African states. 
 Beijing donated a patrol boat to Sierra Leone, enabling the country to 
 patrol its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Prior to this donation, China 
 provided four vessels to the Sierra Leone navy since establishing 
 diplomatic relations in 1987.495 Benin also received a Chinese grant of four 
 million euros ($4.8 million) for the purchase of a patrol boat in 2011.496   
Despite their small size, these donations have often been valuable 
 contributions to local capacity building for countries such as Benin, whose 
 navy only has five small patrol boats.497 
 
 Chinese-manufactured K-8 aircraft in service in Ghana, Zambia, and 
Seychelles have been utilized principally for surveillance and security measures, 
which in turn has served to further stabilization in their regions of operation. The 
same can be said for the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation’s 
Caihong-3 (CH-3), armed, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which was used 
successfully by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram in early 2015.498 Thus 
                                            
495. Defence Web (2011). Zhou Hang and Katharina Seibel, Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of 
Guinea: A Greater Role for China? China Brief, Volume XV, Issue 1, January 9, 2015, p. 16. 
http://bit.ly/2aAEOyz. Accessed on January 9, 2015. 
 
496. Ibid. 
 
497. IISS Military Balance Blog. (2014). Hang and Seibel, Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf, 16. 
Tanzania has also put six Chinese vessels into service. “Two ... Haiqing-class patrol vessels ... 
supplied by China's Poly Technologies .... Two Huchuan fast-attack torpedo boats … [and] two 
Shanghai II-class patrol craft.” Ewence, Steady Course. 
 
498. The CH-3 used by the Nigerians crashed in early 2015 and two more CH-3s crashed 
while being tested by the Algerian military. No details were given as to the reason for the losses 
of the UAVs. Adam Rawnsley, Meet China’s Killer Drones, Foreign Policy, January 14, 2016. 
http://atfp.co/1RIBAbb. Accessed on July 30, 2016. 
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in limited situations, Chinese-manufactured aircraft and vessels have been used 
for promoting peace and stability, rather than being utilized in conflict.499 
 There is a caveat in utilizing the word ‘stabilization,’ since in some 
situations ‘stabilization’ can lead to conflict. Supplying authoritarian rulers such 
as Zimbabwe’s Mugabe or Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir with arms and military 
equipment has the capacity to help them maintain their grip on power, or to 
‘stabilize’ their regime. In such cases though, the stabilization of malevolent 
actors or governments with a history of human rights violations, augments 
regional tensions, which in turn can lead to conflict or war - especially if the 
government or population, or both the government and population, as in the case 
of Burundi, have access to SALWs and munitions. So, in the case of Zimbabwe, 
a certain type of ‘stabilization’ has been made possible via the influx of Chinese-
manufactured arms and military equipment, however that type of support 
provides for the continuation of human rights violation - or more simply, 
repression. 
Chapter 3 - Summary 
  The activities of Chinese defense industrial enterprises in Africa have 
mixed effects. In the cases of SALW, heavy weapons, military equipment, 
vehicle, and aircraft transfers, many of the end-uses are questionable at best. 
Shinn and other experts opine that PRC-manufactured small arms have become 
the weapons of choice in many African conflict zones.  
                                            
499. During the course of research, the author did not come across any information, which 
indicated that Chinese-made vessels had been used in any conflicts, acts of aggression or 
human rights violations.  
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China’s most controversial military sales concern Sudan where there have 
been two major conflicts - the North-South civil war and the crisis in 
Darfur. China provided up to 90 percent of the … [SALWs] delivered to 
Sudan between 2004 and 2006 …. There is a growing concern that China, 
because its small arms are so inexpensive, is becoming the provider of 
choice for the generic version of the AK-47 and related assault rifles.  
Although China sells the weapons to African governments, they are 
increasingly finding their way into conflict zones,” and the hands of militias 
and civilians. 500 
 
In part, the research of Wezeman et al. parallel Shinn’s perspective: 
“supplies of SALW and major arms [do] play a role in armed conflict in sub-
Saharan Africa; even supplies of relatively small quantities of older weapons can 
have a notable [negative] impact on conflicts …. [Yet] in several cases it could be 
argued that arms supplies have contributed to a government’s ability to 
legitimately maintain or restore stability in its country, including with the use of 
force against rebel groups,”501 or to increase the level of security against other 
threats, as has been the case with the sale of UAV’s to Nigeria to combat Boko 
Haram, and the sale of vessels to both Nigeria and Seychelles.  
 In the 2011 SIPRI policy paper entitled Arms Flow to Sub-Saharan  
 
Africa, the authors note, “in many cases arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa 
have had clearly undesirable effects.”502 
 
 
                                            
500. Shinn, Chinese Involvement African Conflict, 8. 
 
501. Wezeman, Wezeman, and Béraud-Sudreau, Arms Flows, vi-vii. While Shinn specifically 
states that Chinese weapons have a negative impact on stabilization and conflict in Africa, the 
2011 analysis by Wezeman, Wezeman, and Béraud-Sudreau doesn’t indicate to the extent that 
Shinn did, that (specifically) the PRC is responsible for facilitating regional destabilization and 
conflict.  
 
502. Ibid. 
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 1. The supply of arms can be argued to have been an incentive for the   
     recipients to try to achieve their goals via violence instead of dialogue. 
  
 2. Arms have been used in human rights violations. 
  
 3. Arms recipients often do not have the capability to secure their   
     stockpiles and weapons have been lost or stolen, including by rebel   
     groups. 
 
 4. Arms recipients have deliberately diverted weapons to targets of UN  
     arms embargoes or rebel groups in neighbouring countries. 
  
 5. Arms supplied to governments have been turned against those     
     governments in military coups d’état.503 
 
 The conclusions of Wezeman et al, are echoed by other scholars such as 
Taylor and Nigerian scholar Chuka Enuka, who like Shinn, have directly identified 
Chinese arms sales to African countries as a mechanism which facilitates conflict 
and destabilization. While in some cases, Chinese-manufactured arms, 
technology and equipment have been used to enhance a country’s security and 
stability, in most instances the impact of sales and transfers has been detrimental 
to the host-countries and surrounding region(s).  
 In China’s New Role in Africa, Taylor explicitly states Chinese weapons 
and equipment are exacerbating conflicts. “It is difficult to see how … [weapons 
sales and transfers do] not undermine … [regional] peace, security and stability 
…. The same goes for Chinese [SALW] trade … [throughout] Africa.”504 Nigerian 
scholar Chuka Enuka came to a similar conclusion and posited that China’s drive 
                                            
503. Ibid.  
 
504. Taylor, China’s New Role, 125. 
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for resources led to relationships and weapons sales with governments that had 
a history of human rights violations.  
 Because of strategic interests, China is enmeshed in cutting deals with 
 bad governments and providing them with arms. Arms sales and military 
 relationships help China gain important African allies in the United Nations 
 - including Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria …. To meet its oil and mineral 
 needs, Beijing has consistently delivered arms to pariah states in Africa 
 especially the conflict-torn zones …. China has been implicated in the 
 proliferation of arms in Africa, which either provoke conflicts or exacerbate 
 the existing ones.505 
 
China’s Real Agenda and Plausible Deniability 
 In areas with long histories of conflicts, human rights violations, 
internecine clashes, and waves of IDPs which inevitably result from these violent 
regional engagements, China’s agenda regarding weapons and military 
equipment transfers is, at a minimum, highly questionable. The arming of Great 
Lakes Region states throughout some of its most turbulent times, and the sale of 
SALWs and heavy weapons to South Sudan soon after its independence raises 
the issue that China is well aware of the potential ramifications of its actions.  
 If the consignment of 600,000 machetes to Rwanda helped to enable a 
genocide, then by comparison - what did SOE Norinco believe the potential 
impact of supplying SALWs, heavy weapons and 24 million rounds of 
ammunition to the SPLA of South Sudan (which has a population of just over 11 
                                            
505. Chuka Enuka, China’s Military Presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s Wobbling 
Peace, Journal of Political Studies, Volume 18, Issue 1, 15-30, April 2011, pp. 2-3. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1833542. Accessed March 2014.  Enuka is a 
lecturer at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. 
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million people) would be?506 A Joint Special Operations University analysis 
entitled Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent notes, “most of the 
casualties [in Africa] - and the numbers are horrific - come from small arms … 
[or] from spears and machetes.”507  
 China’s history of funneling arms to African countries or ethnic groups 
embroiled in conflict proves that, at a minimum, China is complicit in fanning the 
flames of conflict. The repetitive and destabilizing nature of these transactions, to 
use a legal term, demonstrates the ‘deliberate indifference’ of Chinese defense 
industrial enterprises towards the populations of African states that have 
historically been prone to conflict or subject to oppression by authoritarian 
regimes.508 
 NGOs have questioned the policies of the PRC for more than two 
decades. In 1997, Human Rights Watch suggested the Chinese government 
might be turning a ‘blind eye’ to arms sales in conflict-torn regions and 
authoritarian states and, given the more recent transactions of major defense 
industrial enterprises such as Norinco in countries like South Sudan, this appears 
to be a feasible and well-founded conclusion which still provides a timely insight 
into the current dynamics of Sino-African arms exports.  
                                            
506. “In the fifteen months prior to the genocide, China shipped double the usual number of 
machetes … to Rwanda, nearly 600,000 in all.” Jacques Semelin (2009). Samuel Totten, 
Impediments to the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide, 2013, p. 202. 
 
507. Colonel John B. Alexander (U.S. Army Retired), Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark 
Continent, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 09-5, May 2009, p. 1. 
jsou.socom.mil/PubsPages/2009JSOUPublications.aspx. Accessed on August 1, 2016. 
 
508. Further proof of these activities is demonstrated by Poly Technologies shipping 
documentation for Zimbabwe-bound weapons shipments in Appendix 9. 
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 China's main arms manufacturers and exporters, all state-owned 
 companies, have become more aggressive in their export marketing, 
 reflecting a change in Chinese policy to make ministries and government 
 corporations responsible for raising their own revenues …. Some China 
 experts suggest that the government may encourage such transactions, 
 preferring not to give them its stamp of approval in order to conceal its 
 own role. Such activities would afford a measure of "plausible deniability" 
 in international affairs, especially in cases of shipments that violate the 
 laws of other states.509 
  
The 1997 Human Rights Watch (HRW) analysis entitled Stoking the Fires: 
Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi, stated the organization had 
acquired classified, Chinese government documents that revealed a government-
sanctioned, ‘out-of-sight, out-of-mind’ policy that allowed for black market 
weapons sales to foreign governments. Thus, regardless of what Chinese 
officials might publicly state to assuage their critics, they have maintained an 
internal, policy of selling arms to embargoed countries such as Sudan.510 It is on 
record that China maintained this policy as far back as 1984, which demonstrates 
that its government has a history of state-sanctioned, illegal arms transfers. 
 Human Rights Watch has in its possession a set of internal (neibu) 
 regulations of the Chinese government which refer to the use of "secret 
 channels" in the transfer of embargoed goods. Point 6 of the regulations, 
                                            
509. According to an interview with U.S. Defense Officials in April 1997, in some cases, 
defense industrial enterprises “like other government-held agencies, have been rife with 
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in the illegal export of weapons and other military equipment and technology.” However, in the 
cases of the machete shipment to pre-genocide Rwanda and Norinco’s sale of arms and 
equipment to South Sudan in 2014, these do not seem to be ‘unofficial diversions,’ but rather 
intentional, contracted, and pre-arranged transfers. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Stoking 
the Fires, 125-126. 
 
510. As a side note, when Norinco entered into a contract with the GoSS in 2013, for the arms 
and equipment sale in 2014, South Sudan was not under an embargo, but given the prior debacle 
(genocide) in Rwanda, the sale and transfer still indicates deliberate indifference on the part of 
Norinco, and therefore the Chinese government. 
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 issued by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in 1984, [specifically] 
 states: ‘Concerning embargoed equipment and materials that are imported 
 via secret channels ... secrecy should be maintained.’"511 
 
 While the classified documents are more than thirty years old, they serve 
to establish a historic precedent and pattern of deliberate behavior. MSS 
documents subsequently obtained by HRW a decade later reveal a continuation 
of this policy.512 Chinese defense industrial enterprises have earned a repeat 
offender status in Africa. As the author has previously mentioned, while the 
PRC’s defense firms are certainly not the sole perpetrators of the arming of 
unstable regions, they have progressively assumed larger and more pivotal roles 
in this activity.513   
 Since the mid-1990’s, the Chinese government has issued a series of 
white papers which “outline China's arms control, arms exports and disarmament 
[policies]”514 
 [China’s white papers offer] a good standard against which to measure 
 China’s arms export policies …. The sales of arms of which Human Rights 
 Watch is aware - to both sides of the civil war in Rwanda, to Burundi 
 … Sudan [and South Sudan] - all have been sales to parties engaged in 
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 egregious abuses of human rights, including genocide in Rwanda. Even if 
 human rights is not one of the principles named in … [these] White 
 Paper[s], as … [they]should have been, it should be clear that [the 
 aforementioned] arms sales … are highly destabilizing and constitute a 
 severe threat even to the prospect of peace. It is important to add that 
 China has prided itself on its non-aligned credentials. [Yet China’s] non-
 alignment appears to have translated into selling arms to all sides rather 
 than contributing to a lessening of tensions in the most conflict-ridden 
 areas of Africa.515 
 
 “Human Rights Watch … found that Chinese … networks that ship 
weapons to Burundi via Uganda or Tanzania also … [used] the same routes to 
supply arms to the Rwandan government and to Sudanese rebels in Southern 
Sudan. Meanwhile, China has also helped to replenish the arsenal of the 
Sudanese government, which has been fighting insurgents in the south, and is 
reported to have delivered MiG fighter jets to the Mobutu regime in Zaire.”516 
 For many developing countries China is a desired patron because it sells 
 arms competitively, often marketing cheaper models of weapons at lower 
 prices517 Moreover, according to one expert on Chinese weapons export 
 policy, ‘With its comprehensive, dependable, and inexpensive line of 
 hardware, the PRC is well positioned to secure more contracts from  
 impoverished, isolated, and threatened clients . . . . Developing countries 
 and states with narrowly based economies will be more inclined to 
 purchase Chinese weaponry since the PRC, with its expanding resources, 
 will be able to arrange favorable offset and countertrade agreements.’518 
  
 White papers issued by the PRC since the 1997 document were never 
modified in order to sufficiently address CDIE conventional weapon sales to 
conflict zones or to governments with a history of human rights violations. The 
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wording within the documents is intentionally ambiguous. This lends further 
support to the argument that the PRC’s internal policy of secret transfers 
continues to this day, even as it assures watchdog groups, NGOs and the U.N. 
that it takes sufficient measures to regulate such transfers. According to a 
September 2005 publication entitled China's Endeavors for Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: 
 In handling affairs related to … arms control … the Chinese government 
 always bases its policy-making on the judgment [of] whether it serves to 
 safeguard national sovereignty and security, whether it serves to maintain 
 … stability and … promote security … China is committed to … 
 addressing humanitarian issues in … arms control …. [In addition] it holds 
 that while humanitarian concerns are addressed, full consideration should 
 be given to the legitimate military security needs of sovereign states …. 
 Firmly combating illegal activities in the field of …. [SALW proliferation] is 
 of great importance to maintaining regional peace [and] stability.519 
  
 The PRC is engaged in what could be referred to as a ‘thimble-rigging 
display,’ and attempts to detract attention away from questionable consignments 
bound for conflict zones by issuing white papers which reference its ‘concern’ for 
regulating conventional weapons proliferation, regional stability, and human 
rights. 
 In reality, Chinese weapons-manufacturing firms have a well-established 
pattern of supplying arms, vehicles, aircraft, and military equipment to any party, 
                                            
519. Government of the People’s Republic of China, China's Endeavors for Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, September 2005. http://bit.ly/2adW9J2. Accessed on April 9, 
2014. In 2010, the PRC issued another white paper entitled China's National Defense in 2010: 
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which has the money, blood diamonds, or other resources to make purchases. 
They have also shown a propensity to supply arms and military equipment to 
parties on both sides of a conflict until the death toll or number of IDPs garners 
international attention.520  
 According to an October 2008 Oxfam Briefing Paper entitled Shooting 
Down the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals), “irresponsible arms 
transfers”521 from countries such as China “[fuel] armed conflict and other forms 
of violence, which undermine states’ economies … [reduce] government funds 
available for development, through inappropriate or corrupt arms purchases … 
[marginalize and impoverish] communities when arms are misused to commit 
human rights abuses that violate economic, social, and cultural rights.”522 This 
statement epitomizes the effects of PRC’s arms trafficking from Juba to Harare. 
 To understand the complexity of Chinese arms sales and transfers to 
Africa, one also needs to examine the proxies of the state, whether ‘official’ or 
not. In the case of Anjin’s activities in Zimbabwe, and the PLA’s presence in the 
Marange Fields, whether Anjin is a CMIE or CDIE does not alter the negative 
impact its activities have had on regional stabilization and rural populations. 
Weapons do not have a ‘half life,’ and China engaged in a scorched earth 
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resource extraction operation that displaced tens of thousands of people, much 
as they did in South Sudan.  
Weapons shipments to Burundi from China, during the Burundian Civil 
War, to newly independent South Sudan, and to Sudan and authoritarian 
regimes like Zimbabwe, may also give substance to the perspective that the 
government of the People’s Republic of China is well aware that its arms and 
shipments are facilitating conflict. And in the case of pre-genocide Rwanda or 
Zimbabwe today, it could even open up the possibility that CDIEs perceive a 
higher death toll, or a wider regional conflict to be a mechanism by which even 
more weapons and military equipment could be sold. “Atrocities all over Africa 
have been perpetrated with Chinese weapons,” regardless of sanctions and 
embargos.523 Indeed, if a country has been sanctioned and its normal weapons-
purchasing channels eliminated, supply diminishes and the demand increases - 
meaning a higher profit margin for companies such as Poly Technologies or 
Norinco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
523. “The Chinese have sold arms to both Sudan and Zimbabwe … and [have] regularly 
flout[ed] international sanctions and embargos against these two countries.” Serge Michel and 
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Chapter 4 - Chinese Military Activities 
 Over the past five years, the activities and operations of the PLA and 
PLAN have expanded rapidly on the African continent. While China’s 
involvement in United Nations peacekeeping activities and its anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden have received the lion’s share of the attention, it 
has also become involved in demining activities (as well as providing instruction 
to African military personnel for demining operations), as well as providing on-
vessel medical care to African citizens. 
 While the demining operations and PLAN-provided medical care are 
certainly humanitarian activities, its ant-piracy operations, and peacekeeping 
participation may have more to do with protecting its industrial assets than 
assisting African host countries in endeavors related to increasing the level of 
regional security. The PLA has provided contingents to the United Nations 
through United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, with the provision that 
Chinese troops are first and foremost responsible for protecting Chinese assets 
and mineral extraction operations. The PLAN has actively participated in Anti-
Piracy Operations, however nearly half of the ships they have escorted and 
protected have been their own.  
Thus it is possible that, “China’s military presence in Africa …. has the 
potential to provide solid support to China’s African strategy, strengthening ties to 
the African Union while ensuring its access to strategically important minerals.”524 
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Of equal or even greater importance to the People’s Republic of China is its 
recent agreement with the government of Djibouti to install a military base, in 
very close proximity to The United States of America’s Camp Lemonnier, which 
sits on one of the world’s most economically vital chokepoints: the Bab-el-
Mandeb Strait. 
People’s Liberation Army 
 The People’s Liberation Army is comprised of three basic cadres 
dedicated to terrestrial, maritime and air operations. While the terrestrial- and 
maritime-oriented forces have played prominent roles in Africa, to date the 
Chinese air force (PLAAF) has had minimal activity on the continent, limited 
mostly to training African military personnel.525 Generally, the presence of the 
PLA in Africa is seen in a positive light, since China’s army and navy have made 
significant contributions to anti-piracy operations and peacekeeping activities on 
the continent.526  
 Academics such as Robert G. Sutter reflect that “The more narrow 
national interests of China [have been] served in … [African] deployments ….”527 
Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang of SIPRI “…. identified three reasons [also 
alluded to by Sutter] for China’s interest in peacekeeping.”528 
                                            
525. The role of the PLAAF will likely increase with the installation of China’s base in Djibouti.  
 
526. In most cases, this statement holds true. However, due to the diamonds-for-weapons 
deals between the PLA/Anjin and Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe, the majority of the 
Zimbabwean population does not view the PLA in a positive light. 
 
527. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 
2012, p. 130.  
 
528. Shinn, Chinese Involvement African Conflict, 8. 
 229 
 
First, making a positive contribution to peace and security helps 
China to project a more benign and “harmonious” image and to 
balance … Western influence.  
 
Second, the PLA wants to expand its non-combat missions such as 
peacekeeping, anti-piracy, disaster response and humanitarian 
relief.  
 
Third, the PLA and Chinese security forces can … obtain practical 
experience that may improve their … coordination of military 
emergency command systems and ability to conduct non-combat 
missions at home.529 
 
  The final chapter of the dissertation will examine peace-keeping 
operations, demining contributions, and China’s maritime presence vis-à-vis anti-
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. 
United Nations Peace Keeping Operations 
 One of China’s contributions to Africa has been the deployment of 
personnel to UNPKOs, which like most of China’s other activities on the 
continent, has led to vigorous debate. So far, the most notable deployment has 
been to oil-rich South Sudan. However, as will be subsequently discussed, 
China’s contributions to the UNPKO in the newly liberated country came with a 
price, and with new precedents.  
 China has engaged or supported UNPKO’s in Africa since the 1990s.  
beginning with peacekeeping operations in Somalia, and has subsequently 
supported or participated in the following UNPKOs: 
 MINURSO     United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
 MINUSMA     UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
                                            
529. Ibid. 
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 MONUSCO   United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the  
             Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
 UNAMID        United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur 
 UNMIL           United Nations Mission in Liberia 
 UNMISS        United Nations Mission in South Sudan 
 UNOCI          United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire530 
 Garth Shelton claims that China’s UNPKO participation is having a 
positive impact in Africa. He maintains “China is in a position to escalate UNPKO 
involvement in Africa and thereby make a decisive contribution to advancing 
stability on the continent.”531 
Ian Taylor’s mirrors Shelton’s perspective. He maintains China’s UNPKO-
participation has a beneficial impact on the regions in which the troops operate. 
“In recent years there has been a real sea of change in China’s attitude to peace 
operations and Beijing has emerged as a significant contributor …. This is a 
major development in China’s diplomacy and has positive implications for a 
continent such as Africa, which is often beset with conflict.”532 
 According to Ambassador Shinn, “By the end of February 2009, China had 
1,745 troops, police and observers assigned to six of the UN’s seven 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. The largest units were in Liberia, Southern 
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Sudan, Darfur and the DRC.”533 Shinn opines “Chinese peacekeeping, anti-
piracy activity and de-mining engage China in a positive way in current or former 
African conflict zones. These efforts are generally appreciated by African leaders 
and the international community.”534 
 In 2010, the Liberian president and U.N. deputy envoy echoed American 
scholars by maintaining the PRC had played an active role in helping to stabilize 
Liberia and assist with infrastructure creation. 
 Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf … commended Chinese 
 Peacekeepers in Liberia for their … contributions towards … the security 
 and peace of Liberia … [and] also to the postwar reconstruction and 
 development [of] … public facilities such as bridges, roads … and 
 providing free medical treatments to local communities. A few days later 
 …UN Deputy Envoy Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu decorated … Chinese 
 Peacekeepers with UN medals for their contributions to peace in Liberia 
 and … for contributing to the development of Liberia’s infrastructure.535 
  
 According to Marc Lanteigne of the NFG Research Group, in 2013, the 
nature of China’s UNPKO contributions underwent a substantial change, one that 
contradicted its prior claims of non-involvement. “The Mali mission marked the 
                                            
533. United Nations (2009). Shinn, Chinese Involvement African Conflict, 7. According to the 
United Nations, in June of 2016 China had 2,645 personnel in service in UNPKOs. That includes 
police, U.N. military experts, and troops. Given the additional number of non-African UNPKOs 
since Shinn’s 2009 analysis, the number of PRC UNPKO personnel has not changed significantly 
in Africa. United Nations, Troop and Police Contributions, June 30, 2016. http://bit.ly/2ajHVLr. 
Assessed on August 3, 2016.  
 
534. Shinn, Chinese Involvement African Conflict, 9. 
 
535. According to “[the] vice director of the Peace-Keeping Affairs Office of China’s Ministry of 
National Defense [as of 2008] Chinese peacekeepers worldwide have built or repaired more than 
200 bridges and 7,500 kilometers of roads, airports, and water supply infrastructures, and they 
have treated nearly 50,000 local patients. Moreover local populations benefit from many facilities 
[and rehabilitated] … infrastructure.” Cooke (2008). Kossi Ayenagbo, Tommie Njobvu, James V. 
Sossou and Biossey K. Tozoun, China’s Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: From unwilling 
Participation to Responsible Contribution, African Journal of Political Science and International 
Relations, Volume 6(2), February 2012, pp. 28-30. http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR. 
Accessed on August 3, 2016.  
 232 
 
first time in its history that China agreed to send combat forces to a UN mission, 
as previously Beijing preferred to restrict its contributions of personnel to civilian 
police, normally drawn from civilian units and the People’s Armed Police … and 
combat engineers as well as other support staff.”536 
 In some cases, it is apparent China is utilizing its UNPKO participation as 
a means to protect its resource operations, such as in South Sudan. However, 
Mali was an exception in that China did not have any significant resource 
interests in the country. Yet for the purposes of diplomacy and Sino-African 
guanxi, China’s assistance to Mali “can be viewed within the larger idea of 
China’s cross-regional diplomacy and positive identity-building with the whole of 
sub-Saharan Africa.”537 While the PRC did dispatch some combat troops, the 
majority of the Chinese UNPKO personnel would be dedicated to infrastructure 
repair and medical activities.538 
  Despite China’s contributions to Liberia and Mali via UNPKOs, other 
experts question China’s duplicitous approach. Pieter Wezemaan of SIPRI 
contends “questions can be raised … [when] China supplied weapons to [regions 
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such as] South Sudan, while at the same time tried to be a peace broker in the 
ongoing conflict” through the contribution of PLA soldiers to UNPKOs in that 
region.539 
 While Chinese participation in UNPKOs has facilitated regional 
stabilization in a few select countries, others to which PLA troops have been 
deployed are areas in which China has supplied arms and munitions, or areas in 
which Chinese SOEs have mounted resource extraction operations. Although 
China is working to reduce conflict, provide security, and increase stabilization 
through APOs and its UNPKO contingents, in most cases APOs and PLA 
personnel assigned to UNPKOs maintain a presence, first and foremost, to 
protect Chinese interests, facilities, personnel, resource founts, and mineral 
extraction and transport related infrastructure and routes. 
 With many Africans sceptical [sic] of China’s intentions and impact on their 
 continent, Beijing can’t simply send its own troops to protect its 
 investments and citizens when they’re in danger, as they currently are in 
 South Sudan. After 20 years of attempting to cultivate Africa as a sphere 
 of influence, China understands that a softer touch is needed - even in   
situations that might require the use of force …. So China is effectively 
 using the UN as cover for a military deployment that serves Beijing’s 
 specific interests.540  
  
The Wall Street Journal notes Chinese UNPKO’s have been cleared by 
the U.N to use force to protect their (China’s) facilities and personnel. “While 
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Beijing's troops … operate under U.N. command, their posting to South Sudan 
marks a sharp escalation of China's efforts to ensure the safety of its workers 
and assets in Africa and guarantee a steady flow of energy for domestic 
consumption …. Under its mandate, U.N. [Chinese] peacekeepers are allowed to 
use ‘all necessary means’ to protect imperiled civilians at oil installations. If 
attacked … the Chinese soldiers are ‘combat-ready and can fight back.”541 
Demining Operations 
 The PRC has rendered some assistance to African countries in the way of 
demining. China has donated demining equipment, trained military personnel 
from more than ten African countries in demining procedures and protocol, and 
has also dispatched PLA demining units to Africa on at least one occasion. 
Michael P. Moore, the author of Landmines in Africa blog maintains that while 
China’s demining activities still do not equal those of the U.S. in Africa, it has 
made substantial contributions in that arena.  
 According to the AidData Project …. from 2000 to 2011 … China 
 provided … US $2 million in demining equipment to Angola, Eritrea, 
 Ethiopia, and Mozambique. On its own and through the United Nations 
 Mine Action Service, China has provided demining training to over 100 
 deminers from Eritrea, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Chad, 
 Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and South Sudan. Not included in the 
 AidData figures were donations of mine detectors and equipment to Egypt 
 and a demining team from China that participated in the UN Peacekeeping 
 mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.542 
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 However, China’s demining assistance in Africa is not without its critics. 
China has refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty, which is also known as the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel mines and on their Destruction.543 “Many major powers 
continue to retain the right to use APLs [anti-personnel landmines], including 
China …. [And] Chinese landmines, in particular, have reportedly been deployed 
… [in] Africa.”544 While the author was unable to find any recent references to 
Chinese APL sales to African countries, one interviewee working for Rimfire 
International Ltd. noted that Chinese APLs were deployed in Angola and 
Mozambique, and a shipment of “Chinese landmines and cluster weapons …. 
destined for Sudan …. were discovered in Djibouti.”545 
 According to Matthew Bolton, author of Foreign Aid and Landmine 
Clearance, while China’s 2008 White Paper states that it has “continuously taken 
an active part in international humanitarian de-mining assistance …. Landmine 
Monitor … notes] China’s contribution to mine action in 2007 was only $789,000, 
miniscule in comparison with the US demining budget of $70 million or tiny 
Norway’s $50 million.”546 
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 In the case of demining assistance, China’s donations of demining 
equipment and training of African military personnel in demining procedures can 
be viewed as a boon to regional stability and development in Africa. However, it 
appears as though, this may be a public relations ploy. China still produces 
landmines and cluster munitions, its APLs have been sold to African  
governments and deployed on African soil, and finally the amount of assistance 
that they have offered is trivial compared to other countries such as the U.S. and 
Norway. 
People’s Liberation Army Navy 
 The biggest role the PLAN plays in Africa is its anti-piracy operations. 
Since December 26, 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has patrolled the 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, providing escorts to vessels transiting one of the 
world’s most important and dangerous SLOCs in a unilateral anti-piracy 
operation. This heralds a new era for the Chinese navy while simultaneously 
calling attention to its growing maritime force projection capabilities. 
Nevertheless, China’s activities in this region raise several questions: What lies 
behind this sudden flurry of maritime activity, thousands of miles from Beijing; do 
the operations contribute to regional stability; and what if any are the effects of its 
regional presence? 
 Subsequent to China launching its unilateral APOs in the Gulf of Aden, 
incidents of piracy in the region had decreased, as noted by naval strategists and 
the New York Times. In most respects, self-interest aside, in the maritime realm, 
China’s positive contributions have thus far tipped the scales in the favor of 
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benefitting African countries suffering from maritime security issues. “In mid-2012 
the New York Times reported that pirate attacks worldwide had “plummeted,” due 
largely to the efforts of many nations’ navies.547 According to the International 
Maritime Bureau, there were no pirate attacks off Somalia for the entire month of 
July 2012.548 The PLAN’s efforts to fight piracy since 2008 contributed 
significantly to this reduction and should be recognized for its positive 
contribution.”549 
 Dr. Alison Kaufman of the Center for Naval Analysis believes that APOs 
demonstrate China is beginning to shoulder some of its international security 
responsibilities, while simultaneously signaling that China’s maritime power 
projection capability is increasing. “Participating in anti-piracy missions, 
conversely, displays both the ability of the PLAN to carry out a mission far from 
home, and the willingness of China’s government to ‘active[ly] fulfill … its 
international obligations’ to help control piracy in the region.”550 
 According to the 2015 assessment by the Office of Naval Intelligence 
entitled, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, 
China has several reasons for maintaining a presence in the Gulf of Aden and 
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Indian Ocean. “The … [PLAN’s] sustained counter-piracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden demonstrate Beijing’s intention to protect important SLOCs. China’s 
participation serves several purposes: first, it is in line with the … [PLAN’s] 
mission requirements to protect the PRC’s strategic maritime interests; second, it 
provides the … [PLAN] with the opportunity to develop and refine the operational 
capabilities it needs for “far seas” operations; and third, it enhances China’s 
image as a responsible member of the global community.”551 
 It is obvious that China’s participation in APO’s provides a multitude of 
benefits to Beijing and the PLAN, but overall have the PRC’s contributions 
benefitted HOA countries in any manner or promoted regional security? While 
China has established a presence in the region out of self-interest, since it 
mounted APOs in the Gulf of Aden, the incidence of piracy has been 
substantially reduced. Protection of SLOCs benefits all vessels that traverse the 
maritime corridors and boosts the economic security of Indian Ocean coastal 
countries. Erickson and Strange maintain the PLAN’s participation in anti-piracy 
operations has played an integral part in stabilizing and securing a dangerous 
region. 
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 The PLAN has deployed nearly ten thousand personnel on thirty-seven 
 warships with twenty-eight helicopters in thirteen task forces.552 Over the 
 course of more than five hundred operations, these forces have protected 
 more than five thousand commercial vessels - Chinese and foreign in 
 nearly equal proportion, the latter flagged by more than fifty nations553 …. 
 [Chinese vessels] successfully met and escorted, rescued and salvaged 
 over 60 ships.”554 The conclusion of the US Naval War College research 
 indicates that “…. The PLAN’s escort of  ... supplies through the Gulf of 
 Aden… signals Chinese willingness to assume greater international 
 responsibility for … stability.”555  
  
 In another publication, US Naval War College academics stated that 
“Despite its status as an independent provider of SLOC security … the PLAN’s 
coordination with Western antipiracy forces suggests that China can contribute in 
parallel with, rather than threaten to destabilize, existing … governance 
mechanisms.”556   
Even though anti-piracy operations do not usually necessitate submarines, 
China has also used Gulf of Aden APOs as an opportunity to deploy submarines 
and submarine tenders to the region. This has allowed for submarine crews to 
acquire much-needed training, provided opportunities for electronic intelligence 
(ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, and generated some 
positive publicity on at least one occasion. “In an effort to combine submarine 
logistics with naval diplomacy, a submarine tender, Changxingdao, generated 
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fresh water to alleviate a shortage in the Maldives capital of Male in December 
2014, an expensive but politically visible way to provide such aid.”557 
As an aside, China’s maritime support has also been noteworthy in 
Seychelles and Nigeria. China’s assistance and vessel donations to both 
countries have assisted in securing their coastlines. As piracy tapered off in the 
Gulf of Aden, due in part to China’s APO participation, the incidence of similar 
activity began to increase in the Gulf of Guinea.  
While China also has resource interests in Nigeria, its vessel donations 
and willingness to engage in joint training exercises with the West African country 
have benefitted security and stabilization - especially in the oil-rich Delta-region. 
During a meeting between Chinese and Nigerian naval officers, “The leader of 
the [Chinese] Task Group … said … the task group and the Nigerian Navy will 
jointly train on counter piracy, to enable the two navies [to] share knowledge on 
how to combat piracy …. further strengthen cooperation [and] … promote 
regional peace and stability.”558  
Despite the fact that the PLAN does not participate in many multi-national 
operations and prefers to only engage in unilateral APOs, as time has 
progressed, it has assumed larger responsibilities, which augment regional 
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SLOC security. Erickson and Strange concluded “increasingly, the PLAN’s 
antipiracy mandate is oriented toward broader international security objectives 
…. Initially China’s navy was only allowed to escort Chinese-flagged ships 
through the Gulf of Aden, but now in some cases over 70 percent of ships in 
given Chinese escort flotillas have been foreign flagged.”559 
China’s naval presence in the region is not without its critics though. 
Ridzwan Rahmat of IHS Jane's Defence Weekly views the increase of PLAN 
activities in the Indian Ocean from another perspective. “As well as seeking to 
protect critical sea lines of communication … China may be seeking to expand its 
presence in the Indian Ocean to offset the political-military constraints it faces in 
the Pacific Ocean region given the increasing US focus on that region.”560 
Others, such as Matthew G. Minot-Scheuermann, author of Chinese Anti-
Piracy and the Global Maritime Commons, feel the PRC’s unwillingness to 
coordinate maritime operations with other naval powers in the region is 
detrimental to combatting Gulf of Aden piracy. “China’s naval presence and 
activities off the Horn of Africa are defined by three factors; independent 
command and control operation, unilateral action, and an unwillingness to 
meaningfully integrate into other anti-piracy coalitions operating in the area. This 
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… [stance] hinders what should be the overarching and shared goal of stability 
and the elimination of piracy in the area.”561 
Another potentially negative issue, which has not been addressed is the 
protection of Chinese boats illegally fishing in the territories of coastal African 
countries. The waters off the Horn of Africa teem with sharks, a popular delicacy 
in China. Illegal fishing is a “maritime crime … that affects potential growth in 
unstable states such as Somalia” in which the PLAN often patrols.562 Will the 
PLAN work to protect Somali resources from being plundered by fellow Chinese 
nationals? 
While China’s “antipiracy operations have helped stabilize waters off 
Somalia [and the HOA, they also help to] … secure some of China’s purported 
1.2 million workers and $500 billion in investments overseas.”563 Furthermore, 
Chinese vessels were frequently targeted by pirates. “A sharp increase in piracy 
attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with China’s foreign trade …. Over 
1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven 
months of 2008, and of this number eighty-three were attacked by pirate groups. 
Direct threats to China’s economic interests and citizens abroad were thus 
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important drivers of the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment.”564 Thus, China’s 
anti-piracy operations have some similarities to its South Sudanese peace-
keeping operations 
There may be other reasons for China’s presence in the region. In addition 
to allowing the PLAN to protect China’s resource supply in coastal East Africa, 
Gulf of Aden APOs could be a guise for a longer-term grand strategy, which 
entails an increase in power projection, and a synchronized ‘widening’ of the 
Maritime Silk Road, so to speak.  
China is presently enhancing the security environment in the Gulf of Aden, 
at a cost - some known and others still not revealed. The establishment of a 
Chinese military base in Djibouti may be the next stage of an as yet unrevealed 
PRC agenda. While it is not within the scope of this dissertation to do a predictive 
analysis, China’s regional presence in Djibouti has the capacity to either promote 
or diminish security and stability in the Horn of Africa. 
  Chapter 4 - Summary 
 China has many reasons to maintain and increase its military footprint in 
Africa. The two primary reasons are, first, to provide or augment protection of its 
resource founts and Chinese citizens working or supporting the work on them, 
and, second, to secure its trade routes. That footprint has had both positive and 
negative consequences. In both Liberia and Mali, for example, Chinese UNPKO 
personnel have assisted in rebuilding the countries respective infrastructures, 
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while providing medical treatment as part of a post-conflict protocol. In other 
cases, Chinese-sponsored demining programs have rendered once-dangerous 
areas habitable again. These are beneficial services, which benefit the host 
states and the region. There is no argument these activities definitively contribute 
to regional stability and development. 
 However, anti-piracy operations and demining are only two facets of 
China’s complex interactions with Africa. Matthew Bolton, author of Foreign Aid 
and Landmine Clearance notes with regard to PRC demining operations: “it is 
likely that China’s emergence as a mine action donor is linked to its growing role 
in the international arena, particularly in Africa, which has been driven by its need 
for oil and other natural resources …. This means that mine affected countries 
and mine action agencies should be cautious about celebrating too loudly 
China’s demining assistance in places like Sudan, where it has been particularly 
criticized for fueling the conflict in Darfur.”565 
 Similar concerns have been voiced about China’s anti-piracy operations. 
What are the real reasons for China’s presence in the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean, and can China have vested interests in the region and still 
facilitate regional stability?  
 Have Chinese’s [sic] efforts been positive? Have they helped reduce the 
 burden of piracy off the Horn of Africa? In superficial terms, [the] answer 
 is a resounding yes. Yet …. the end goal …. [is] it seems, is less driven by 
 some newfound altruistic approach to the security of the global maritime 
 commons and more driven by pure, unbridled national interest ….  
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 When considering Chinese anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa, one 
 cannot help but note that nearly all of China’s crude oil and petroleum 
 imports pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden and the 
 surrounding waters of the Arabian Sea ….   
 
 Given  this dependence, China has been committing a serious investment  
 of effort, power and influence to not only establishing itself as a power 
 player in the region, but also setting up the conditions for permanent 
 residency for its naval forces off the Horn of Africa …. in essence and in 
 practice a forward operating base for Chinese naval assets with the goal 
 of further cementing China’s presence in the region.566 
  
 Up until this point, China’s investments in the region have not, at least in a 
limited sense, precluded it from contributing to regional stability through APOs or 
United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, or using its diplomatic clout to 
prevent conflicts. However, Beijing may be using its APOs as a springboard for 
increasing its regional presence under the guise of protecting one of the world’s 
most important SLOCs. 
 Some scholars have noted “a strong correlation between where Chinese 
antipiracy warships have docked ashore and Chinese-funded port development 
projects in … Africa …. Chinese firms are reportedly engaged in maritime port 
construction in many countries the PLAN has called on during antipiracy 
operations. Such developments could intensify as part of Chinese President Xi 
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Jinping’s New Silk Road, or “One Belt, One Road” initiative.”567 The same 
scholars report, however, that there are those who view these operations and 
similar activities in the Seychelles as a low-key power projection.568 
 China’s desire to increase and maintain a naval presence in the region is 
corroborated by Shinn’s statement in a July 2016 issue of the China Brief: “While 
the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is essentially over, China continues to 
expand its naval and military presence” in the region.569 
 However, these varying positions must be considered with one caveat. 
The emphasis of my analysis is on ‘if’ rather than ‘why.’ The primary focus of this 
chapter is to determine ‘if’ China is facilitating stabilization in the region, or does 
its presence augment factors which contribute to, or facilitate conflict; not, ‘why’ 
does China maintain a military presence in certain locations in Africa. With regard 
to the first question, demining, UNPKO and APO participation do indeed 
contribute to stability, albeit in limited scope.  
 Without question, the most beneficial of China’s military contributions on 
the continent are its Gulf of Aden APOs. The PLAN’s anti-piracy operations 
provide security for thousands of miles of coastline, and for every country which 
utilizes the Gulf of Aden as a transit lane. Demining operations do assist local 
communities in facilitating post-conflict land mine removal, and its UNPKO 
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contributions, while relatively minimal compared to other countries, have helped 
to secure conflict zones and guarantee the safety of IDPs.  
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Conclusion 
 During this work, it was important to avoid digressing into a discussion of 
‘Why China is in Africa,’ because that is not the goal of this analysis. China 
obviously maintains ‘boots on the ground’ and ‘fins in the water’ in Africa due to 
the necessity of finding resources needed to maintain its economic growth. 
However, it was key to avoid the slippery slope of confounding the thesis 
statement with the motivations of Beijing. Simply because China is in Africa for 
reasons related to resources, resource infrastructure security, or SLOC security, 
does not necessarily prove China to be either a stabilizing or a destabilizing actor 
in the region.  
 The first citation of this dissertation included a referenece to John J. 
Mearsheimer, who stated: “the attendant question that will concern every maker 
of foreign policy and student of international politics ... can China rise 
peacefully?”570 At this juncture, it should be evident the impact of Chinese 
financing, enterprises, and industrial activities in Africa varies depending on 
location and project type.  
 Yet regardless of what proponents of China’s increasing presence on the 
continent maintain, there have been negative and often subtle ramifications for 
for the African people, their respective economies and the environment. These 
dynamics have generated a ‘geopolitical climate,’ which is conducive to 
destabilization and conflict, rather than stability.  
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 China’s economic stability is inherently dependent on an abundant and 
constant supply of natural resources. Given the present dynamics, the answer to 
Mearsheimer’s question is no. China’s rise will not be peaceful. Indeed, its 
accession to a global power will exact a cost from the regions in which it 
operates. The collateral effects of China’s expansionism and power projection in 
African countries will inevitably facilitate conflict and instability. 
 The fact the Chinese SOEs maintain a presence in Africa to secure 
resources or generate revenue does not imply that they cannot contribute to 
regional security, or conversely, that their activities will not exacerbate regional 
tensions or conflicts. It is essential to keep in mind that Chinese strategic thinking 
applies to commercial and industrial planning as well as to military operations.  
 The dynamics are very complex and thus it is not easy to render a 
summary conclusion. China’s operations are multi-layered, with guanxi dynamics 
and soft-power politics often taking precedence over contracts. Therefore, one 
must maintain a ‘tip-of-the-iceberg’ mentality in weighing and evaluating Sino-
African dynamics and negotiations. 
 There is a sliding scale with regard to causal link provability. 
Demonstrating that a resource extraction operation or transfer of conventional 
weapons to a country triggers or facilitates regional destabilization and conflict is 
a relatively straightforward and transparent process. South Sudan is a case in 
point. However, it is more difficult to demonstrate causal links between activities 
not discernible by analysts or the general public, such as those perpetuated in 
boardrooms, and conflict and destabilization.   
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 The negative impacts of Angola-mode packages, governmental 
corruption, and graft are ephemeral and difficult to identify. While graft and 
corruption are exacerbated through opaque financing mechanisms such as the 
Angola-mode, it is very hard to document specific issues of malfeasance, and 
thus difficult to determine to what extent such activities impact stability, and 
trigger or exacerbate conflicts. To a lesser extent, as revealed in Chapter 2, since 
weapons sales are secretive by nature, transactions of this type may also hinder 
the definitive establishment of causal links between nation-states, regional 
stability, and conflict.  
 The biggest exception(s) to this rule, in the case of this analysis, are 
Chinese-run extractive operations in Africa. It is possible to gather data, on the 
ground, in real time, regarding oil, mining and logging operations. Extractive 
operations often leave environmental scars, which take decades to heal, and the 
socio-economic impact on the populations in the areas of Chinese SOE activity 
may also be easily identified for analysis.  
 Without a doubt, the People’s Republic of China has done more 
infrastructure work in Africa than any other country at this point. It has also made 
inroads to usurping the World Bank as the financier of choice in some countries. 
China’s strategy of ‘non-involvement,’ its ‘no-strings-attached policies,’ and the 
ability of its state-backed lenders to forge complex arrangements with African 
heads of state at a much faster pace than its western counterparts have proven 
to be formidable tactics in China’s foreign policy.  
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 In many cases, the Angola-mode provides much-needed funding for 
undeveloped African states. It allows countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan and 
South Sudan the opportunity to use their resources as collateral for the creation 
of roads, railways, telecommunications systems and ports.571 The Angola-mode 
has provided countries such as Angola and Ethiopia with the mechanism to 
expand limited transportation systems within a relatively short period of time, to 
areas which, a few short years ago, were connected by barely navigable roads. 
In this respect, the People’s Republic of China has surpassed the endeavors of 
Western-backed projects.    
 However, the Angola-mode is a financing mechanism that, like the roads it 
helps to build, often leads into shadowy and obscure realms. In underdeveloped 
countries or states with poor governance, the benefits of the infrastructure can be 
negated by collateral effects not visible to the casual observer. Thus ‘no strings 
attached’ and ‘non-involvement’ may also be a bane to the general population of 
the countries which hastened to enter agreements with the PRC. 
 It should be evident from Chapter 1 that China has more control over 
infrastructure projects than the African host countries themselves. It is also 
apparent that China profits in other ways from the Angola-mode: The credit lines 
the PRC extends to African countries are utilized by those countries to purchase 
Chinese-manufactured goods (or arms and military equipment); the repayment 
schedules often include interest structuring which is favorable to the Chinese 
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financial institution (and may even become less than favorable, over time, to the 
borrower); and repayment is made to China through exploration rights and 
natural resource concessions which often take a toll on the environment. 
 However, as was mentioned throughout the paper, local critics and 
scholars such as Corkin have offered additional criticisms. Construction materials 
are often sourced from China, not Africa; the Chinese SOEs responsible for the 
projects have opted to use sub-standard material to maximize profit; and the 
Chinese companies have a history of using Chinese nationals for menial labor 
rather than Africans. Additionally, incidents of non-payment to African 
employees, injury and unfair labor practices come into play when Africans are 
hired to work on infrastructure projects. Furthermore, as was previously 
discussed, in countries such as Angola and Uganda, there have been instances 
where roads, housing and hospitals, have exhibited signs of rapid deterioration 
due to poor workmanship and low-quality construction material. 
 Another issue, which African locals must deal with, is the displacement of 
locally-manufactured goods. Many SOEs are run from the province-level in 
China, not directly from Beijing. As these provincially-run enterprises set up shop 
in Africa, they are often trailed by Chinese entrepreneurs and business people 
who cater to the Chinese communities working in Africa. In some cases, Chinese 
will identify locally produced goods, which are in demand in African markets, and 
then begin to import cheaper substitutes for them, undercutting the prices of the 
locals.  
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 This results in the collapse of small to medium African enterprises and 
deprives locals of employment and an income. Once the Chinese business 
people have displaced the local producers and marketers, they subsequently 
raise the price on the products, which are often of low quality. As a side note, if 
Chinese vendors are selling merchandise and staple foods in the local market, 
Chinese laborers working infrastructure projects will only purchase from other 
Chinese nationals, in effect creating a ‘closed loop’ system in which the beneficial 
economic spillover to the African community is negligible.  
 Despite all the initial, superficial benefits of Angola-mode financing, the 
opaque nature of these types of agreements is conducive to graft. Furthermore, 
many of the dealmakers for the Chinese SOEs use guanxi to push local, 
indigenous contractors out of the bidding processes, which usually are not 
transparent to begin with. Another issue is that the Chinese often bundle the 
construction equipment into the contracts, yet at the completion of the project(s) 
most of the machinery is in such poor condition, that it no longer has any value 
and cannot be used for future projects or infrastructure maintenance.  
 The short-term benefits of resource-for-infrastructure deals appear to be 
beneficial for the country and its population at the outset, yet in the end, since 
there is a plethora of issues endemic to such deals, very often China walks away 
the winner, with few socio-economic benefits trickling down to the general 
population. While infrastructure improvement does allow for more expedient 
access to and extraction of resources, who ultimately benefits? In most cases the 
beneficiaries are the respective governments rather than the general population.  
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 It has to be recognized that the loss of resources and immediate negative 
impact on the local population and economy have long-term, negative 
implications, which are not immediately evident. Moreover, even the 
governments of the host countries suffer since Chinese autonomy precludes 
African state-owned enterprises from gaining autonomy. China does not provide 
many opportunities for the participation of indigenous, African companies. Thus 
in reality, such deals inhibit the host nation’s socio-economic development. 
 With regard to regional stability and conflict, in some cases Angola-mode 
financing and infrastructure creation exacerbates pre-existing problems. In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan, roadways allow for a 
more rapid deployment of troops, militias, arms and munitions. It is true that 
roadways and railways to rural resource sites allow for more efficient industrial 
operations. This in turn provides for a more rapid influx of revenue for the 
governments of the host countries, however as addressed in Chapter 2, in many 
instances the recipients are totalitarian governments or militias.  
 In developed countries, or countries that have a history of good 
governance, financing, and resource for infrastructure deals would help to 
facilitate regional stability, and act as a mechanism for development. However, in 
states with a history of instability, or those under control of an authoritarian 
regime, either the status quo is maintained or the situation on the ground 
worsens. Thus, while Angola-mode financing and resource for infrastructure 
deals usually do not trigger regional destabilization or conflict, they may 
contribute to the status quo and thus exacerbate pre-existing conditions. 
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 Finally, as referenced in Chapter 3 (Sino-Ethiopian dam projects), Chinese 
financial institutions involved in subsidizing African infrastructure projects do not 
engage in feasibility studies as the World Bank does. Chinese-funded 
infrastructure projects do not take into account pre-existing tribal tensions in 
remote regions, property rights, the capacity for project-related IDPs, or 
environmental damage. In conclusion, while Angola-mode financing and 
infrastructure creation give the superficial appearance of benefitting the host 
country, the cost and collateral damage outweigh any benefits, especially in the 
long term.  
 The impact of mining, logging and petroleum extraction operations on 
stability and conflict are much easier to identify than the effect of financing 
mechanisms. The Chinese have built trails and tales of woe from landlocked 
mines and forests to the ports from which the resources are exported. In Sudan 
and South Sudan, hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced due to 
resource-related conflicts, poisoned water supplies, tribal disparities exacerbated 
by loss of habitable land, and an infusion of arms from the very country that is 
exploiting their resources, with no benefit to the general population. Chinese-run 
petroleum operations in Sudan and South Sudan rely in large part on Chinese 
workers, so very few opportunities are provided to the locals from such activities.  
 One might argue that in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Mozambique the locals are employed by the Chinese. But in most cases, at best, 
these operations represent a “one-step-forward, two-steps-back” opportunity for 
rural communities. The men often abandon their fields and herds for an 
 256 
 
opportunity to make more money and for a short period of time, they may, but at 
great cost.  
 Working conditions are terrible, and as with Chinese road construction 
crews, the safety standards are sub-par, if existent at all. Protective equipment is 
rarely used, and if it is available, it is often in poor condition. Most Chinese SOEs 
flout the local laws, do not provide medical insurance for the African workers, and 
refuse to pay their medical expenses if they are injured on the job. Child labor is 
prevalent and the children, like the adults, are subject to abusive site managers. 
Prostitution is rampant, sexually transmitted disease is common, and the family 
units in areas of Chinese-run extractive operations have suffered greatly.  
 Furthermore, rural mining operations are often run in collusion with local 
militias. Thus, in addition to taking a toll on the environment and living standards 
of rural communities, the revenues for ‘blood minerals’ are often used to 
subsidize rebel groups, which widen their range as they augment their stockpiles 
of weapons and munitions. Another issue that is not spoken about frequently is 
the devastating effect these rural operations have on fauna. The Chinese pay 
locals to procure bushmeat to complement their basic rations of rice and other 
staples. This especially holds true in logging operations in which every day crews 
will cut deeper into the bush. In addition to physically devastating the 
environment, Chinese road crews utilize locals to harvest endangered species 
from once-pristine and unadulterated woodland sanctuaries. 
 In the case of Mozambique, forests which provided the locals with shade, 
fruit, and game have now been ravaged by indiscriminant logging practices. The 
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Chinese SOE owners, working in conjunction with ministers, local politicians and 
port agents have ignored prohibitions against cutting down certain species of 
trees and have depleted Mozambique’s forests to the extent that it will take more 
than five decades for the ecosystem to recover. As referenced in Chapter 2, this 
in turn has an effect on precipitation levels, even in other parts of Africa. 
 As a result of this, the arability of certain areas of Mozambique - and other 
countries, has plummeted. Many villagers abandoned their subsistence farming 
operations, and now rely on illegal logging to generate an income. Mozambique 
is already suffering from some of the worst deforestation on the continent. When 
the trees are gone, the locals will no longer be able to rely on the Chinese 
logging companies for an income. Nor will they be able to return to their 
traditional, ecosystem-dependent, subsistence lifestyle, since their forests have 
been depleted to the point that they no longer have the capacity to sustain 
indigenous communities.  
The ability of local populations to feed their families or generate a revenue 
through traditional means has diminished as Chinese SOEs continue to export 
protected fauna. Subsistence agriculture, fishing, hunting and raising cattle have 
been harmed by the deforestation in areas that have had a history of tribal 
conflict. The PRC’s logging companies have left local communities with few 
means for survival even as their once-dense forests continue to dwindle as a 
result of China’s demand for its hardwood.  
 In the case of infrastructure creation, an argument can be made that the 
Chinese have assisted post-war African states in their rebuilding efforts by 
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providing them with much-needed infrastructure, railways, roads, and hospitals. 
But in places like the Blue Nile State in South Sudan, or the interior of 
Mozambique, there are no obvious counter-points which can be presented to 
diminish the argument that Chinese activities in those areas have had a 
devastating impact on the environment, and the populations which have 
depended upon them for centuries.  
 The people of South Sudan, the D.R.C., and Mozambique have been left 
with less than what they had before Chinese SOEs and NOCs arrived. However, 
these dynamics cannot be blamed entirely on the Chinese SOEs. Without the 
assistance of politicians in the host-countries, the Chinese would not have been 
able to move so far, so fast, to the extent they have. In addition to leaving behind 
poisoned rivers and erosion-prone land, which was once graced by sixty meter 
hardwoods, the Chinese in Mozambique and the D.R.C. have facilitated 
unprecedented amounts of graft. Additionally, in the case of Mozambique, the 
revenue generated from the sale of the timber to the Chinese would have 
contributed greatly to the development of the country. Instead, a handful of 
Mozambique’s elite benefitted.  
 In summary, the impact of Chinese-owned extractive operations in Africa 
has had devastating effects on entire regions and populations. The destruction of 
life-sustaining ecosystems in Mozambique, the migrations en masse of IDPs in 
South Sudan, and the arming of militias in the D.R.C., with revenue from blood 
minerals, has negatively impacted regional stabilization, has facilitated conflict, 
and will continue to do so for years to come.  
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 The third chapter addressed the opaque world of Chinese defense- and 
military-industrial enterprises. In some cases, causal links between Chinese 
made weapons, conflict, and regional destabilization are evident. Rwanda, 
Sudan, and South Sudan have all borne the brunt an infusion of Chinese 
weapons and military equipment brought in by Chinese defense industrial 
enterprises such as Norinco and Poly Technologies.572 Both these SOEs have a 
history of shipping weapons into conflict zones, or delivering arms consignments 
to countries under embargo.  
 The under-reported activity discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the PLA in 
Zimbabwe is a case in which causal links between Chinese military-industrial 
activity and negative regional impacts can be established. Zimbabwe is very 
interesting because the presence and activity of the PLA may be the first 
substantial proof that the PLA is once again engaging in military-industrial 
enterprises after Beijing’s 1998 mandate to the military to divest. Thus Anjin 
Construction’s operation in the Marange Fields is most likely a watershed 
indicator that the PLA is once again engaged in commercial activities. 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, ‘Zimbabwe-mode’ financing - or blood mineral 
extraction subsidization through arms transfers can be directly linked to graft, 
corruption, IDPs, human rights abuses, fatalities, environmental damage, and 
regional destabilization, in the immediate vicinity of the weapons/blood diamonds 
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transshipment point; the Chinese-built, Marange Field runway.573 In the cases of 
Sudan and South Sudan, while there is a high probability that oil revenues have 
helped fund arms purchases for both countries, the Marange Field diamonds-for-
arms transfers are the most clear-cut of such activities to date.  
 CDIEs such as Norinco or Poly Technologies often act as exploratory 
commercial proxies for Chinese NOCs or SOEs involved in other extractive 
industries. Zambia and Kenya have also accepted militarily related consignments 
for resources. Yet evidence of the negative regional impacts is not always 
discernible, nor can causal links be proven as in Zimbabwe, Sudan, or the Great 
Lakes Region.  
 Aptly named ‘smoking gun’ proof can be provided for the Burundian Civil 
War and Rwandan Genocide. While ethnic conflicts between the Hutus and 
Tutsis can be traced back for more than a century, China actively engaged in 
funneling weapons to the GLR in the early 1990s. The arming of the Hutus and 
Tutsis in Burundi augmented the potential for high-intensity regional conflict and 
destabilization, which subsequently spread to Rwanda and then spilled over into 
Zaire. 
 Another interesting point is that both Uganda and Sudan had weapons 
and munitions factories set up by the Chinese, with Chinese equipment. Both 
Uganda and Sudan have acted as regional producers and trans-shipment 
                                            
573. The Chinese also created infrastructure in the area such as housing, electric and water 
systems, in addition to the largest airfield in Zimbabwe. In this case, the Chinese-built 
infrastructure contributed to stabilization, albeit the stabilization of Mugabe’s totalitarian regime, 
which in turn led to IDPs, fatalities and environmental damage.    
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proxies for Chinese arms and munitions. Chinese arms funneled through Uganda 
were subsequently used in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Zaire). Locally produced Chinese arms and munitions, as well as arms 
shipped from the PRC to Khartoum have played a role in conflict, ethnic 
cleansing or internal displacement in Chad, Darfur, and South Sudan.  
 This substantiates the main claim of this dissertation, that while China’s 
presence in Africa is often not the source of regional conflict or destabilization, 
some of its activities have greatly exacerbated regional destabilization and pre-
existing conflicts. Thus, it can be concluded that there are three potential 
mechanisms through which externally-operating state-owned proxies such as 
SOEs, NOCs, CDIEs, or CMIEs can harm LDCs:  
 1. State-owned proxies can be the progenitors of conflict 
 2. State-owned proxies have the capacity to trigger conflict between  
    polarized groups 
 
 3. State-owned proxies can exacerbate the intensity of pre-existing  
    tension and conflicts. 
  
In most cases, China’s proxies in Africa fall into the second and third 
categories. In the case of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, an influx of weapons 
served to exacerbate pre-existing tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi. 
While it could possibly be argued that the shipment of machetes to Rwanda 
served as a ‘trigger’ for the genocide, the machetes were an enabling 
mechanism through which the conflict intensity was exacerbated. The same 
conclusion may be drawn regarding weapons procured through the Zimbabwe 
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Mode in the Marange Fields. Tensions and conflict between Mugabe’s regime 
and the population pre-dated PLA and CMIE presence in the country.  
 With regard to the Blue Nile State in South Sudan and the dam project in 
Southern Ethiopia, while there were pre-existing tensions, and in the case of 
Southern Ethiopia, smaller-scale skirmishes, Beijing’s front-companies in those 
regions could possibly be considered ‘conflict triggers,’ or conflict progenitors, in 
association with the governments of the respective host countries. However, it is 
not necessary to neatly pigeonhole or categorize their exact role in order to prove 
that in conflict-prone regions, SOEs, NOCs, CDIEs, and CMIEs augment conflict-
intensity, which in turn further destabilizes the regions in which they operate.574  
 The activities of Sinopec and CNPC, both national oil companies, in South 
Sudan and the Blue Nile State, may have also served as conflict ‘triggers’ rather 
than simply exacerbated pre-existing tensions. Additionally, as previously 
discussed, Norinco sent a huge quantity of weapons and millions of rounds of 
ammunition to the SPLA, which in turn aggravated the Dinka-Nuer civil conflict. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the destabilization in both Sudan and South 
Sudan is the result of regional dynamics aggravated by at least two different 
                                            
574. In the future, Southern Ethiopia may be one of the few instances where it can be proven 
that a Chinese financial institution directly contributed to conflict and destabilization through IDPs, 
environmental damage, loss of ethnically designated pastoral lands and fishing areas. As 
referenced in Chapter 2, in order to avoid pre-project environmental impact studies in the 
S.S.N.P.R., the Ethiopian government utilized a Chinese financing mechanism instead of the 
World bank in its quest to construct the Gibe III Dam. This project has the capacity to either 
create or trigger conflicts between S. Ethiopian ethnic groups, or between the governments of 
Kenya and Ethiopia, since the Gibe III project has the capacity to impede Lake Turkana’s water 
supply. 
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kinds of Chinese state-owned proxies: oil companies and defense industrial 
enterprises.575  
 There is evidence which demonstrates that Chinese UNPKO’s, demining 
operations, and the Gulf of Aden APOs have contributed to regional stability and 
functioned to prevent, or at least impede conflict. As stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, it is important to avoid confounding the thesis statement with the 
motivations of Beijing. It is obvious that China’s presence in the Gulf of Aden and 
South Sudan is first and foremost based on maintaining a secure resource 
pipeline. However, the goal of this analysis is not to explore ‘why’ China has 
deployed forces to those areas, but the effect of their presence in those regions. 
 Generally, the UNPKOs and especially the Gulf of Aden APO’s have 
benefitted their areas of operations. On a regional and international level, when 
compared to the PLA, the PLAN has had a greater impact than the troops 
deployed for UNPKO operations. In terms of commerce and security, the Gulf of 
Aden anti-piracy operations benefit the entire international community, not just 
African states. So, the PLAN’s activities in the Gulf contribute to both regional 
security, and larger-scale geopolitical stability. The de-mining operations also 
provide for the growth of smaller-scale, community-based development and 
agricultural projects. This too facilitates stability through potential economic 
                                            
575. CNPC, Sinopec, and Norinco, respectively. In limited cases, such as China’s contribution 
of military equipment and OPVs to the navies of Seychelles and Nigeria, there has been a 
positive impact on stability, since the augmentation of SLOC security is both regionally and 
geopolitically beneficial. 
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development and increases the amount of land, which can be used for 
agricultural and pastoral purposes.  
The UNPKOs in South Sudan may help in alleviating some of the local 
tensions, however their primary focus, given Beijing’s prerequisites for their 
deployment to South Sudan, was initially stated to be for providing security to 
China’s petroleum operations.576 However, according to “Abigaël Vasselier ... the 
Asia and China program coordinator at the European Council on Foreign 
Relations,” despite Beijing’s prerequisite that Chinese troops participating in 
South Sudanese UNPKOs be located near PRC-owned NOCs, “the 700 combat 
troops in UNMISS ....  were assigned to protect the UN House and the Protection 
of Civilians Camp 1 ... in Juba.”577 
 So, in summary, do Chinese SOEs, NOCs, CDIEs, CMIEs and the PLA 
contribute to regional stability, or do these state proxies trigger or exacerbate 
regional conflicts? This is not a question that can be answered easily. According 
to Michael P. Moore: 
 [While] there is a lot of hand-wringing in the international community about 
 the Chinese involvement in Africa …. [since] China’s investments often 
 appear to be very self-serving, especially the oil and mineral extraction 
 activities …. China has also learned the important lesson of soft power 
 and has made investments that, unlike the oil wells, roads and gifts to 
 leaders, don’t have an immediate return.  
                                            
576. In July 2016, during fighting in Juba, the Chinese UNPKO personnel abandoned their 
posts instead of protecting civilians and aid workers. Two Chinese UNPKO soldiers perished in 
the conflict. The only other major PLA activity on the continent to date (previously addressed) is 
the PLAs activity in Zimbabwe. While recent news reports indicate the PLA is going to enhance 
the PRC’s power projection in Africa through a new base in Djibouti, as of yet there have not 
been any notable effects on stabilization in the region, either positive or negative.  
 
577. Abigaël Vasselier, Chinese Foreign Policy in South Sudan: View From the Ground. China 
Brief, Volume XVI, Issue 13, August 22, 2016, p. 18. http://bit.ly/2c4VryZ. Accessed on 
September 4, 2016. 
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 China has paid for the building of  many hospitals in Africa, sent its doctors 
 to treat malaria patients across the continent and offered Chinese 
 language instruction to Africans …. the Chinese have also built or re-
 furbished a spectacular number of football stadiums and not just those 
 used for international tournaments, along with opera houses and other 
 cultural venues.578 
 
 These undertakings do contribute to development and are therefore 
conducive to stability (or at least neutral). However, Chinese arms and munitions, 
blood diamond revenue, and resource extraction-related environmental damage 
have served to destabilize entire populations, and exacerbated regional conflicts, 
or conversely - stabilized oppressive and corrupt governments. 
 One of the issues that the People’s Republic of China has is that different 
state entities maintain different and often competitive agendas. For example, 
Norinco exported millions of dollars of arms and munitions to the SPLA in South 
Sudan in the latter part of 2014. As discussed in Chapter 3, CNPC has a sizable 
interest in South Sudan’s petroleum resources, and the PLA has dispatched 
troops to the region as part of UNPKOs - which the PRC initially maintained 
would be utilized as a mechanism to protect its NOCs and the Chinese nationals 
working in those installations. In July 2016: 
 Two Chinese peacekeepers were killed and several others injured by a 
 mortar shell earlier this month during fighting between followers of 
 President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, the former rebel leader who  
 became vice president under a deal to end the civil war …. China's 
 foreign minister Wang Yi [made a statement that] …. peace is a 
 prerequisite for development, and he hoped both sides in South Sudan  
 can put the public interest first, and protect the safety of lives and 
 property, including Chinese lives and property …. China[‘s] … energy 
 strategy … including major infrastructure investment … has been   
                                            
578. Moore, Landmines in Africa.  
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 bedeviled by  civil conflict …. [As a result of the conflict] China National 
 Petroleum Company … evacuated the bulk of its workers from South 
 Sudan but [maintained] its  operations were unaffected.579 
 
 Vasselier posits that in an effort to “strengthen relations” with South 
Sudan’s government, Beijing directed Norinco to supply the GoSS with arms and 
munitions .... [yet] at the same time ... Beijing invited a delegation of rebels to 
China to meet Chinese officials ... [in an effort to build] trust.”580 But at what cost 
to the Chinese government, and other SOEs operating in the region, such as the 
China National Oil Company? “China needs peace to proceed with oil 
production,”581 yet Norinco’s arms sales contributed to ethnic violence in South 
Sudan, which in turn disrupted CNOC’s operations, production and export.582   
“There are also rumors in Juba that China is still arming both parties. 
Several sources confirmed than an alleged arms deal with the rebels could be 
linked to the protection of oilfields controlled by the rebels. This shows that 
‘China engages with the two parties on their own terms’ which turns [out] to be 
quite harmful for the peace agreement.” 583 Once again this illuminates the 
complexity of Sino-African dynamics, especially when several (Chinese) state 
actors are attempting to work in conjunction with competing African states and 
ethnic groups simultaneously.  
                                            
579. Pete Sweeney, China asks South Sudan to Punish Those Responsible for Chinese 
Peacekeeper Deaths, Reuters. July 30, 2016. http://bit.ly/2at4m22. Accessed on August 1, 2016. 
 
580. Vasselier, Chinese Foreign Policy, 17.  
 
581. Ibid, 18. 
 
582. Lynch, China's Arms Exports. 
 
583. Vasselier, Chinese Foreign Policy, 17. 
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 As of August 2016, “diplomatically [in South Sudan] there are ... 
indications that Chinese forces and companies in the country are not entirely 
welcome .... by the beginning of 2016, even before the most recent outbreak of 
violence, concerns about China’s presence had already resulted in a downturn in 
relations.”584 
As previously mentioned, in countries that lack good governance, external 
investment may serve to hinder development. While South Sudan has made 
efforts to create regulatory mechanisms by which NOCs and other foreign-owned 
SOEs can be more effectively monitored, Chinese NOCs, Huawei, and ZTE have 
actively circumvented the efforts of the GoSS.585  
The Asia Directorate at the South Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MoFA) confirms that Beijing needs to help South Sudan in the security, 
mining and agricultural sectors. However [MoFA] argues that Juba first 
needs to strengthen the institutions before further opening up South 
Sudan’s natural resources to Chinese development.  
 
With these priorities in mind, the South Sudanese central government has 
set up mechanisms to limit China’s development of the country’s 
resources. With their profits at stake in the aftermath of independence, 
Beijing turned the federal structure of South Sudan into an advantage: 
Chinese companies [subsequently] bypassed the central government and 
took their requests directly to county administrations [effectively bypassing 
all centrally mandated regulatory mechanisms].586 
 
                                            
584. Vasselier, Chinese Foreign Policy, 15. As referenced in Chapter 2: “[Minister]  David 
Deng Athorbei accused the Chinese government of stealing South Sudanese oil and resources 
without doing anything for the suffering South Sudanese people.” Nyamilepedia, China-South 
Sudan Bilateral. 
 
585. See footnote 137. In 2012 Huawei and ZTE bypassed official GoSS channels and 
approached private telephone companies for contracts.  
 
586.  Vasselier, Chinese Foreign Policy, 16. 
 268 
 
 The disruption of CNOC operations epitomizes the activities of China’s 
state-owned proxies and military in Africa. Until this point, most of the benefits 
derived from Chinese APOs and UNPKOs appeared to be self-serving and 
reactionary. While there may be a limited positive effect on regional stability, the 
negative effect(s) created by rather reckless extraction operations at the same 
time CDIEs are funneling weapons into these regions, has devastating regional 
effects. 
Pumping conventional weapons into conflict-prone countries while vast 
swathes of its ecosystems are destroyed, or its people displaced, lays the 
groundwork for future conflicts. In actuality, the HRW-analysis in Chapter 2 
entitled Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi, 
lends itself to the evaluation of the actions of CDIEs such as Poly Technologies 
and Norinco. While inter-ethnic conflicts often date back centuries, CDIEs ‘stoke’ 
regional fires by providing warring groups with even more tools of war and 
oppression.  
When Chinese defense industrial enterprises supply weapons, munitions, 
and military equipment to countries such as Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, 
they function as ‘conflict metastasization mechanisms.' In essence, CDIEs 
facilitate the spread of conflict. They act as mechanisms or vehicles by which the 
intensity, scope, and duration of conflicts inevitably increases. This is in turn 
results in more casualties, larger numbers of internally displaced persons, and 
wide spread humanitarian crises which can engulf entire regions. 
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 These dynamics open the door for further debate. Is there an overall logic 
to China’s presence in Africa, a uniformity of interest, a grand strategy; or do the 
various goals of different Chinese commercial, industrial and military entities, 
whether nationally or provincially controlled, collectively stimulate or facilitate 
conflict, especially in areas that have historically seen inter-ethnic tensions and 
violence? 
 It is my belief that while Beijing and provincial governments may aspire to 
a grand strategy which combines commercial, industrial and military endeavors, 
in reality, the goals of national oil companies, mining and logging companies, 
construction companies, defense industrial enterprises, and military industrial 
enterprises are often at loggerheads, resulting in a general inability, up until this 
point, to implement a grand strategy, if that was ever Beijing’s goal. China’s 
presence in Africa will benefit China - and some African nations, in the short 
term. In the long term however, the environmental and socio-economic 
consequences for the African people may be dire. 
 In conclusion, the biggest determinant of Chinese military, defense, and 
industrial presence on conflict and stabilization in Africa is the pre-entry state of 
governance, stability, and ethnic divisions within the countries in which they are 
operating. If a region is already experiencing conflict, or the ruling regime is 
authoritarian and has a history of human rights abuses, the effects of Chinese 
presence in those regions only serve to contribute to or exacerbate 
destabilization and conflict.  
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Appendix 1 - Cobalt Coltan Tantalum Tungsten 
Cobalt is used for a variety of purposes including the production of high-strength 
alloys, as a coloring agent for different materials, and as a radioactive tracer for 
isotopic labeling.587  
 
Coltan (the term for columbite-tantalite), from which tantalum is extracted, is 
utilized in many electronic devices, mobile phones, and for the production of 
temperature-resistant alloys.588 
 
Tantalum is a corrosion resistant, refractory metal, which can be utilized as a 
platinum substitute in electronics, and is an important component of tantalum 
capacitors, which are found in many types of electronic devices and equipment.  
 
“Its high capacitance property allows the storage and instantaneous release of 
electric charge with minor power loss. Tantalum is also in demand by the 
defense, aviation and medical technology industries for its resistance to extreme 
heat and chemical corrosion, hardness and ductility.”589  
 
Tungsten is a high-density chemical element known for its high melting point. It 
is used in the production of X-ray tubes, super alloys, radiation shielding, and for 
military applications such as penetrating projectiles.590  
 
 
 
 
                                            
587. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Strategic Minerals. 
 
588. Ibid. 
 
589. Ma, China and Congo’s Coltan, 1. 
 
590.  Burmúdez-Lugo, Conflict Minerals, 1. 
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Appendix 2 - Mineral and Timber Distribution Map - DRC 
Map 5 - Selected mineral resources of the DRC591 
591. Rekacewicz (2003). Adapted by Katunga, Minerals Forests Violent Conflict, 15.
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Appendix 3 - Defense-Industrial versus Military-Industrial Enterprises 
 According to James Mulvenon in a 1997 RAND analysis of Chinese 
corporations working in the defense field, “There are significant … differences 
among military [-industrial and] defense-industrial … companies …. [While] 
purely military [or military-industrial] companies do in some cases subsidize the 
PLA …. Defense-industrial companies do not directly subsidize the PLA, 
although the military receives indirect benefit from profits used to modernize 
China’s defense-industrial base.”592 Mulvenon also emphasizes that: 
 Analytically, the military and defense-industrial institutional hierarchies 
 should be categorized as two distinct systems containing elements of both 
 cooperation and competition. The military side contains those institutions 
 which can be considered ‘purely military’ …. including the three General 
 Departments (Staff,  Political, Logistical) … and the active-duty and 
 reserve forces of the Army, Navy, [and] Air Force ….  
 
 Each of these organs, within carefully defined parameters, has authority 
 over a variety of economic enterprises. These enterprises, known as 
 jundui qiye or “military enterprises," are formally affiliated with the PLA and 
 engage in increasingly diversified and civilian-oriented commerce, both in 
 China and abroad.  
 
 On the other side is the defense-industrial system, which is made up of 
 civilian industrial ministries related to ordnance, aviation, space, 
 shipbuilding, nuclear weapons, and electronics production.  
 
 Each of these ministries has its own affiliated corporation, which 
 concentrates on selling civilian and military-related output to both domestic 
 and international markets. These corporations, whose constituent 
 elements are known as jungong … are officially civilian in nature and 
 operate within a chain of command that proceeds vertically from the 
 enterprises through the ministerial leadership to the government's State 
 Council, headed by the Premier.593 
                                            
592. Mulvenon, Chinese Military Commerce, xv.  
 
593. Ibid, 5-6. Emphasis added. 
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 While Mulvenon made the following statement about SOE operation(s) in 
the United States, the same conclusion may be drawn from SOE activities in 
Africa: “Non-military affiliated companies make up a make up the majority of the 
Chinese companies operating in the United States. Most of these enterprises are 
subsidiaries of the trading corporations of China's large ministries and state-
owned enterprises …. While some of these organizations might have significant 
dealings with the PLA or the defense-industrial complex, they are [quite] distinct 
from [each other] ….”594 
 Another aspect which has the propensity to confound the understanding of 
Chinese military, industrial, and defense activities in Africa is the occasional 
hybridization of resource-extraction enterprises (such as mining or petroleum 
acquisition projects) with either military- or defense-industrial entities through the 
creation of subsidiary companies which engage in activities far removed from the 
primary focus of their parent entities.595 
 In the case of China, the companies which are defense-industrial, or which 
made the transition from military (or military-industrial) to defense-industrial are 
all SOEs, with chains of command that run through the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, which in turn operates under the authority of the State 
Council. Military-owned companies and defense-industrial entities alike were 
                                            
594. Ibid, 10.  
 
595. For example, both Zhenhua Oil Company Limited 
(http://zhenhuaoil.com/English/1136.html) and Wanbao Mining Company Limited 
(http://www.norinco.com/GB/61/91/93/index.html) are owned by NORINCO, which is a defense-
industrial corporation (CDIE). 
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historically controlled by the Commission on Science Technology and Industry for 
National Defense (COSTIND) until 1998.596 
 As of 1998, defense industrial “…. firms … [were] contracted by the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to produce military items. China’s defense 
industrial firms are completely different entities from the PLA-owned companies 
and factories (known as jundui qiye or military enterprises) …. [It should be noted 
that] … China defense industrial firms have diversified away from exclusive 
military production ….”597 and began to provide goods and services to the civilian 
sector, as well as becoming involved in resource acquisition projects.598 
 While COSTIND was originally “a joint military-civilian body responsible 
both for running China’s defense industries and for overseeing the procurement 
of equipment by China’s military,”599 it was subsequently placed under civilian 
authority, while weapon system research, development and procurement done 
                                            
596. Defense-industrial firms are also referred to as civilian-military enterprises. While they are 
a component of the ‘military-industrial’ complex, they are not specifically ‘military-industrial’ 
companies per se, as they neither are controlled by nor, work under the direction of any PLA 
branch. Previously COSTIND was managed through a branch of the PLA before its command 
chain was moved to the civilian authority of the State Council. Until 1998, “trading companies 
operated by Chinese military officers, such as Poly Technologies, actively participated in China’s 
arms trade.” Medeiros and Gill, Chinese Arms Exports, xii. 
 
597. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2004). Evan S. Medeiros, 
Analyzing China’s Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese  
Military Modernization, RAND Corporation, February 2004, p. 3. http://bit.ly/2ae1Po0. Accessed 
on April 18, 2015.  
 
598. Since the PLA was involved in arms production and sales until it was ordered to divest 
from commercial activities in 1998, some analysts do not take the time to discern between 
defense industrial enterprises and commercial endeavors by the PLA, which were classified as 
military-industrial enterprises rather than as ‘defense’ industrial enterprises. Parent companies of 
CDIEs, such as Poly Group diversified into conglomerates which are now involved in a wide 
range of commercial ventures, including but not limited to, resource extraction operations.  
 
599. Roger Cliff, The Rand Corporation, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission Testimony, p. 2, March 16, 2006. http://bit.ly/2ae1Po0. Accessed on April 18, 2015.  
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on behalf of the PLA were placed under the power of a newly formed military 
oversight organization referred to as the General Armaments Department 
(GAD).600  
 In 2008, COSTIND was replaced by a civilian regulatory organization 
referred to as the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for 
National Defense (SASTIND). “Their primary responsibilities include drafting 
guidelines, policies, laws and regulations related to science, technology and 
industry for national defense,”601 and they presently operate under the authority 
of the MIIT. SASTIND is also responsible for overseeing the exports of weapon 
systems and other military- and defense-related items.602 Figure 6 on page 276 
outlines the export controls for both CDIEs and CMIEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
600. “The GAD is responsible for the entire lifecycle of weapons and equipment from before 
they enter the force until they are retired from service. The GAD runs a network of research and  
development institutes and weapons test centers …. Along with the service headquarters, the 
GAD assigns Military Representatives to the defense industries to perform liaison and quality  
control.” Dennis J. Blasko, Chinese Military Logistics: The GAD System - Part II, The China Brief, 
The Jamestown Foundation, Volume: 4, Issue: 20, October 14, 2004, p. 1. http://bit.ly/2eRpBfl.  
Accessed on April 25, 2015. 
 
601. Ministry of Industry and Information Technology - Department of Civilian-Military 
Integration Promotion, Nuclear Threat Initiative Facility Report. July 13, 2012. 
http://jmjhs.miit.gov.cn. Accessed on April 25, 2015.  
 
602. In addition to SASTIND Chinese arms exports may in some cases fall under the scrutiny 
of General Administration of Customs (GAC) which maintains a supervisory role in weapon 
systems exports. Both MIIT and GAC are regulated by the State Council. 
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Figure 6 - Defense Industrial and Military Industrial Export Controls603 
 
 It is important to note, for nearly a decade, analysts have focused 
predominantly on Chinese Defense Industrial Operations rather than on military 
enterprises. In 2009, Mulvenon and co-author Tyroler-Cooper prepared an 
analysis for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, entitled 
China’s Defense Industry on the Path of Reform.  
 While they addressed the slowly strengthening defense-industrial sector in 
China, they did not reference Chinese military-industrial operations once. More 
recent research from other academics also fails to examine military-industrial 
enterprises, nor even appear to discern between CDIEs and CMIEs, indicating 
there is presently an information deficit regarding PLA-run industrial enterprises 
and operations.  
 
                                            
603. Original chart modified to reflect relevant participatory agencies for SALW, Conventional 
Weapons and Military Equipment Exports. China Arms Control & Disarmament Association 
(CACDA). Adopted from The Chinese Nonproliferation Policy and Export Control Practice 
Publication, p. 14, August 28, 2013. http://csis.org/files/attachments/130828_LiHong.pdf. 
Accessed on April 25, 2015. 
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Appendix 4 - Chinese state-owned enterprises (CDIEs) authorized to export 
Weapons, Munitions, Military Equipment and Vehicles. 
 
1. China Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC) 
2. China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) 
3. China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) 
4. China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation (CSTC) 
5. China Precision Machines Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) 
6. Poly Technologies Inc. (a subsidiary of Poly Group) 
 
7. China Xinxing Import and Export Corporation 
8. China Jing’an Import and Export Corporation 
9. China Electro-Sci-Tec International Trading Corporation (CETC International) 
10. China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corporation (CSOC) 
11. Aerospace Long March International Trade Corporation (ALIT)604 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
604. Chinese Export Control Official Interview (April 2012) and Poly Group website profile 
(2016). Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel, and Paul Holtom, China’s Export of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, SIPRI Policy Paper 38, October 2013, p. 28. http://bit.ly/2ayAY8F. Accessed on 
April 8, 2014. 
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Appendix 5 - Norinco Group and Subsidiary Member Products and 
Activities 
 
Military, Security and Police equipment (MSP), this includes, inter alia, following: 
• Armoured vehicles: Main Battle tanks (Type 62; ZTZ99; MBT2000; MBT3000);  
  WZ551 (ZSL-92) series 6X6 wheeled armoured vehicles ; ZBL-09 (VN1) 8 × 8  
  wheeled armoured vehicles; WMZ551; VN3; VN4; GSL131 mine clearing  
  vehicle; ZBD-04 (WZ502) infantry fighting vehicle; 
 
• Long-range suppression/artillery: howitzers (Type 83 152mm self-propelled;  
  PLZ05 155mm self-propelled); artillery (PTL02 100 mm self-propelled; 105mm  
  self-propelled; PTL-05 120 mm self-propelled mortars); 122mm multiple rocket  
  launcher systems;  
 
• Air defense and anti-missile: PGZ95 self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery; 25mm  
  AA; 35mm AA 
 
• Precision strike weapons: HJ-09 antitank missile systems; Red Arrow 8; 
• Effective damage: extended range full bore ammunitions 
• Anti-riot/law enforcement: tear gas; ZFB-05 4x4 wheeled armoured anti-riot  
  vehicle; WZ901 armoured vehicle 
 
• Resource extraction 
• Construction 
• Chemical engineering 
• Heavy-duty Equipment: GJT-210 and GJT 211 armoured bulldozer; 
• Logistics 
• Import & Export 
• Opto-electronic Information Technology605 
 
 
                                            
605.  Omega Research Foundation and the International Peace Information Service, Working 
Paper on China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGC), October 2014, p. 8. 
http://bit.ly/2aHxEXe. Accessed on January 28, 2015. 
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Appendix 6 - Norinco-SPLA Arms Delivery Communications 
December 27, 2013 - Engineering Equipment Delivery606 
                                            
606 While the validity of this letter has not been verified, it was taken from a Facebook page 
belonging to Gatluke Chuol Reat, President of the Nuer Community of North America, and was 
posted in conjunction with the communiqué from the SPLA to NORINCO (Appendix 6B), 
published by the The Sentry (Enough Project) in Fall 2016. http://bit.ly/2hKjLvL. 
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Appendix 6B - Communiqué from SPLA to NORINCO
December 2013 Acknowledgement Letter from SPLA to NORINCO607 
                                            
607. Originally accessed through The Sentry (Enough Project), War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay, 45. 
A high-definition, color version of the document was accessed through a secondary source 
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Appendix 7 - The ‘Zimbabwe-mode’ Contract 
 
Anjin Executives meet President Mugabe608 
 
 From left to right: Unknown Anhui/Anjin Executive; Anhui Chairman Jiang 
Qingde; President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe; the Zimbabwean Minister of 
Defence, Emmerson Mnangagwa; and a senior colonel of the People’s Liberation 
Army. Note the four stars on his green epaulette near the right border of the  
 
 
                                            
(without scribbling and damage) and was substituted for the black-and-white document included 
in the Enough Project publication.  
 
608. Global Witness, Diamonds: A Good Deal for Zimbabwe? February 2012, p. 9. 
http://bit.ly/2aqtCF1. Accessed on August 6, 2016. 
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image.609 According to documents obtained by Global Witness, “The Chinese 
executive directors of Anjin are Mr. Jian Qingde, Mr. Jiang Diaru, Mr. Tian 
Shiyue, Mr. Jian Zhaoyao, and Mr. Li Renfu, and nonexecutive board members 
are Mr.Zhang Shibin and Ms. Lu Qingxia.”610 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
609. As referenced in Chapter 3, Anhui is the parent company of Anjin. 
 
610. Global Witness, Diamonds: A Good Deal, p. 6. 
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Appendix 8 - Chinese Arms Shipments to GLR - 1994 to 1996 
 In the period August 1-10, 1994, the ship MV Ruvo off-loaded a weapons 
 consignment from China in Dar es Salaam, with the final destination listed 
 as both Rwanda and Burundi.216 Ugandan soldiers took delivery of the 
 cargo in Dar es Salaam, and transported the weapons to Uganda by rail. 
 At the time, Rwanda was under an international arms embargo, and this 
 particular shipment would therefore have constituted a violation of that 
 embargo. 
 
 On September 27, 1994, the ship Ruaha delivered ammunition to the port 
 of Dar es Salaam, with the final destination filled in as Uganda. The 
 consignment also contained coded information which, according to 
 persons involved with the shipment, listed Burundi as an additional 
 destination. 
 
 On November 25, 1994, the ship Shunyi delivered a cargo of ammunition 
 to the port of Dar es Salaam, with the destination listed as Burundi.218 
 The cargo was transported by Uganda Railways to Tabora, for possible 
 onward shipment to Uganda (and Burundi) via Mwanza on Lake Victoria, 
 or to Burundi via Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika. 
 
 On February 24, 1995, the ship Ruaha delivered ammunition to the port of 
 Dar es Salaam, with the final destination filled in as Uganda. The 
 consignment also contained coded information which, according to 
 persons involved with the shipment, listed Burundi as an additional 
 destination. 
 
 On March 19, 1995, the ship Pingu delivered two separate consignments 
 of military equipment, one a set of seventy boxes and the other a set of 
 fifty-five boxes, as well as five aircraft engines, to Dar es Salaam, with 
 both Rwanda and Burundi listed as the final destinations. At least some of 
 the cargo was transported from Dar es Salaam to Tabora by Uganda 
 Railways for apparent onward shipment to Uganda. At the time, Rwanda 
 was under an international arms embargo, and this particular shipment 
 would therefore have constituted a violation of that embargo. 
 
 On April 4, 1995, the ship Shunyi arrived in Dar es Salaam with 3,643 
 cases labeled “ammunition” for onward delivery to Burundi. The 
 Tanzanian authorities’ action to stop the off-loading of the shipment 
 received intense press coverage and triggered a flurry of diplomatic 
 activity. 
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 On May 11, 1995, the ship Ruvu arrived in Dar es Salaam with two 
 separate consignments, one of 12,514 cases and one of 368 cases, each 
 labeled “ammunition,” with the final destination filled in as Uganda. Both 
 of these consignments also contained coded information which, according 
 to persons involved with the shipment, listed Burundi as an additional 
 destination. The Ruvu carried at least some of the goods that had 
 originally been on the Shunyi, delivery of which had been blocked a month 
 earlier (see above). Some of the weapons cargo from the Ruvu was 
 transported from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika by 
 Tanzania Railways Corporation, for apparent onward shipment to Burundi, 
 not Uganda. 
 
 On July 2, 1995, the ship Ruaha delivered ammunition to the port of Dar 
 es Salaam, with the final destination filled in as Uganda. The consignment 
 also contained coded information which, according to persons involved 
 with the shipment, listed Burundi as an additional destination. 
  
 On October 16, 1995, the ship Shunyi arrived in the port of Dar es Salaam 
 and, according to some records and sources, delivered a cargo of arms 
 that included tanks and Chinese-manufactured dual-use vehicles for 
 Burundi. Other records and sources indicated that the cargo contained just 
 three cases of ammunition, also intended for Burundi. At least some of the 
 cargo was transported to Mwanza on Lake Victoria by Uganda Railways. 
 
 On November 24, 1995, the ship Ruaha delivered 205 cases listed as 
 containing “ammunition” to the port of Dar es Salaam. The final destination 
 was not clear from available documentation, but shipping sources stated it 
 was Burundi. The consigner was listed as China North Industries 
 Corporation (Norinco) … Beijing. Some of the cargo was then ferried to 
 Kigoma by Tanzania Railway Corporation for apparent onward shipment 
 to Burundi, or possibly Zaire. 
 
 On February 12, 1996, the ship Shunyi unloaded three cases at the port of 
 Dar es Salaam, the contents of which were not specified in the documents 
 but, according to the shipping agent, the cargo contained weapons. 
 Burundi was listed as the destination, and the consigner was listed as 
 China Wau Bao Engineering Corporation in Shanghai.611 
 
 
 
                                            
611. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Stoking the Fires, 134-137. 
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Appendix 9 - Zimbabwe Arms Shipment Documentation 
 
Arrival Notification for Ministry of Defense - Zimbabwe612 
 
 
                                            
612. Noseweek (2008). Wikileaks, Zimbabwe Chinese Weapons Shipment Documentation, 
April 24, 2008. http://bit.ly/2aGu1Pr. Accessed on July 25, 2016.  
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Poly Technologies Commercial Invoice613 
                                            
613. Ibid. Bold red font inserted by dissertation author. 
 287 
 
 
Poly Technologies Arms Shipment Packing List614 
 
                                            
614. Ibid.   
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COSCO Bill of Lading - Zimbabwe Arms Shipment615 
                                            
615. Ibid.  
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